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12 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 2017–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2026"A Batson-Soares objection to a proposed peremptory challenge . . . triggers a three-step process." Henderson, 486 3 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491 , 511 (2020). 9 Mass. at 311. 2024Although the exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively proper, see Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008), where there is a question of whether a "challenge is based impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group, . . . . [a] three- step burden shifting analysis [Batson-Soares test] is applied to determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is proper." Kozubal, supra. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-491 , cert. denied, 44 | 6 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Robertsongreen2 sentences2024See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 395 (2018) ("where a juror's membership in a protected class is reasonably in dispute, trial judges, in performing the first step of the Batson-Soares analysis, ought to presume that the juror is a member of the protected class at issue"). 2024See Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 395 (2018) ("where a juror's membership in a protected class is reasonably in dispute, trial judges, in performing the first step of the Batson-Soares analysis, ought to presume that the juror is a member of the protected class at issue"). | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2024Although "the possibility of an objective, group-neutral explanation for the strike," Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 322 (2017), is more properly applicable at the second and third stages of the Batson-Soares framework, "a readily apparent, group-neutral reason that already has been raised by the striking party in a for-cause challenge . . . might cut against an inference of discriminatory intent." Sanchez, supra at 513 n.17. 2024Although "the possibility of an objective, group-neutral explanation for the strike," Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 322 (2017), is more properly applicable at the second and third stages of the Batson-Soares framework, "a readily apparent, group-neutral reason that already has been raised by the striking party in a for-cause challenge . . . might cut against an inference of discriminatory intent." Sanchez, supra at 513 n.17. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Soaresgreen2 sentences2026"A Batson-Soares objection to a proposed peremptory challenge . . . triggers a three-step process." Henderson, 486 3 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491 , 511 (2020). 9 Mass. at 311. 2024Although the exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively proper, see Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008), where there is a question of whether a "challenge is based impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group, . . . . [a] three- step burden shifting analysis [Batson-Soares test] is applied to determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is proper." Kozubal, supra. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-491 , cert. denied, 44 | 1 | 6 |
Johnson v. Californiagreen1 sentence2026In the first step, "the challenger 'must make out a prima facie case' that [the challenge] was impermissibly based on race or other protected status 'by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.'" Commonwealth v. Jackson, 486 Mass. 763 , 768 (2021), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Arriagagreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 562 (2003) ("a requirement that each jury include members of every group in the community is impracticable"); Commonwealth v. Mora, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 575, 579 (2012) ("there is no right to the particular impartial jurors [who] the [defendant] speculates may be most favorably disposed to his defense" [quotation omitted]). 10The defendant made a Batson-Soares objection to the peremptory challenge of juror no. 34, referencing his earlier challenge to juror no. 74 as the basis. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Benoitgreen1 sentence2024Although the exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively proper, see Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008), where there is a question of whether a "challenge is based impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group, . . . . [a] three- step burden shifting analysis [Batson-Soares test] is applied to determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is proper." Kozubal, supra. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-491 , cert. denied, 44 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Moragreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 562 (2003) ("a requirement that each jury include members of every group in the community is impracticable"); Commonwealth v. Mora, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 575, 579 (2012) ("there is no right to the particular impartial jurors [who] the [defendant] speculates may be most favorably disposed to his defense" [quotation omitted]). 10The defendant made a Batson-Soares objection to the peremptory challenge of juror no. 34, referencing his earlier challenge to juror no. 74 as the basis. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lacoygreen1 sentence2024Although the exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively proper, see Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008), where there is a question of whether a "challenge is based impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group, . . . . [a] three- step burden shifting analysis [Batson-Soares test] is applied to determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is proper." Kozubal, supra. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-491 , cert. denied, 44 | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Oberlegreen1 sentence2020See Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 546 (2017). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chapmangreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Maldonadogreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johansgreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hollowaygreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Scottgreen1 sentence2017That juror, juror no. 117, was seated immediately following the defendant’s first Batson-Soares challenge to juror no. 113B, where the judge without hesitation had determined that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of discrimination. 30 While it is permissible for a judge to consider the composition of the empanelled members of the jury, insofar as it may affect whether he or she infers discrimination in the strike under review, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 463 Mass. 561, 571 (2012); Scott v. Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2016) (denying habeas corpus in same case), that is only one | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Issagreen1 sentence2017See Issa, 466 Mass. at 11 n.14 (error in failing to find prima facie showing of discrimination “unlikely to be harmless”). 32 We discern no merit in the Commonwealth’s argument that the defendant waived the Batson-Soares issue either by failing to object a second time following the judge’s determination that he had not made the necessary prima facie showing, or by mentioning only Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , rather than both Soares and Batson, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S. Ct. 1712 , 90 L. | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Gelbgreen1 sentence2017That juror, juror no. 117, was seated immediately following the defendant’s first Batson-Soares challenge to juror no. 113B, where the judge without hesitation had determined that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of discrimination. 30 While it is permissible for a judge to consider the composition of the empanelled members of the jury, insofar as it may affect whether he or she infers discrimination in the strike under review, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 463 Mass. 561, 571 (2012); Scott v. Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2016) (denying habeas corpus in same case), that is only one | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. Parkergreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Bessingergreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 439 Mass. 460 , 463 n.4 (2003), citing State v. Holloway, 209 Conn. 636, 645-646 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1071 (1989), State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1993), State v. Parker. 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992), and State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 305-306 (1995), overruled on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Sanchez v. Rodengreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 307 (1st Cir. 2014). 2017See, e.g., Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 307 (1st Cir. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Massachusetts v. Soares
green
2 sentences2026"A Batson-Soares objection to a proposed peremptory challenge . . . triggers a three-step process." Henderson, 486 3 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491 , 511 (2020). 9 Mass. at 311. 2024Although the exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively proper, see Commonwealth v. Lacoy, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 427, 431 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218 (2008), where there is a question of whether a "challenge is based impermissibly on a juror's membership in a protected group, . . . . [a] three- step burden shifting analysis [Batson-Soares test] is applied to determine whether a peremptory strike of a potential juror is proper." Kozubal, supra. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-491 , cert. denied, 44 | 5 | 2024–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Lopes
green
2 sentences2025The Court explained that the Batson-Soares test "does not apply to challenges to members 9 of all minority ethnic or racial groups lumped together, but instead applies to challenges to 'particular, defined groupings in the community.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Lopes 478 Mass. 593 , 600 n.5 (2018). 2025The Court explained that the Batson-Soares test "does not apply to challenges to members 9 of all minority ethnic or racial groups lumped together, but instead applies to challenges to 'particular, defined groupings in the community.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Lopes 478 Mass. 593 , 600 n.5 (2018). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
L.L., a juvenile v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2025That is, we must determine whether "a decision resulted from 'a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.'" Id., quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169 , 185 n.27 (2014). 2025That is, we must determine whether "a decision resulted from 'a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.'" Id., quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169 , 185 n.27 (2014). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.