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15 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Keevangreen2 sentences2014“A general unanimity instruction informs the jury that the verdict must be unanimous, whereas a specific unanimity instruction indicates to the jury that they must be unanimous as to which specific act constitutes the offense charged.” Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 420 Mass. 508, 512 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 566-567 (1987). 2007As explained in Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 566-567 (1987): “A general unanimity instruction informs the jury that the verdict must be unanimous, whereas a specific unanimity instruction indicates to the jury that they must be unanimous as to which specific act constitutes the offense charged.” Generally speaking, a specific unanimity instruction is appropriate where there is “evidence of alternate incidents that could support the charge against the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick, 423 Mass. 436, 442 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1015 (1996). | 6 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Conefreygreen2 sentences2023A general unanimity instruction "informs the jury that the verdict must be unanimous," and a specific unanimity instruction "indicates to the jury that they must be unanimous as to which specific act constitutes the offense charged." Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 420 Mass. 508, 512 (1995). 2023See id. at 513 ("where evidence of separate incidents is offered to the jury and any one incident could support a conviction, a general unanimity instruction may not suffice to ensure that the jury actually [do] reach a unanimous verdict"). | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Sylvestergreen2 sentences1997See Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 400 Mass. 334, 340 (1987); Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 567 (1987). 18 Read as a whole, as we must, see Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 417 Mass. 592, 595 (1994), the judge’s instructions were such that no reasonable juror could have been confused or misled as to his or her obligations in passing upon the issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence under either theory on each count. 19 The Commonwealth has sufficiently responded to and refuted the defendant’s additional assignments of error, and we need not discuss them further. 1995See Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 400 Mass. 334, 340 (1987) (where general unanimity instruction is given, reviewing court assumes that jury followed it absent evidence to the contrary). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Santosgreen2 sentences2010In some circumstances, a general unanimity instruction 2 and a general verdict slip will not be sufficient “to ensure the requisite unanimity.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 284 (2003). 2009Jury verdicts in criminal cases “must be unanimous,” and in certain narrowly defined circumstances, a general unanimity instruction is insufficient “to ensure the requisite unanimity.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 440 Mass. 281, 284 (2003). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2001The possibility of disagreement exists where the defendant is accused of a number of unrelated incidents, such as alleged rapes at different times or places, leaving the jurors free to believe different parts of the testimony and yet convict the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 366-367 (1991), quoting from People v. Burns, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1440, 1458 (1987). 1995See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 367 (1991). 9 We believe that this is such a case. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Burnsgreen1 sentence2001The possibility of disagreement exists where the defendant is accused of a number of unrelated incidents, such as alleged rapes at different times or places, leaving the jurors free to believe different parts of the testimony and yet convict the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 366-367 (1991), quoting from People v. Burns, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1440, 1458 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ferreiragreen1 sentence1997See Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 400 Mass. 334, 340 (1987); Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 567 (1987). 18 Read as a whole, as we must, see Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 417 Mass. 592, 595 (1994), the judge’s instructions were such that no reasonable juror could have been confused or misled as to his or her obligations in passing upon the issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence under either theory on each count. 19 The Commonwealth has sufficiently responded to and refuted the defendant’s additional assignments of error, and we need not discuss them further. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Lee Hagergreen1 sentence1995See and compare United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 891 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 904 (1992) (general unanimity instruc tian sufficient where evidence “not so complex that there was a genuine possibility of juror confusion”); United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Maria L. Sayangreen1 sentence1995See and compare United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 891 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 904 (1992) (general unanimity instruc tian sufficient where evidence “not so complex that there was a genuine possibility of juror confusion”); United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Ottgreen1 sentence1995See and compare United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883, 891 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 904 (1992) (general unanimity instruc tian sufficient where evidence “not so complex that there was a genuine possibility of juror confusion”); United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Comtoisgreen2 sentences1987See Commonwealth v. Comtois, 399 Mass. 668, 675-677 (1987). 1987See Commonwealth v. Comtois, 399 Mass. 668, 675-677 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Mistretta
green
2 sentences2026In Mistretta, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 907 , we held that the intentional and reckless forms of assault and battery are "closely related subcategories of the same crime" for which "[s]pecific unanimity is not required." We reasoned that "[i]n the case of reckless assault and battery, actual intent to commit the crime is not present, but its equivalent is established by the nature of the act (the act, itself, must be intentional, and its character wanton and reckless) and its results (there must be actual physical injury, and not simply unconsented-to touching)." Id. 2026In Mistretta, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 907 , we held that the intentional and reckless forms of assault and battery are "closely related subcategories of the same crime" for which "[s]pecific unanimity is not required." We reasoned that "[i]n the case of reckless assault and battery, actual intent to commit the crime is not present, but its equivalent is established by the nature of the act (the act, itself, must be intentional, and its character wanton and reckless) and its results (there must be actual physical injury, and not simply unconsented-to touching)." Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
L.L., a juvenile v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2018We review the judge's refusal to give the requested jury instructions for abuse of discretion, which occurs when a judge makes " 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision ..., such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives." L.L . v. Commonwealth , 470 Mass. 169 , 185 n.27 (2014) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Lonardo
green
1 sentence2010Commonwealth v. Lonardo, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 566, 571 (2009). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick
green
1 sentence2007As explained in Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 566-567 (1987): “A general unanimity instruction informs the jury that the verdict must be unanimous, whereas a specific unanimity instruction indicates to the jury that they must be unanimous as to which specific act constitutes the offense charged.” Generally speaking, a specific unanimity instruction is appropriate where there is “evidence of alternate incidents that could support the charge against the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick, 423 Mass. 436, 442 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1015 (1996). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Brown v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2007As explained in Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 566-567 (1987): “A general unanimity instruction informs the jury that the verdict must be unanimous, whereas a specific unanimity instruction indicates to the jury that they must be unanimous as to which specific act constitutes the offense charged.” Generally speaking, a specific unanimity instruction is appropriate where there is “evidence of alternate incidents that could support the charge against the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick, 423 Mass. 436, 442 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1015 (1996). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.