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9 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clough v. Adventist Health Systems, Inc.green2 sentences1993Under NMSA 1986, Section 57-1-1 (Repl.Pamp. 1987), "Every contract, agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, any part of which trade or commerce is within this state, is unlawful." In order to establish an antitrust law violation, "the plaintiff must show a conspiracy or combination among two or more persons and an unreasonable restraint of trade due to this combination or conspiracy." Clough v. Adventist Health Sys., Inc., 108 N.M. 801, 804 , 780 P.2d 627, 630 (1989) (citation omitted). 1993Under NMSA 1986, Section 57-1-1 (Repl.Pamp. 1987), "Every contract, agreement, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, any part of which trade or commerce is within this state, is unlawful." In order to establish an antitrust law violation, "the plaintiff must show a conspiracy or combination among two or more persons and an unreasonable restraint of trade due to this combination or conspiracy." Clough v. Adventist Health Sys., Inc., 108 N.M. 801, 804 , 780 P.2d 627, 630 (1989) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.green2 sentences2012Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 416 (2004) (Stevens, Souter & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (applying the AGC factors and reasoning that “we have eschewed a literal reading of [15 U.S.C.] § 4, particularly in cases in which there is only an indirect relationship between the defendant’s alleged misconduct and the plaintiff’s asserted injury”); see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 , 264 n.14 (1972) (“The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an anti 2005“Antitrust injury, causation, and damages all are necessary parts of the proof because ‘Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.’ ” Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1055 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 , 262-63 n. 14, 92 S.Ct. 885 , 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972)). | 1 | 2 |
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLPgreen1 sentence2012Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 416 (2004) (Stevens, Souter & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (applying the AGC factors and reasoning that “we have eschewed a literal reading of [15 U.S.C.] § 4, particularly in cases in which there is only an indirect relationship between the defendant’s alleged misconduct and the plaintiff’s asserted injury”); see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 , 264 n.14 (1972) (“The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an anti | 1 | 1 |
Ho v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.green1 sentence2012Preventing Plaintiff here from bringing a claim under the NMAA will not “leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied.” AGC, 459 U.S. at 542 ; see Ho, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (finding that Visa and MasterCard “have been subjected to judicial remediation for their wrongs, and any recovery here would be duplicative”). 4. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Catfish Antitrust Litigationgreen2 sentences2005A contrary rule would essentially preclude class treatment whenever separate issues had to be tried. 130 F.R.D. at 110 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also In re Catfish, 826 F.Supp. at 1042-43 (stating relaxed standard of whether “the proposed methods are so insubstantial that they amount to no method at all,” and “it is generally recognized that some relaxation of the plaintiffs burden of proving damages is tolerated once an antitrust violation and resulting damages have been established” and stating further that the determination of damages amounts, although individual 2005“Antitrust plaintiffs have a limited burden with respect to showing that individual damages issues do not predominate.” In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 697 (D.Minn.1995). “[I]t is generally recognized that some relaxation of the plaintiffs burden of proving damages is tolerated once an antitrust violation and resulting damages have been established.” In re Catfish, 826 F.Supp. at 1042 . | 1 | 1 |
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.green2 sentences2005See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 , 66 S.Ct. 574 , 90 L.Ed. 652 (1946); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C.1992); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C897, MDL 997, 1994 WL 663590 (N.D.Ill. 2005See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 , 66 S.Ct. 574 , 90 L.Ed. 652 (1946); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C.1992); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C897, MDL 997, 1994 WL 663590 (N.D.Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.green2 sentences2005See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 , 114 & n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 1562 , 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969) (distinguishing the injury element establishing causation, which requires proof of “some” damage from a conspiracy, from the damages element that measures the extent of damage); Bell Atl. 2005See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 , 114 & n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 1562 , 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969) (distinguishing the injury element establishing causation, which requires proof of “some” damage from a conspiracy, from the damages element that measures the extent of damage); Bell Atl. | 1 | 1 |
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsorgreen2 sentences2005See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 617 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 (indicating that the class action process solves the problem of lack of incentive to seek redress for an antitrust violation by aggregating small potential recoveries into a matter worth pursuing, including an attorney’s labor). 2005See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 617 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 (indicating that the class action process solves the problem of lack of incentive to seek redress for an antitrust violation by aggregating small potential recoveries into a matter worth pursuing, including an attorney’s labor). | 1 | 1 |
