employer to rebut presumption in California

2025Union, Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 820, 831-832 (Batarse); see Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).) “At trial, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; if he does so, a presumption of discrimination or retaliation arises. [Citations.] The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that its adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory

2025Union, Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 820, 831-832 (Batarse); see Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).) “At trial, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; if he does so, a presumption of discrimination or retaliation arises. [Citations.] The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that its adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory

2025(Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 214 ; Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 354-355.) If this burden is satisfied, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by 8 offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.

2024Applicable Law “FEHA prohibits an employer from subjecting an employee to an adverse employment action based on the employee’s protected status. [Citation.] In evaluating claims of discrimination under FEHA, California courts apply the burden- shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 .” (Martin, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 161; see Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 214 ; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz).) “Under this approach, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case supporting his or her discri

2016(Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ] (Hersant) [explaining nature of prima facie case in context of age discrimination].) “If, at trial, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355 .) “Accordingly, at this trial stage, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to ‘raise[] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a judgment for the [employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscrimi

2016(Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ] (Hersant) [explaining nature of prima facie case in context of age discrimination].) “If, at trial, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355 .) “Accordingly, at this trial stage, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to ‘raise[] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a judgment for the [employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscrimi

2025Union, Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 820, 831-832 (Batarse); see Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).) “At trial, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; if he does so, a presumption of discrimination or retaliation arises. [Citations.] The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that its adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory

2023(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [applying McDonnell Douglas burden- shifting to claim of retaliation under FEHA]; Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, 560 [“CFRA retaliation claims . . . are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis [citation].”].) Under this approach, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case supporting his or her discrimination or retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination or retaliation by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

2020Principles of Law “California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 354 .) “Generally, the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circu

2014(Id. at p. 355.) “[T]he burden [then] shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to ‘raise[] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a judgment for the [employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. [Citations.]” ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 355-356.) “This likewise is not an onerous burden [citation], and is generally met by presenting admissible evidence showing the defendant’s reason for its employment decision [citation].” (Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160 .) “Finally, if the defendant presents

2023(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [applying McDonnell Douglas burden- shifting to claim of retaliation under FEHA]; Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, 560 [“CFRA retaliation claims . . . are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis [citation].”].) Under this approach, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case supporting his or her discrimination or retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination or retaliation by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

2021(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz) [applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting to claim of retaliation under FEHA]; Bareno v. 18 San Diego Community College Dist. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 546, 560 (Bareno) [“CFRA retaliation claims . . . are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis [citation].”].) Under this approach, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case supporting his or her discrimination or retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination or retaliation by offering a legitimate, nondis

2022(Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 309 (Sandell); Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327 , 343−344 (Arteaga).) “ ‘ “ ‘If the employer presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiff’s prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact material to the defendant’s showing.

2014On a disability discrimination claim, the prima facie case requires the plaintiff to show ‘he or she (1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2) could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability.’ [Citation.]” ( Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 159-160.) “‘If . . . the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises [and]’ ‘. . . the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the p

2000Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, 506 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 ( Hicks ); Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. 248, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 .) This presumption, though "rebuttable," is "legally mandatory." ( Burdine, supra, at p. 254, fn. 7 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 ; see also Hicks, supra, at p. 506 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 .) Thus, in a trial, "[i]f the trier of fact believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case." ( Burdine, supra, at p. 25

2000Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, 506 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 ( Hicks ); Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. 248, 254 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 .) This presumption, though "rebuttable," is "legally mandatory." ( Burdine, supra, at p. 254, fn. 7 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 ; see also Hicks, supra, at p. 506 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 .) Thus, in a trial, "[i]f the trier of fact believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case." ( Burdine, supra, at p. 25

1940Passing to the appeal from the judgment which limits the amount of appellant’s recovery to $31,000 by deducting from the $35,000 guaranteed under the contract the sum of $4,000 received by appellant for her services in radio broadcasts during the month of September, 1936, it is well settled that “ ‘The measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is generally and primarily . . . the agreed wage for the unexpired part of the term, and the burden is upon the employer to rebut this presumption by proof that the damages sustained were actually less.’ (Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748

