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12 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1994–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc.green2 sentences2011As developed and refined over time, there are five identified conditions precedent to the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine: “[f]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the parly asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party agai 2011As developed and refined over time, there are five identified conditions precedent to the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine: “[f]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the parly asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party agai | 5 | 7 |
Matter of Estate of Dawsongreen2 sentences2015For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the re-litigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. [In Re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 2 2015For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the re-litigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. [In Re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 2 | 2 | 11 |
State v. K.P.S. and State v. Carmini Laloogreen2 sentences2020Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006) (quoting In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1 , 20- 21 (1994)).] A-2987-18T2 7 Application of collateral estoppel is prohibited "if a party has not had a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue.'" State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 493 (2015) (quoting State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 278 (2015)). 2019Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006) (quoting In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1 , 20- 21 (1994)).] "A fundamental tenet of collateral estoppel is that the doctrine cannot be used against a party unless that party either participated in or was 'in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.'" State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 277 (2015) (quoting In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20 (1994)). | 2 | 2 |
Pace v. Kuchinskygreen2 sentences2011As developed and refined over time, there are five identified conditions precedent to the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine: “[f]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the parly asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party agai 2011As developed and refined over time, there are five identified conditions precedent to the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine: “[f]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the parly asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party agai | 1 | 4 |
State v. Jamil McKinney(073070)green1 sentence2020Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006) (quoting In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1 , 20- 21 (1994)).] A-2987-18T2 7 Application of collateral estoppel is prohibited "if a party has not had a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue.'" State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 493 (2015) (quoting State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 278 (2015)). | 1 | 1 |
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shoregreen1 sentence2020Super. 31, 39-40 (App. Div. 2018), certif. denied, 236 N.J. 628 (2019) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979)). [F]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Coruzzigreen2 sentences2010Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 , 897 A. 2d 1003 (2006) (quoting In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20-21 , 641 A. 2d 1026 (1994)) (citations and parentheticals omitted).] "`[E]ven where these requirements are met, the doctrine, which has its roots in equity, will not be applied when it is unfair to do so.'" Olivieri, supra, 186 N.J. at 521-22 , 897 A. 2d 1003 (quoting Pace v. Kuchinsky, 347 N.J.Super. 202, 215 , 789 A. 2d 162 (App.Div.2002)); see also In Re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 568 , 472 A. 2d 546 (1984) (noting collateral estoppel should not apply when "sufficient countervailing interests" 2010Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 , 897 A. 2d 1003 (2006) (quoting In re Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20-21 , 641 A. 2d 1026 (1994)) (citations and parentheticals omitted).] "`[E]ven where these requirements are met, the doctrine, which has its roots in equity, will not be applied when it is unfair to do so.'" Olivieri, supra, 186 N.J. at 521-22 , 897 A. 2d 1003 (quoting Pace v. Kuchinsky, 347 N.J.Super. 202, 215 , 789 A. 2d 162 (App.Div.2002)); see also In Re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 568 , 472 A. 2d 546 (1984) (noting collateral estoppel should not apply when "sufficient countervailing interests" | 1 | 1 |
Blair v. Taxation Division Directorgreen1 sentence1998Blair v. Director, Dir. of Taxation, 9 N.J.Tax 345, 349 (Tax 1987), aff'd, 225 N.J.Super. 584 , 543 A.2d 99 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 349 , 550 A.2d 460 (1988); Warren Tp. v. Suffness, 225 N.J.Super. 399, 408 , 542 A.2d 931 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied 113 N.J. 640 , 552 A.2d 166 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Wunschel v. City of Jersey Citygreen2 sentences1994See Wunschel v. *21 City of Jersey City, 96 N.J. 651, 658 , 477 A2d 329 (1984) (stating, “Central to the application of the doctrine [of collateral estoppel] is that the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked must have been party to or privy to the prior proceedings.”). 1994See Wunschel v. *21 City of Jersey City, 96 N.J. 651, 658 , 477 A2d 329 (1984) (stating, “Central to the application of the doctrine [of collateral estoppel] is that the party against whom the doctrine is to be invoked must have been party to or privy to the prior proceedings.”). | 1 | 1 |
Pittman v. LaFontainegreen1 sentence1994For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding, see Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F.Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J.1991) (stating that for issue to be precluded subsequent action must involve substantially similar or identical issues); (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, see ibid, (stating that “the litigant against whom issue preclusion is invoked must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Warren Tp. v. Suffness
green
