8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
California v. LaRuegreen2 sentences1995In California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972), for example, the Court said: "Given the added presumption in favor of the validity of the state regulation in this area that the Twenty-first Amendment requires, we cannot hold that the regulations on their face violate the Federal Constitution." The Twenty-first Amendment, ratified in 1933, repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and rendered the National Prohibition Act inoperative. 1995In California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972), for example, the Court said: "Given the added presumption in favor of the validity of the state regulation in this area that the Twenty-first Amendment requires, we cannot hold that the regulations on their face violate the Federal Constitution." The Twenty-first Amendment, ratified in 1933, repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and rendered the National Prohibition Act inoperative. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wagner v. Springaire Corp.
green
2 sentences1979If the court has concluded the motion was timely filed, then Wagner v. Springaire Corp., 50 Wis.2d 212, 220 , 184 N.W.2d 88 (1971) sets forth the two essential elements to be considered in deciding a motion to vacate a judgment. 1979If the court has concluded the motion was timely filed, then Wagner v. Springaire Corp., 50 Wis.2d 212, 220 , 184 N.W.2d 88 (1971) sets forth the two essential elements to be considered in deciding a motion to vacate a judgment. | 2 | 1979–1979 |
Milton v. Washburn County
green
2 sentences2018Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶11 , 280 Wis. 2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 889 ; Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶16 , 300 Wis. 2d 498 , 730 N.W.2d 428 ; Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 WI App 48, ¶9 , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , 797 N.W.2d 924 . ¶84 The court of appeals in Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351-52 , however, altered this longstanding definition of "occupies" to mean "has actual possession of the property," with the added requirement that one must achieve a "degree of permanence" on the property. 2018Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶11 , 280 Wis. 2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 889 ; Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶16 , 300 Wis. 2d 498 , 730 N.W.2d 428 ; Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 WI App 48, ¶9 , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , 797 N.W.2d 924 . ¶84 The court of appeals in Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351-52 , however, altered this longstanding definition of "occupies" to mean "has actual possession of the property," with the added requirement that one must achieve a "degree of permanence" on the property. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Doane v. Helenville Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2018Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶11 , 280 Wis. 2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 889 ; Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶16 , 300 Wis. 2d 498 , 730 N.W.2d 428 ; Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 WI App 48, ¶9 , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , 797 N.W.2d 924 . ¶84 The court of appeals in Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351-52 , however, altered this longstanding definition of "occupies" to mean "has actual possession of the property," with the added requirement that one must achieve a "degree of permanence" on the property. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶11 , 280 Wis. 2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 889 ; Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶16 , 300 Wis. 2d 498 , 730 N.W.2d 428 ; Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 WI App 48, ¶9 , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , 797 N.W.2d 924 . ¶84 The court of appeals in Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351-52 , however, altered this longstanding definition of "occupies" to mean "has actual possession of the property," with the added requirement that one must achieve a "degree of permanence" on the property. 2018Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶11 , 280 Wis. 2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 889 ; Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶16 , 300 Wis. 2d 498 , 730 N.W.2d 428 ; Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 WI App 48, ¶9 , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , 797 N.W.2d 924 . ¶84 The court of appeals in Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351-52 , however, altered this longstanding definition of "occupies" to mean "has actual possession of the property," with the added requirement that one must achieve a "degree of permanence" on the property. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Leu v. PRICE COUNTY SNOWMOBILE TRAILS ASS'N, INC.
green
2 sentences2018Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶11 , 280 Wis. 2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 889 ; Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶16 , 300 Wis. 2d 498 , 730 N.W.2d 428 ; Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 WI App 48, ¶9 , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , 797 N.W.2d 924 . ¶84 The court of appeals in Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351-52 , however, altered this longstanding definition of "occupies" to mean "has actual possession of the property," with the added requirement that one must achieve a "degree of permanence" on the property. 2018Snowmobile Trails Ass'n, Inc., 2005 WI App 81, ¶11 , 280 Wis. 2d 765 , 695 N.W.2d 889 ; Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, Inc., 2007 WI App 43, ¶16 , 300 Wis. 2d 498 , 730 N.W.2d 428 ; Milton v. Washburn Cty., 2011 WI App 48, ¶9 , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , 797 N.W.2d 924 . ¶84 The court of appeals in Doane, 216 Wis. 2d at 351-52 , however, altered this longstanding definition of "occupies" to mean "has actual possession of the property," with the added requirement that one must achieve a "degree of permanence" on the property. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lane v. SHARP PACKAGING SYSTEMS, INC.