1940Passing to the appeal from the judgment which limits the amount of appellant’s recovery to $31,000 by deducting from the $35,000 guaranteed under the contract the sum of $4,000 received by appellant for her services in radio broadcasts during the month of September, 1936, it is well settled that “ ‘The measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is generally and primarily . . . the agreed wage for the unexpired part of the term, and the burden is upon the employer to rebut this presumption by proof that the damages sustained were actually less.’ (Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748

1940Passing to the appeal from the judgment which limits the amount of appellant’s recovery to $31,000 by deducting from the $35,000 guaranteed under the contract the sum of $4,000 received by appellant for her services in radio broadcasts during the month of September, 1936, it is well settled that “ ‘The measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is generally and primarily . . . the agreed wage for the unexpired part of the term, and the burden is upon the employer to rebut this presumption by proof that the damages sustained were actually less.’ (Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748

1940Passing to the appeal from the judgment which limits the amount of appellant’s recovery to $31,000 by deducting from the $35,000 guaranteed under the contract the sum of $4,000 received by appellant for her services in radio broadcasts during the month of September, 1936, it is well settled that “ ‘The measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is generally and primarily . . . the agreed wage for the unexpired part of the term, and the burden is upon the employer to rebut this presumption by proof that the damages sustained were actually less.’ (Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748

1940Passing to the appeal from the judgment which limits the amount of appellant’s recovery to $31,000 by deducting from the $35,000 guaranteed under the contract the sum of $4,000 received by appellant for her services in radio broadcasts during the month of September, 1936, it is well settled that “ ‘The measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is generally and primarily . . . the agreed wage for the unexpired part of the term, and the burden is upon the employer to rebut this presumption by proof that the damages sustained were actually less.’ (Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748

1940Passing to the appeal from the judgment which limits the amount of appellant’s recovery to $31,000 by deducting from the $35,000 guaranteed under the contract the sum of $4,000 received by appellant for her services in radio broadcasts during the month of September, 1936, it is well settled that “ ‘The measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is generally and primarily . . . the agreed wage for the unexpired part of the term, and the burden is upon the employer to rebut this presumption by proof that the damages sustained were actually less.’ (Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748

2022(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355 .) “Accordingly, at this trial stage, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to ‘raise[ ] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a judgment for the [employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” (Id. at pp. 355-356.) “[T]he employer may dispel the presumption merely by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” (McCaskey, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 980 ; Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 159 [burden on employer to art

2022(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355 .) “Accordingly, at this trial stage, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to ‘raise[ ] a genuine issue of fact’ and to ‘justify a judgment for the [employer],’ that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” (Id. at pp. 355-356.) “[T]he employer may dispel the presumption merely by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” (McCaskey, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 980 ; Wills, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 159 [burden on employer to art

2020Principles of Law “California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination, including age discrimination, based on a theory of disparate treatment.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 354 .) “Generally, the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circu

2015(Ibid.) Under the second step of the test, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by “ ‘articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.’ ” (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 .) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears.” ( Guz, supra, at p. 356 .) Under the third step of the test, the “plaintiff must . . . have the opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Ibid.) In the summary judgment context

2025Union, Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 820, 831-832 (Batarse); see Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).) “At trial, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; if he does so, a presumption of discrimination or retaliation arises. [Citations.] The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that its adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory

2025Union, Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 820, 831-832 (Batarse); see Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (Guz); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).) “At trial, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; if he does so, a presumption of discrimination or retaliation arises. [Citations.] The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that its adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory

2024(Wills v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160 ; see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 [“from commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”].) “If the employer presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiff’s prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces

2022(Sandell v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 309 (Sandell); Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327 , 343−344 (Arteaga).) “ ‘ “ ‘If the employer presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiff’s prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact material to the defendant’s showing.

