antitrust violation in New York

1994Indeed, courts which have considered interposition of antitrust defenses in contract actions have followed the rule and rationale of Kelly (supra) (see, e.g., Dachowitz v Bergman, 113 Misc 2d 236, 239 [Sup Ct, NY County]; Fleet-Wing Corp. v Pease Oil Co., 29 Misc 2d 437, 441 [Sup Ct, Erie County], mod on other grounds 14 AD2d 728 ; see also, New York Stock Exch. v Goodbody & Co., 42 AD2d 556 ["where the antitrust violation is collateral to the main issue in the complaint, it cannot remain as a viable defense”]; Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v Roskin Distribs., 31 AD2d 22, 25 , affd in part, dismi

1973Kosuga, 358 U. S. 516 ; Bruce’s Juices v. American Can Go., 330 U. S. 743 ; Small Co. v. Lamborn é Go., 267 U. S. 248 ; Refrigeration Sales Go. v. York Gorp., 32 Mise 2d 231, affd. 18 A D 2d 1140).

2012It is market-wide effect that is crucial to an antitrust claim under the Sherman Act or Donnelly Act (see CDC Tech., 186 F3d at 80-81 ), not the existence of otherwise compensable individual injury.

2011Thus, the dissent cites Puerto Rico Tel. (supra) for the proposition that “the presumptively proper antitrust plaintiff is a customer who obtains services in the threatened market or a competitor who seeks to serve that market” and stresses that plaintiff “does not allege that it participated in any market where retrocessional insurance coverage was sold — either as purchaser or competitor — at any point after 1996 (when Equitas was formed), the period of the alleged conspiracy.” 1 Consistent with the appropriate methodology of assuming an antitrust violation, the dissent (and Equitas in its b

2001The plaintiff has standing, even though it is a contracting party, to claim that its agreement now represents an antitrust violation (see, Perma Life Mufflers v International Parts Corp., 392 US 134 ).

1994Indeed, courts which have considered interposition of antitrust defenses in contract actions have followed the rule and rationale of Kelly (supra) (see, e.g., Dachowitz v Bergman, 113 Misc 2d 236, 239 [Sup Ct, NY County]; Fleet-Wing Corp. v Pease Oil Co., 29 Misc 2d 437, 441 [Sup Ct, Erie County], mod on other grounds 14 AD2d 728 ; see also, New York Stock Exch. v Goodbody & Co., 42 AD2d 556 ["where the antitrust violation is collateral to the main issue in the complaint, it cannot remain as a viable defense”]; Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v Roskin Distribs., 31 AD2d 22, 25 , affd in part, dismi

1994Indeed, courts which have considered interposition of antitrust defenses in contract actions have followed the rule and rationale of Kelly (supra) (see, e.g., Dachowitz v Bergman, 113 Misc 2d 236, 239 [Sup Ct, NY County]; Fleet-Wing Corp. v Pease Oil Co., 29 Misc 2d 437, 441 [Sup Ct, Erie County], mod on other grounds 14 AD2d 728 ; see also, New York Stock Exch. v Goodbody & Co., 42 AD2d 556 ["where the antitrust violation is collateral to the main issue in the complaint, it cannot remain as a viable defense”]; Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v Roskin Distribs., 31 AD2d 22, 25 , affd in part, dismi

1994Indeed, courts which have considered interposition of antitrust defenses in contract actions have followed the rule and rationale of Kelly (supra) (see, e.g., Dachowitz v Bergman, 113 Misc 2d 236, 239 [Sup Ct, NY County]; Fleet-Wing Corp. v Pease Oil Co., 29 Misc 2d 437, 441 [Sup Ct, Erie County], mod on other grounds 14 AD2d 728 ; see also, New York Stock Exch. v Goodbody & Co., 42 AD2d 556 ["where the antitrust violation is collateral to the main issue in the complaint, it cannot remain as a viable defense”]; Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v Roskin Distribs., 31 AD2d 22, 25 , affd in part, dismi

1989Thus, the reported decisions are not free from disagreement, either in terms of the exercise of State jurisdiction over an antitrust defense or the binding nature and preclusive effect of a State determination (compare, Marrese v American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 US 373 , supra, with Andrea Theatres v Theatre Confections, supra, and American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres v American Mfrs.

1989Thus, the reported decisions are not free from disagreement, either in terms of the exercise of State jurisdiction over an antitrust defense or the binding nature and preclusive effect of a State determination (compare, Marrese v American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 US 373 , supra, with Andrea Theatres v Theatre Confections, supra, and American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres v American Mfrs.

1985A. State action Immunity under Parker v Brown Parker v Brown ( 317 US 341 , supra) involved an antitrust challenge to a California statute authorizing collective raisin marketing programs which eliminated pricing competition among producers.

1976(Allen Bradley Co. v Union, 325 US 797 ; see Van Cise, Understanding the Antitrust Laws [Practising Law Inst., 1976 ed], p 82; 2 Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust [Matthew Bender], pp 1077, 1079.) In addition, here the parties involved, members of the association, are primarily independent businessmen not employees.

1973Kosuga, 358 U. S. 516 ; Bruce’s Juices v. American Can Go., 330 U. S. 743 ; Small Co. v. Lamborn é Go., 267 U. S. 248 ; Refrigeration Sales Go. v. York Gorp., 32 Mise 2d 231, affd. 18 A D 2d 1140).

1973Kosuga, 358 U. S. 516 ; Bruce’s Juices v. American Can Go., 330 U. S. 743 ; Small Co. v. Lamborn é Go., 267 U. S. 248 ; Refrigeration Sales Go. v. York Gorp., 32 Mise 2d 231, affd. 18 A D 2d 1140).

1969Indeed, in General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co. ( 305 N. Y. 479, 484-485 ), we stated that a party to an action brought in the courts of this State ‘ ‘ may, of course, * * * defend upon the ground that the contract sued upon runs afoul of the [Federal] antitrust laws and is, therefore, illegal.” (See, also, Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammer stein, 221 N. Y. 507 .) The wisdom of these decisions is apparent when one realizes that a contrary result—prohibiting a State court from examining a claim of illegality advanced under the Sherman Act—would permit a party to a contract such as plaintiff

1969Indeed, in General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co. ( 305 N. Y. 479, 484-485 ), we stated that a party to an action brought in the courts of this State ‘ ‘ may, of course, * * * defend upon the ground that the contract sued upon runs afoul of the [Federal] antitrust laws and is, therefore, illegal.” (See, also, Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammer stein, 221 N. Y. 507 .) The wisdom of these decisions is apparent when one realizes that a contrary result—prohibiting a State court from examining a claim of illegality advanced under the Sherman Act—would permit a party to a contract such as plaintiff

1954No majority opinion was written at the Appellate Division, but the dissenting-opinion by Presiding Justice Peck states that “ The majority of the court is of the opinion that plaintiffs should not be foreclosed, on motion addressed to the complaint, from the opportunity of developing at the trial their theory that the payment received by Skouras in settlement of the litigation against Loew’s in some respect represented ‘ gross receipts ’ of the theatres in which plaintiffs were entitled to share.” ( 283 App. Div. 922 .) The theory upon which this cause of action has been sustained was evidentl