In re Potash Antitrust Litigationgreen1 sentence2005“Antitrust plaintiffs have a limited burden with respect to showing that individual damages issues do not predominate.” In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 697 (D.Minn.1995). “[I]t is generally recognized that some relaxation of the plaintiffs burden of proving damages is tolerated once an antitrust violation and resulting damages have been established.” In re Catfish, 826 F.Supp. at 1042 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigationgreen1 sentence2005A contrary rule would essentially preclude class treatment whenever separate issues had to be tried. 130 F.R.D. at 110 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also In re Catfish, 826 F.Supp. at 1042-43 (stating relaxed standard of whether “the proposed methods are so insubstantial that they amount to no method at all,” and “it is generally recognized that some relaxation of the plaintiffs burden of proving damages is tolerated once an antitrust violation and resulting damages have been established” and stating further that the determination of damages amounts, although individual | 1 | 1 |
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.green1 sentence2005“Antitrust injury, causation, and damages all are necessary parts of the proof because ‘Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.’ ” Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1055 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 , 262-63 n. 14, 92 S.Ct. 885 , 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972)). | 1 | 1 |
In re Workers' Compensationgreen1 sentence2005A contrary rule would essentially preclude class treatment whenever separate issues had to be tried. 130 F.R.D. at 110 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also In re Catfish, 826 F.Supp. at 1042-43 (stating relaxed standard of whether “the proposed methods are so insubstantial that they amount to no method at all,” and “it is generally recognized that some relaxation of the plaintiffs burden of proving damages is tolerated once an antitrust violation and resulting damages have been established” and stating further that the determination of damages amounts, although individual | 1 | 1 |
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.green2 sentences1982United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 200 , 629 P.2d 231, 276 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 , 101 S.Ct. 1966 , 68 L.Ed.2d 289 (1981) (our 1980 opinion). 1982United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 200 , 629 P.2d 231, 276 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 , 101 S.Ct. 1966 , 68 L.Ed.2d 289 (1981) (our 1980 opinion). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 794138green2 sentences2007Cf. id. at 58 (observing that the prosecution of an antitrust claim involves a great deal of expense, labor, and “elaborate factual inquiry” that is distinguishable from other types of consumer claims). {56} Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision to enforce the arbitration provision despite the fact that it might be found unconscionable in some other jurisdictions. 2007Cf. id. at 58 (observing that the prosecution of an antitrust claim involves a great deal of expense, labor, and "elaborate factual inquiry" that is distinguishable from other types of consumer claims). {56} Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision to enforce the arbitration provision despite the fact that it might be found unconscionable in some other jurisdictions. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Seay Bros., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque
green
1 sentence2015In that case, the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico rejected a private refuse collector’s antitrust challenge to ordinances enacted by the City of Albuquerque that precluded private refuse collectors from collecting refuse in the city. 601 F. Supp. at 1519 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lorix v. Crompton Corp.
green
1 sentence2012The court concluded: “Whatever the precise prudential limits on Minnesota antitrust standing, we do not believe that the legislature intended to create ‘consumer standing’ by allowing every person in the state to sue for an antitrust violation simply by virtue of his or her status as a consumer.” Id. at 632 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters
green
1 sentence2012Preventing Plaintiff here from bringing a claim under the NMAA will not “leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied.” AGC, 459 U.S. at 542 ; see Ho, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (finding that Visa and MasterCard “have been subjected to judicial remediation for their wrongs, and any recovery here would be duplicative”). 4. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
cluster 348624
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 454 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 , 66 S.Ct. 574 , 90 L.Ed. 652 (1946); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 146 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C.1992); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C897, MDL 997, 1994 WL 663590 (N.D.Ill. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Pringle v. Texas
green
1 sentence1982United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 200 , 629 P.2d 231, 276 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 , 101 S.Ct. 1966 , 68 L.Ed.2d 289 (1981) (our 1980 opinion). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Thomas v. Crouch
green
1 sentence1982United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 200 , 629 P.2d 231, 276 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 , 101 S.Ct. 1966 , 68 L.Ed.2d 289 (1981) (our 1980 opinion). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Prenzler v. Kamrath
green
1 sentence1982United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 200 , 629 P.2d 231, 276 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 , 101 S.Ct. 1966 , 68 L.Ed.2d 289 (1981) (our 1980 opinion). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Kelly v. Kosuga
green
2 sentences1980Under such circumstances, the refusal to recognize an antitrust defense would place the court in the position of “enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by the [antitrust laws].” Kelly v. Kosuga, supra, 358 U.S. at 520 , 79 S.Ct. at 432 . 1980Under such circumstances, the refusal to recognize an antitrust defense would place the court in the position of “enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by the [antitrust laws].” Kelly v. Kosuga, supra, 358 U.S. at 520 , 79 S.Ct. at 432 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State Ex Rel. Pennsylvania Transformer Division v. Electric City Supply Co.
green
2 sentences1980GAC relies on State v. Electric City Supply Company, 74 N.M. 295 , 393 P.2d 325 (1964) and Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 , 79 S.Ct. 429 , 3 L.Ed.2d 475 (1959). 1980GAC relies on State v. Electric City Supply Company, 74 N.M. 295 , 393 P.2d 325 (1964) and Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 , 79 S.Ct. 429 , 3 L.Ed.2d 475 (1959). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.