green
1 sentence2013Lane, 251 Wis. 2d 68, ¶ 21 . ¶ 121. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Gould
green
2 sentences1981“The plain language of the statute should not be extended or construed to achieve absurd or unreasonable consequences” (cites omitted); Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis.2d 116, 124 , 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977), “A court will always reject an unreasonable construction of a statute where a reasonable construction appears, and this is so notwithstanding that the statute is to be strictly construed.” (cites omitted) ; State v. Gould, 56 Wis.2d 808, 812 , 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973), “Absurd results or interpretations [of statutes] are to be avoided.” (Cites omitted.) Thus, we hold that sec. 194.0 1981“The plain language of the statute should not be extended or construed to achieve absurd or unreasonable consequences” (cites omitted); Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis.2d 116, 124 , 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977), “A court will always reject an unreasonable construction of a statute where a reasonable construction appears, and this is so notwithstanding that the statute is to be strictly construed.” (cites omitted) ; State v. Gould, 56 Wis.2d 808, 812 , 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973), “Absurd results or interpretations [of statutes] are to be avoided.” (Cites omitted.) Thus, we hold that sec. 194.0 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Falkner v. Northern States Power Co.
green
2 sentences1981“The plain language of the statute should not be extended or construed to achieve absurd or unreasonable consequences” (cites omitted); Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis.2d 116, 124 , 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977), “A court will always reject an unreasonable construction of a statute where a reasonable construction appears, and this is so notwithstanding that the statute is to be strictly construed.” (cites omitted) ; State v. Gould, 56 Wis.2d 808, 812 , 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973), “Absurd results or interpretations [of statutes] are to be avoided.” (Cites omitted.) Thus, we hold that sec. 194.0 1981“The plain language of the statute should not be extended or construed to achieve absurd or unreasonable consequences” (cites omitted); Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis.2d 116, 124 , 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977), “A court will always reject an unreasonable construction of a statute where a reasonable construction appears, and this is so notwithstanding that the statute is to be strictly construed.” (cites omitted) ; State v. Gould, 56 Wis.2d 808, 812 , 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973), “Absurd results or interpretations [of statutes] are to be avoided.” (Cites omitted.) Thus, we hold that sec. 194.0 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Franklin
neutral
2 sentences1974(Citing: State v. Franklin (1971), 49 Wis. 2d 484, 487 , 182 N. W. 2d 289 .) So the attorney general concludes that the added clause’s reference to “minimum prescribed” must be to a minimum apart from a statutory enactment. 1974(Citing: State v. Franklin (1971), 49 Wis. 2d 484, 487 , 182 N. W. 2d 289 .) So the attorney general concludes that the added clause’s reference to “minimum prescribed” must be to a minimum apart from a statutory enactment. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences1969When the affidavit is based upon the hearsay of an informant, the statement as to reliability of the informant must include as well the affiant’s ‘reason in support of this conclusion.’ The additional significance we glean from Spinelli is that the magistrate must assure himself that the affidavit is not merely based upon ‘casual rumor circulating in the underworld or *197 an accusation based merely on an individual’s general reputation.’” McCreary v. Sigler (8th Cir. 1969), 406 Fed. 2d 1264, 1268, analyzing Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108 , 84 Sup. Ct. 1509, 12 L. 1969When the affidavit is based upon the hearsay of an informant, the statement as to reliability of the informant must include as well the affiant’s ‘reason in support of this conclusion.’ The additional significance we glean from Spinelli is that the magistrate must assure himself that the affidavit is not merely based upon ‘casual rumor circulating in the underworld or *197 an accusation based merely on an individual’s general reputation.’” McCreary v. Sigler (8th Cir. 1969), 406 Fed. 2d 1264, 1268, analyzing Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108 , 84 Sup. Ct. 1509, 12 L. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.