general unanimity instruction (New Jersey) · Go Syfert
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general unanimity instruction in New Jersey

12 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Parkergreen
nj · 1991 · cited in 5 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2001–2021
2 sentences

2020As the Supreme Court has held, whenever "a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction" – like that given here – "does not suffice." Parker, 124 N.J. at 636 .

2004In State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628 , 592 A. 2d 228 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939 , 112 S.Ct. 1483 , 117 L.Ed. 2d 625 (1992), the Court endorsed the view that when "a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice." Id. at 636 , 592 A. 2d 228 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

25
People v. Melendezgreen
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2001–2002
2 sentences

2002In Parker, supra, we gave examples of such circumstances, “[when] a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.” People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1433-34 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 608 (1990) .... [S]ee also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of j

2002In Parker, supra, we gave examples of such circumstances, “[when] a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.” People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1433-34 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 608 (1990) .... [S]ee also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of j

22
United States v. Claret Echeverrygreen
ca9 · 1983 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1991–2002
2 sentences

2002In Parker, supra, we gave examples of such circumstances, “[when] a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.” People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1433-34 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 608 (1990) .... [S]ee also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of j

2002In Parker, supra, we gave examples of such circumstances, “[when] a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.” People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1433-34 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 608 (1990) .... [S]ee also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of j

22
United States v. Adrian Norman Paysenogreen
ca9 · 1986 · cited in 2 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 1991–2002
2 sentences

2002In Parker, supra, we gave examples of such circumstances, “[when] a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.” People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1433-34 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 608 (1990) .... [S]ee also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of j

2002In Parker, supra, we gave examples of such circumstances, “[when] a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.” People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1433-34 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 608 (1990) .... [S]ee also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of j

22
State v. Frisbygreen
nj · 2002 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 597-98 (2002).

11
State v. Scherzergreen
njsuperctappdiv · 1997 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021In State v. Scherzer, we applied the Parker factors and held that a general unanimity instruction was sufficient where the offenses charged required only one type of criminal act—sexual penetration. 301 N.J.

11
United States v. Jerry R. Mastelotto, and Willis B. Inglesbygreen
ca9 · 1983 · cited in 1 New Jersey opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
1 sentence

2002In Parker, supra, we gave examples of such circumstances, “[when] a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.” People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1433-34 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 608 (1990) .... [S]ee also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of j

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
United States v. Franklin Delano Gipson green
ca5 · 1977
2 sentences

1991Id. at 458-59 ; see also United States v. Payseno, 782 F. 2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) ("`[When] there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice.'" (quoting United States v. Echeverry, 719 F. 2d 974, 975 (9th Cir.1983))).

1991Id. at 458-59 ; see also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“ ‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice.’ ” (quoting United States v. Echeverry, 719 F. 2d 974, 975 (9th Cir.1983))).

41991–2020
State v. Crisoforo Montalvo (077331) (Monmouth and Statewide) green
nj · 2017
1 sentence

2021Accordingly, "there is a presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice . . . defendant's case." Montalvo, 229 N.J. at 320 .

12021–2021
State v. Cagno green
nj · 2012
1 sentence

2020Cagno, 211 N.J. at 516 -17 (quoting Parker, 124 N.J. at 641 ).

12020–2020
Girling Health Systems, Inc. v. United States green
scotus · 1992
1 sentence

2004In State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628 , 592 A. 2d 228 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939 , 112 S.Ct. 1483 , 117 L.Ed. 2d 625 (1992), the Court endorsed the view that when "a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice." Id. at 636 , 592 A. 2d 228 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

12004–2004
Arlen v. United States green
scotus · 1992
1 sentence

2004In State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628 , 592 A. 2d 228 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939 , 112 S.Ct. 1483 , 117 L.Ed. 2d 625 (1992), the Court endorsed the view that when "a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice." Id. at 636 , 592 A. 2d 228 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

12004–2004
Ohio Department of Human Services v. Ohio Hospital Ass'n green
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

2004In State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628 , 592 A. 2d 228 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939 , 112 S.Ct. 1483 , 117 L.Ed. 2d 625 (1992), the Court endorsed the view that when "a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice." Id. at 636 , 592 A. 2d 228 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

2004In State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628 , 592 A. 2d 228 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939 , 112 S.Ct. 1483 , 117 L.Ed. 2d 625 (1992), the Court endorsed the view that when "a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice." Id. at 636 , 592 A. 2d 228 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

12004–2004
United States v. Claret Echeverry green
ca9 · 1983
2 sentences

2002In Parker, supra, we gave examples of such circumstances, “[when] a single crime can be proven by different theories based on different acts and at least two of these theories rely on different evidence, and [when] the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable possibility that a juror will find one theory proven and the other not proven but that all of the jurors will not agree on the same theory.” People v. Melendez, 224 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1433-34 , 274 Cal.Rptr. 599, 608 (1990) .... [S]ee also United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1986) (“‘[When] there is a genuine possibility of j

2002Echeverry, [supra,] 698 F.2d at 376-77 .

12002–2002

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:24-4 (5) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:43-7.2 (5) NJ § N.J. Stat. § 2C:14-2 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

MI 49 (1994–2026) TX 30 (2005–2026) OH 30 (1989–2020) TN 22 (1995–2024) MA 15 (1987–2026) NJ 12 (1991–2026) DE 10 (1988–2025) HI 8 (1996–2021) UT 8 (1987–2026) DC 6 (1985–2017) CA 5 (2014–2022) MT 5 (1981–2022) KS 5 (2000–2011) MD 4 (1999–2022) CT 4 (2022–2023) ID 3 (2004–2016) ND 2 (2015–2015) AL 2 (1998–1998) WY 2 (1992–2022) WA 2 (2007–2007) NH 2 (1999–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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