2020(McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 979 .) The elements of a disparate treatment claim are “ ‘(1) the employee’s membership in a classification protected by the statute; (2) discriminatory animus on the part of the employer toward members of that classification; (3) an action by the employer adverse to the employee’s interests; (4) a causal link between the discriminatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damage to the employee; and (6) a causal link between the adverse action and the damage.’ ” (Ibid.) “[A]t this trial stage, the burden shifts to the em

2013(Guz, at p. 354.) "A prima facie case generally means the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position he or she sought or was performing competently in the position held, (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests a discriminatory motive." (Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1004 (Scotch).) "If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then a presumpt

2016(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 ; Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 964 .) The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that the adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 355- 356; Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 965 .) If the 25 employer does so, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to establish the employer’s proffered reasons are untrue or pretextual, or to offer other evidence of intentional disc

2016(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354 ; Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 964 .) The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that the adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 355- 356; Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 965 .) If the 25 employer does so, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to establish the employer’s proffered reasons are untrue or pretextual, or to offer other evidence of intentional disc

2015Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) Similarly, “[t]he central assertion of a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy is that the employer’s motives for terminating the employee are so contrary to fundamental norms that the termination inflicted an injury sounding in tort.” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 702 .) 9 suggests a discriminatory motive. ( Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 354-355; see also Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 44 ; Turner v. Anheuser- Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1252 (Turner).) If the plaintiff makes this prima faci

2013(Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 44 .) The FEHA, however, " 'does not prohibit an employer from . . . discharging an employee with a physical or mental disability, . . . where the employee, because of his or her physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations . . . .' " (Scotch, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 .) Where an employee claims discriminatory discharge under section 12940, subdivision (a), the employee has the burden of showing "(1) that he or she was discharged because of a disability;

2014(Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042 ; Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 989 .) If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation.

2013(Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 44 .) The FEHA, however, " 'does not prohibit an employer from . . . discharging an employee with a physical or mental disability, . . . where the employee, because of his or her physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations . . . .' " (Scotch, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 .) Where an employee claims discriminatory discharge under section 12940, subdivision (a), the employee has the burden of showing "(1) that he or she was discharged because of a disability;

2025Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 367 (Y.K.A.).) “[S]ummary judgment is improper ‘[w]here the evidence submitted by [the] moving [party] does not support judgment in his favor.’” (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1196 (Thompson).) The opposition to a motion for summary judgment must include an opposition memorandum, evidence supporting the opposition, and “a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating if the opposing party agrees or disagrees that th

2025Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 367 (Y.K.A.).) “[S]ummary judgment is improper ‘[w]here the evidence submitted by [the] moving [party] does not support judgment in his favor.’” (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1196 (Thompson).) The opposition to a motion for summary judgment must include an opposition memorandum, evidence supporting the opposition, and “a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating if the opposing party agrees or disagrees that th

2024(Id. at p. 356.) “The ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of actual discrimination remains with the plaintiff.” (Ibid.) 18 “The McDonnell Douglas framework was designed as ‘an analytical tool for use by the trial judge in applying the law, not a concept to be understood and applied by the jury in the factfinding process.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]n the usual case, the first two prongs of the [framework], that is, whether the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of discrimination and whether the employer has rebutted that prima facie showing, will be tested prior to trial,’ such as through a m

2024(Wills v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160 ; see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 [“from commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”].) “If the employer presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiff’s prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces

2024(Wills v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 160 ; see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 [“from commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”].) “If the employer presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiff’s prima facie elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces

2020(McCaskey v. California State Automobile Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 947, 979 .) The elements of a disparate treatment claim are “ ‘(1) the employee’s membership in a classification protected by the statute; (2) discriminatory animus on the part of the employer toward members of that classification; (3) an action by the employer adverse to the employee’s interests; (4) a causal link between the discriminatory animus and the adverse action; (5) damage to the employee; and (6) a causal link between the adverse action and the damage.’ ” (Ibid.) “[A]t this trial stage, the burden shifts to the em