added claim in Texas

2015In sum, the Allen charge given in this case “gave the jury false notions of the validity and force of majority opinion; it tended to limit full and free discussion in the jury room; it prejudiced the right of an accused to a hung jury and a mistrial by tending to stifle the dissenting voices of minority jurors.” Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. Fla. 1962).

2015In sum, the Allen charge given in this case “gave the jury false notions of the validity and force of majority opinion; it tended to limit full and free discussion in the jury room; it prejudiced the right of an accused to a hung jury and a mistrial by tending 14 to stifle the dissenting voices of minority jurors.” Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. Fla. 1962).

2003See Chessher, 658 S.W.2d at 564 .

2003See Chessher , 658 S.W.2d at 564 .

2017“This added instruction is given to clear up any confusion where the jury has no reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense, but is uncertain about the grade or degree of that offense.” Id.

2011Id.

2021See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009) (upholding suppression of cocaine found in car’s back seat in part because “Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended 15 authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. . . . [W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” (qu

2021The same default rule obtains when an arrestee was in a vehicle shortly before the arrest, with the added exception that officers may search the vehicle for evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.6 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (“[T]he Chimel rationale 6 That added exception does not assist the State here because the crime of Serna’s arrest was “credit/debit card abuse” and thus, in the absence of any evidence tying a handgun to Serna’s alleged credit- or debit-card abuse or to officer safety, not a crime that could reasonably be related to a handgun.

2021See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009) (upholding suppression of cocaine found in car’s back seat in part because “Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended 15 authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. . . . [W]e also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” (qu

2019This court previously held “[t]he use of a vehicle now elevates evading arrest to a third-degree felony, without the added requirement of proof of a prior conviction.” Franco v. State, No. 04-13-0096-CR, 2015 WL 3616057 , at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 10, 2015) (mem. op., not designated for publication); accord Adetomiwa, 421 S.W.3d at 927 .

2014Tex. Ass’n of Business v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.1993); see also Lapiner v. Maimon, 429 S.W.3d 816, 825-26 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (Frost, C.J., concurring) (noting former shareholder’s lack of standing could be raised for first time on appeal); Somers ex rel.

2014Ritter v. Las Colonitas Condominium Ass’n, 319 S.W.3d 884, 891 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); Wilson v. Davis, 305 S.W.3d 57, 73 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2014Tex. Ass’n of Business v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.1993); see also Lapiner v. Maimon, 429 S.W.3d 816, 825-26 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (Frost, C.J., concurring) (noting former shareholder’s lack of standing could be raised for first time on appeal); Somers ex rel.

2014Ritter v. Las Colonitas Condominium Ass’n, 319 S.W.3d 884, 891 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.); Wilson v. Davis, 305 S.W.3d 57, 73 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

1995See Hodari, D., 499 U.S., at 626-628 , 111 S.Ct., at 1551 .

1995See Hodari, D., 499 U.S., at 626-628 , 111 S.Ct., at 1551 .

1993See, e.g., Compton v. Calabria , 811 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no writ); Terk v. Deaton , 555 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Civ.

1993See, e.g., Compton v. Calabria , 811 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no writ); Terk v. Deaton , 555 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Civ.

1989Denby v. State, 654 S.W.2d 457, 464 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1983) (op. on reh’g).

1988See Richardson, 239 S.W. at 224 .

1987Texas Health Facilities Commission v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Tex.1984); Public Utility Commission v. Texland Electric Co., 701 S.W.2d 261, 269 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1987Texas Health Facilities Commission v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Tex.1984); Public Utility Commission v. Texland Electric Co., 701 S.W.2d 261, 269 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1981In Russell v. Edgewood Independent School District, 406 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the Court, relying on Campbell said that the cloak of immunity protected not only trustees, saying that “trustees and agents of a school district, while acting in such official capacity, enjoy the same governmental immunity as does the school district.” The actual holding was that the immunity extended to a school superintendent, although the Court added that such immunity disappeared in cases “which involve individual and separate torts, such as assault, trespass, fraud

1981In Russell v. Edgewood Independent School District, 406 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the Court, relying on Campbell said that the cloak of immunity protected not only trustees, saying that “trustees and agents of a school district, while acting in such official capacity, enjoy the same governmental immunity as does the school district.” The actual holding was that the immunity extended to a school superintendent, although the Court added that such immunity disappeared in cases “which involve individual and separate torts, such as assault, trespass, fraud

1979There can be more than one producing cause, but there can only be one sole producing cause.” In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex.Sup.1977), the Court noted the definition that the trial court in that case used, and that definition of producing cause is substantially the same definition as above with the added requirement in Hopkins that “but for the said cause the occurrence or injuries would not have occurred.” Compare Jones v. Traders & General Ins.

1979Co., 140 Tex. 599 , 169 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.Comm’n App.1943, opinion adopted).