2 sentences1994For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding, see Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F.Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J.1991) (stating that for issue to be precluded subsequent action must involve substantially similar or identical issues); (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, see ibid, (stating that “the litigant against whom issue preclusion is invoked must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 1994For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding, see Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F.Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J.1991) (stating that for issue to be precluded subsequent action must involve substantially similar or identical issues); (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, see ibid, (stating that “the litigant against whom issue preclusion is invoked must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the | 2 | 1994–1998 |
State v. Barham
neutral
1 sentence2020Super. 31, 39-40 (App. Div. 2018), certif. denied, 236 N.J. 628 (2019) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979)). [F]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hennessey v. Winslow Township
green
2 sentences2011And, a principal determinative in whether to apply collateral estoppel is “the benefits flowing from [the] doctrine[ ], such as ‘finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness.’” Id. at 522, 897 A.2d 1003 (quoting Hennessey v. Winslow Twp., 183 N.J. 593, 599 , 875 A.2d 240 (2005) (citation omitted)). *116 The relevant focus, then, must center on whether the conditions precedent to the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine ha 2011And, a principal determinative in whether to apply collateral estoppel is “the benefits flowing from [the] doctrine[ ], such as ‘finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness.’” Id. at 522, 897 A.2d 1003 (quoting Hennessey v. Winslow Twp., 183 N.J. 593, 599 , 875 A.2d 240 (2005) (citation omitted)). *116 The relevant focus, then, must center on whether the conditions precedent to the application of the collateral estoppel doctrine ha | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Blair v. Taxation Division Director
neutral
2 sentences1998Blair v. Director, Dir. of Taxation, 9 N.J.Tax 345, 349 (Tax 1987), aff'd, 225 N.J.Super. 584 , 543 A.2d 99 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 349 , 550 A.2d 460 (1988); Warren Tp. v. Suffness, 225 N.J.Super. 399, 408 , 542 A.2d 931 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied 113 N.J. 640 , 552 A.2d 166 (1988). 1998Blair v. Director, Dir. of Taxation, 9 N.J.Tax 345, 349 (Tax 1987), aff'd, 225 N.J.Super. 584 , 543 A.2d 99 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 349 , 550 A.2d 460 (1988); Warren Tp. v. Suffness, 225 N.J.Super. 399, 408 , 542 A.2d 931 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied 113 N.J. 640 , 552 A.2d 166 (1988). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Township of Warren v. Suffness
green
2 sentences1998Blair v. Director, Dir. of Taxation, 9 N.J.Tax 345, 349 (Tax 1987), aff'd, 225 N.J.Super. 584 , 543 A.2d 99 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 349 , 550 A.2d 460 (1988); Warren Tp. v. Suffness, 225 N.J.Super. 399, 408 , 542 A.2d 931 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied 113 N.J. 640 , 552 A.2d 166 (1988). 1998Blair v. Director, Dir. of Taxation, 9 N.J.Tax 345, 349 (Tax 1987), aff'd, 225 N.J.Super. 584 , 543 A.2d 99 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 349 , 550 A.2d 460 (1988); Warren Tp. v. Suffness, 225 N.J.Super. 399, 408 , 542 A.2d 931 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied 113 N.J. 640 , 552 A.2d 166 (1988). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Blair v. Taxation Div. Director
green
2 sentences1998Blair v. Director, Dir. of Taxation, 9 N.J.Tax 345, 349 (Tax 1987), aff'd, 225 N.J.Super. 584 , 543 A.2d 99 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 349 , 550 A.2d 460 (1988); Warren Tp. v. Suffness, 225 N.J.Super. 399, 408 , 542 A.2d 931 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied 113 N.J. 640 , 552 A.2d 166 (1988). 1998Blair v. Director, Dir. of Taxation, 9 N.J.Tax 345, 349 (Tax 1987), aff'd, 225 N.J.Super. 584 , 543 A.2d 99 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 349 , 550 A.2d 460 (1988); Warren Tp. v. Suffness, 225 N.J.Super. 399, 408 , 542 A.2d 931 (App.Div.1988), certif. denied 113 N.J. 640 , 552 A.2d 166 (1988). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Ford v. Ford
green
1 sentence1994For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding, see Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F.Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J.1991) (stating that for issue to be precluded subsequent action must involve substantially similar or identical issues); (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, see ibid, (stating that “the litigant against whom issue preclusion is invoked must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Ocasio
green
1 sentence1994For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding, see Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F.Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J.1991) (stating that for issue to be precluded subsequent action must involve substantially similar or identical issues); (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, see ibid, (stating that “the litigant against whom issue preclusion is invoked must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Redinger
green
2 sentences1994For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding, see Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F.Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J.1991) (stating that for issue to be precluded subsequent action must involve substantially similar or identical issues); (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, see ibid, (stating that “the litigant against whom issue preclusion is invoked must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 1994For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to foreclose the relitigation of an issue, the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding, see Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F.Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J.1991) (stating that for issue to be precluded subsequent action must involve substantially similar or identical issues); (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, see ibid, (stating that “the litigant against whom issue preclusion is invoked must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the | 1 | 1994–1994 |