stated general rule in Louisiana

1974Gaiennie v. Cooperative Produce Co., 196 La. 417 , 199 So. 377 (1940); Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company, 229 La. 798 , 86 So.2d 909 (1956); and the progeny of those cases.

1974Gaiennie v. Cooperative Produce Co., 196 La. 417 , 199 So. 377 (1940); Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company, 229 La. 798 , 86 So.2d 909 (1956); and the progeny of those cases.

1967In denying the defendant's application for writs, our Supreme Court stated: "There appears no error of law in the judgment complained of." ( 165 So.2d 479 ) In Thibodeaux v. Jack's Cookie Corporation, supra, the driver of the moving vehicle "was partially blinded by the lights of a vehicle approaching" immediately before he collided with a stalled car.

1967He also cites the case Thibodeaux v. Jack’s Cookie Corporation, La.App., 169 So.2d 918 , 3rd Cir. 1964, writ refused, 247 La. 365 , 171 So.2d 479 , 1965, and quotes from that case as follows: “In our opinion, there were no unusual or extraordinary circumstances present in the instant suit sufficient to cause this case to fall under the exception to the above stated general rule.

1974Gaiennie v. Cooperative Produce Co., 196 La. 417 , 199 So. 377 (1940); Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company, 229 La. 798 , 86 So.2d 909 (1956); and the progeny of those cases.

1974Gaiennie v. Cooperative Produce Co., 196 La. 417 , 199 So. 377 (1940); Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company, 229 La. 798 , 86 So.2d 909 (1956); and the progeny of those cases.

1971City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26 , 101 So. 798 (1924) was a suit to enjoin the violation of a zoning ordinance.

1971City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 157 La. 26 , 101 So. 798 (1924) was a suit to enjoin the violation of a zoning ordinance.

1967In Guillory v. Evangeline Parish Democratic Executive Committee, 220 La. 888 , 57 So.2d 758 (1952), the Supreme Court said: “ * * * We do not think there is any material difference between the degree of proof required by the statute and that required by the general rule recognized before its enactment.

1967In Guillory v. Evangeline Parish Democratic Executive Committee, 220 La. 888 , 57 So.2d 758 (1952), the Supreme Court said: “ * * * We do not think there is any material difference between the degree of proof required by the statute and that required by the general rule recognized before its enactment.

1967In denying the defendant's application for writs, our Supreme Court stated: "There appears no error of law in the judgment complained of." ( 165 So.2d 479 ) In Thibodeaux v. Jack's Cookie Corporation, supra, the driver of the moving vehicle "was partially blinded by the lights of a vehicle approaching" immediately before he collided with a stalled car.

1967He also cites the case Thibodeaux v. Jack’s Cookie Corporation, La.App., 169 So.2d 918 , 3rd Cir. 1964, writ refused, 247 La. 365 , 171 So.2d 479 , 1965, and quotes from that case as follows: “In our opinion, there were no unusual or extraordinary circumstances present in the instant suit sufficient to cause this case to fall under the exception to the above stated general rule.

1964We agree with the following statement of law found in the annotation in 48 A.L.R.2d 165 , Section 31: "The fact that the direct cause of the patron's injury was boisterous conduct by other patrons or other third persons has been held not to insulate the proprietor from liability, where it was his duty, under the circumstances, to protect the patron against injury from such an agency." In the case of Rome v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Company of America, *927 169 So. 132 (Orleans Appeal 1936) a 12 year old boy drowned in a municipal swimming pool from some unknown cause.

1963In Hamiter v. Duncan, 78 So.2d 80 (La.App. 2 Cir., 1955) defendant parked his car on an incline and, at some time during the day, the car rolled down hill into plaintiff's vehicle.

1963Spanko v. Spitalnick (1925) 101 N.J.L. 5 , 127 A 663." Several Louisiana cases follow the above stated general rule.

