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12 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kolb v. Burnsgreen2 sentences2025When a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an employer took an adverse employment action as a pretext for discrimination, "the burden of persuasion is shifted to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Allen, 246 N.J. at 290-91 (quoting Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. 2025To establish a CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)]; A-0838-23 11 (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at | 5 | 5 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdinegreen2 sentences1982See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 , 67 L.Ed. 2d 207, 216 (1981); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-26 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 216, 218-19 (1978). 1982See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 , 67 L.Ed. 2d 207, 216 (1981); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-26 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 216, 218-19 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeneygreen2 sentences1982See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 , 67 L.Ed. 2d 207, 216 (1981); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-26 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 216, 218-19 (1978). 1982See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 , 67 L.Ed. 2d 207, 216 (1981); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-26 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 216, 218-19 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trusteesgreen2 sentences1982Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 , 36 L.Ed. 2d 668, 678 (1973), this Court has previously adhered to the concept that once plaintiff's prima facie showing is made, thereby giving rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc., 86 N.J. at 31 ; Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees , 77 N.J. at 83. 1982Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 678 (1973), this Court has previously adhered to the concept that once plaintiff’s prima facie showing is made, thereby giving rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by “articulatpng] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc., 86 N.J. at 31 ; Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77 N.J. at 83. | 1 | 2 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen2 sentences1982Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 , 36 L.Ed. 2d 668, 678 (1973), this Court has previously adhered to the concept that once plaintiff's prima facie showing is made, thereby giving rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc., 86 N.J. at 31 ; Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees , 77 N.J. at 83. 1982Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 , 36 L.Ed. 2d 668, 678 (1973), this Court has previously adhered to the concept that once plaintiff's prima facie showing is made, thereby giving rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc., 86 N.J. at 31 ; Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees , 77 N.J. at 83. | 1 | 2 |
Joel S. Lippman, M.D. v. Ethicon, Inc. (073324)green1 sentence2025To establish a CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)]; A-0838-23 11 (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at | 1 | 1 |
Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc.green1 sentence2021If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action." Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 449 (2005) (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 596 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Clowes v. Terminix International, Inc.green2 sentences2021If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action." Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 449 (2005) (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 596 (1988)). 2021If the employer satisfies its burden, "the burden of production shifts back to the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated by the employer was merely a pretext for discrimination and not the true reason for the employment decision." Ibid. | 1 | 1 |
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Watersgreen2 sentences1981See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 , 67 L.Ed.2d at *32 215; Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-26 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-296 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216, 218-219 (1978); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957, 967-968 (1978). 1981See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 , 67 L.Ed.2d at *32 215; Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-26 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-296 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216, 218-219 (1978); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949-2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957, 967-968 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dzwonar v. McDevitt
green
2 sentences2025To establish a CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)]; A-0838-23 11 (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 2024Where a plaintiff presents sufficient evidence establishing a prima facie CEPA claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c), "the burden of persuasion is shifted to the employer to rebut the presumption of [unlawful retaliation] by articulating some legitimate non[-retaliatory] reason for the adverse employment action." Id. at 290-91 (quoting Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. | 2 | 2024–2025 |
Andersen v. Exxon Co.
green
2 sentences2000The plaintiff then has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the defendant was not the true reason for the employment decision but was merely a pretext for discrimination. [Andersen v. Exxon, 89 N.J. 483, 492-93 , 446 A2.d 486 (1982).] The controversy in this case turns on the second stage, in which the defendant has the burden of going forward to advance or articulate one or more legitimate nondiseriminating reasons for its actions. 1999Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 493 , 446 A. 2d 486 ; Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 319 N.J.Super. 53, 65 , 724 A. 2d 863 (App.Div.1999); Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J.Super. 323, 346 , 695 A. 2d 353 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 189 , 704 A. 2d 19 (1997). | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp.
green
2 sentences1999Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 493 , 446 A. 2d 486 ; Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 319 N.J.Super. 53, 65 , 724 A. 2d 863 (App.Div.1999); Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J.Super. 323, 346 , 695 A. 2d 353 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 189 , 704 A. 2d 19 (1997). 1999Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 493 , 446 A. 2d 486 ; Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 319 N.J.Super. 53, 65 , 724 A. 2d 863 (App.Div.1999); Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J.Super. 323, 346 , 695 A. 2d 353 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 189 , 704 A. 2d 19 (1997). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc.
green
2 sentences1982Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 , 36 L.Ed. 2d 668, 678 (1973), this Court has previously adhered to the concept that once plaintiff's prima facie showing is made, thereby giving rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc., 86 N.J. at 31 ; Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees , 77 N.J. at 83. 1982Relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 678 (1973), this Court has previously adhered to the concept that once plaintiff’s prima facie showing is made, thereby giving rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by “articulatpng] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Goodman v. London Metals Exchange, Inc., 86 N.J. at 31 ; Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77 N.J. at 83. | 2 | 1982–1988 |
Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 493 , 446 A. 2d 486 ; Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 319 N.J.Super. 53, 65 , 724 A. 2d 863 (App.Div.1999); Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J.Super. 323, 346 , 695 A. 2d 353 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 189 , 704 A. 2d 19 (1997). 1999Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 493 , 446 A. 2d 486 ; Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 319 N.J.Super. 53, 65 , 724 A. 2d 863 (App.Div.1999); Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J.Super. 323, 346 , 695 A. 2d 353 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 189 , 704 A. 2d 19 (1997). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corporation
green
1 sentence1999Andersen, supra, 89 N.J. at 493 , 446 A. 2d 486 ; Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 319 N.J.Super. 53, 65 , 724 A. 2d 863 (App.Div.1999); Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 302 N.J.Super. 323, 346 , 695 A. 2d 353 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 189 , 704 A. 2d 19 (1997). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
cluster 744491
green
1 sentence1998Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., supra, 302 N.J.Super. at 345-47 , 695 A.2d 353 . “ ‘To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiffs rejection’ which would support a jury finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the adverse employment action.” Stewart v. Rutgers, supra, 120 F.3d at 432 (quoting St. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.