antitrust violation in Minnesota

2007See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 , 85 S.Ct. 1585 , 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965); Eastern R.R.

2007See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 , 85 S.Ct. 1585 , 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965); Eastern R.R.

2007To determine whether Lorix has standing, we first review several key points of federal and Minnesota antitrust law, including the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 , 88 S.Ct. 2224 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968), Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 , 97 S.Ct. 2061 , 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977), and AGC; the 1984 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 325D.57; and our own decision in Philip Morris Inc. A. Federal Antitrust Law Federal antitrust law does not provide a remedy for every injury flowing from an antitrust violation.

2007To determine whether Lorix has standing, we first review several key points of federal and Minnesota antitrust law, including the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 , 88 S.Ct. 2224 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968), Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 , 97 S.Ct. 2061 , 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977), and AGC; the 1984 amendment to Minn.Stat. § 325D.57; and our own decision in Philip Morris Inc. A. Federal Antitrust Law Federal antitrust law does not provide a remedy for every injury flowing from an antitrust violation.

2007Standing under federal antitrust law, rather, has prudential limits based on remoteness of injury and complexity of proof. “ ‘An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation’s economy; but ‘despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.’ ” AGC, 459 U.S. at 534 , 103 S.Ct. 897 (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982)). “ ‘It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust

2007Standing under federal antitrust law, rather, has prudential limits based on remoteness of injury and complexity of proof. “ ‘An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation’s economy; but ‘despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.’ ” AGC, 459 U.S. at 534 , 103 S.Ct. 897 (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77 , 102 S.Ct. 2540 , 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982)). “ ‘It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust

2007See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 764 , 97 S.Ct. 2061 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that middlemen are ordinarily reluctant to sue their suppliers); Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 450 (“[DJirect purchasers likely will not enforce antitrust laws out of fear of retaliation by their suppliers * * *.”); Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 123 N.C.App. 572 , 473 S.E.2d 680, 687 (1996) (“[T]here are few, if any, reported instances of a defendant paying treble damages to two different classes of purchasers based on a single antitrust violation.”) (citing Thomas Greene, Should Congress Preempt State Indirect Purchase

2007See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 764 , 97 S.Ct. 2061 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that middlemen are ordinarily reluctant to sue their suppliers); Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 450 (“[DJirect purchasers likely will not enforce antitrust laws out of fear of retaliation by their suppliers * * *.”); Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 123 N.C.App. 572 , 473 S.E.2d 680, 687 (1996) (“[T]here are few, if any, reported instances of a defendant paying treble damages to two different classes of purchasers based on a single antitrust violation.”) (citing Thomas Greene, Should Congress Preempt State Indirect Purchase

2007See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 764 , 97 S.Ct. 2061 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that middlemen are ordinarily reluctant to sue their suppliers); Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 450 (“[DJirect purchasers likely will not enforce antitrust laws out of fear of retaliation by their suppliers * * *.”); Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 123 N.C.App. 572 , 473 S.E.2d 680, 687 (1996) (“[T]here are few, if any, reported instances of a defendant paying treble damages to two different classes of purchasers based on a single antitrust violation.”) (citing Thomas Greene, Should Congress Preempt State Indirect Purchase

2007In this case, the district court applied the factors in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 , 103 S.Ct. 897 , 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983) (hereinafter “AGC ”), and granted Crompton’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings, concluding that to sue in antitrust in Minnesota, a plaintiff must be “either a consumer or a customer in the particular industry and there must be neither speculative damages nor risk of duplicative recoveries.” The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Minnesota antitrust law requires that an antitrust plaintif

2003Citing two eases from the Third Circuit, the Sullivan court rejected the NFL’s standing argument, holding .that “[ajbsent some express language to the effect that Sullivan was selling his football related ‘antitrust claims’ or, at the very least, ‘causes of action,’ we cannot find that Sullivan ' assigned the present antitrust claim to the purchasers of the Patriots.” Id. (citing Gulfstream, 995 F.2d at 437-40; Leman v. Joyce Int’l, Inc., 10 F.3d 106, 112 (3d Cir.1993)).

2003Citing two eases from the Third Circuit, the Sullivan court rejected the NFL’s standing argument, holding .that “[ajbsent some express language to the effect that Sullivan was selling his football related ‘antitrust claims’ or, at the very least, ‘causes of action,’ we cannot find that Sullivan ' assigned the present antitrust claim to the purchasers of the Patriots.” Id. (citing Gulfstream, 995 F.2d at 437-40; Leman v. Joyce Int’l, Inc., 10 F.3d 106, 112 (3d Cir.1993)).

1997Id. at 59 , 113 S.Ct. at 1927 (citing FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U.S. 411, 424 , 110 S.Ct. 768, 775 , 107 L.Ed.2d 851 (1990) (emphasis added); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-14 , 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3425-26 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982)); see also Fischer Sand & Aggregate v. City of Lakeville, 874 F.Supp. 957, 959 (D.Minn.1994) (noting that “[although Noerr-Pennington doctrine arose in the antitrust context, lower court cases have established that it applies in other areas of substantive law, including tortious interference with contractual and prospective busine

1997In support of their assertion, appellants quote Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49 , 113 S.Ct. 1920 , 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993), stating that under this doctrine “[t]hose who petition government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability.” Id. at 56, 113 S.Ct. at 1926 (emphasis added).

1997In support of their assertion, appellants quote Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49 , 113 S.Ct. 1920 , 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993), stating that under this doctrine “[t]hose who petition government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability.” Id. at 56, 113 S.Ct. at 1926 (emphasis added).