1962I agree with the trial judge that the cases of Mclancon v. Texas Company, 230 La. 593 , 89 So.2d 135 , its companion case, Bollinger v. Texas Company, 232 La. 637 , 95 So.2d 132 , and Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (2nd Cir.App., writs of certiorari denied) recognized the above stated general rule of law but concluded, under the peculiar facts in each case, that there was an active breach.

1962I agree with the trial judge that the cases of Mclancon v. Texas Company, 230 La. 593 , 89 So.2d 135 , its companion case, Bollinger v. Texas Company, 232 La. 637 , 95 So.2d 132 , and Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (2nd Cir.App., writs of certiorari denied) recognized the above stated general rule of law but concluded, under the peculiar facts in each case, that there was an active breach.

1962I agree with the trial judge that the cases of Mclancon v. Texas Company, 230 La. 593 , 89 So.2d 135 , its companion case, Bollinger v. Texas Company, 232 La. 637 , 95 So.2d 132 , and Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (2nd Cir.App., writs of certiorari denied) recognized the above stated general rule of law but concluded, under the peculiar facts in each case, that there was an active breach.

1962I agree with the trial judge that the cases of Mclancon v. Texas Company, 230 La. 593 , 89 So.2d 135 , its companion case, Bollinger v. Texas Company, 232 La. 637 , 95 So.2d 132 , and Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (2nd Cir.App., writs of certiorari denied) recognized the above stated general rule of law but concluded, under the peculiar facts in each case, that there was an active breach.

1962I agree with the trial judge that the cases of Mclancon v. Texas Company, 230 La. 593 , 89 So.2d 135 , its companion case, Bollinger v. Texas Company, 232 La. 637 , 95 So.2d 132 , and Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (2nd Cir.App., writs of certiorari denied) recognized the above stated general rule of law but concluded, under the peculiar facts in each case, that there was an active breach.

1960It follows that, in the absence of a statute or ordinance expressly imposing liability, an abutting owner or occupant is generally not liable for injuries to a traveler through failure to maintain a sidewalk in repair, if he did not cause the necessity therefor, or from defects or obstructions therein which he did not create." As stated in our opinion in the Brantley case, supra, citing with approval Johnson v. Sewerage and Water Board, La.App., 57 So.2d 923 and Arata v. Orleans Capitol Stores, 219 La. 1045 , 55 So.2d 239 , the jurisprudence of this state follows the above stated general rule.

1960It follows that, in the absence of a statute or ordinance expressly imposing liability, an abutting owner or occupant is generally not liable for injuries to a traveler through failure to maintain a sidewalk in repair, if he did not cause the necessity therefor, or from defects or obstructions therein which he did not create." As stated in our opinion in the Brantley case, supra, citing with approval Johnson v. Sewerage and Water Board, La.App., 57 So.2d 923 and Arata v. Orleans Capitol Stores, 219 La. 1045 , 55 So.2d 239 , the jurisprudence of this state follows the above stated general rule.

1960It follows that, in the absence of a statute or ordinance expressly imposing liability, an abutting owner or occupant is generally not liable for injuries to a traveler through failure to maintain a sidewalk in repair, if he did not cause the necessity therefor, or from defects or obstructions therein which he did not create." As stated in our opinion in the Brantley case, supra, citing with approval Johnson v. Sewerage and Water Board, La.App., 57 So.2d 923 and Arata v. Orleans Capitol Stores, 219 La. 1045 , 55 So.2d 239 , the jurisprudence of this state follows the above stated general rule.

1951NOTES [1] Compare State v. Cascio (on rehearing), La.Sup., 54 So.2d 95 , where it is held that the defendant cannot complain of the improper remarks when they are provoked by, and made in answer to, comments of his counsel provided that they are not of such a nature as to infringe upon defendant's constitutional rights. [2] In State v. Young, 114 La. 686 , 38 So. 517, 518 (although it does not appear whether or not the defendant took the stand), the court adopted a conclusion apparently contrary to the above stated general rule as it is held that it was not objectionable to refer to the accuse