general unanimity instruction in Delaware

2024And because a general-unanimity instruction was not provided, Hale claims that this case is distinguishable from the “typical claim” based on the absence of a specific-unanimity instruction.5 (9) Because Hale did not object to the absence of a general-unanimity instruction or request a specific-unanimity instruction, we review his claim for plain error.6 “Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantive rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”7 (10) “A general unanimity instruction is required in ev

2024And because a general-unanimity instruction was not provided, Hale claims that this case is distinguishable from the “typical claim” based on the absence of a specific-unanimity instruction.5 (9) Because Hale did not object to the absence of a general-unanimity instruction or request a specific-unanimity instruction, we review his claim for plain error.6 “Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantive rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”7 (10) “A general unanimity instruction is required in ev

2025Due to the possibility of nonunanimous verdict, when one count encompasses two separate incidents, the trial judge must instruct the jurors that if a guilty verdict is returned, the jurors must be unanimous on which incident they find the defendant guilty.'' However, there is no danger of nonunanimous verdict when one charge encompasses only a single incident. !? 9 Hale v. State, 2024 WL 5116860 , at *3 (Del. 2024) (quoting Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 1998). 10 Td. quoting State v. Edwards, 524 A.2d 648, 653 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987). 11 Id Td. at *4 quoting Owens v. United States, 49

2024We found that “the incorrect use of masculine gender pronouns in an accomplice liability 21 Id. at 121 (quoting State v. Edwards, 524 A.2d 648, 653 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987)). 22 Id. at 122. 23 Id. at 117. 24 Id. 25 Id. at 120. 8 instruction, where the alleged principal is a male and the alleged accomplice is a female, made it likely that the jury would be confused.”26 Because Probst’s case would be remanded for a new trial, we noted that it would be “appropriate to give a more detailed unanimity instruction” given the State’s presentation of alternative theories of liability.27 (16) On a motion f

2024And because a general-unanimity instruction was not provided, Hale claims that this case is distinguishable from the “typical claim” based on the absence of a specific-unanimity instruction.5 (9) Because Hale did not object to the absence of a general-unanimity instruction or request a specific-unanimity instruction, we review his claim for plain error.6 “Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantive rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”7 (10) “A general unanimity instruction is required in ev

2024And because a general-unanimity instruction was not provided, Hale claims that this case is distinguishable from the “typical claim” based on the absence of a specific-unanimity instruction.5 (9) Because Hale did not object to the absence of a general-unanimity instruction or request a specific-unanimity instruction, we review his claim for plain error.6 “Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantive rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”7 (10) “A general unanimity instruction is required in ev

2024And because a general-unanimity instruction was not provided, Hale claims that this case is distinguishable from the “typical claim” based on the absence of a specific-unanimity instruction.5 (9) Because Hale did not object to the absence of a general-unanimity instruction or request a specific-unanimity instruction, we review his claim for plain error.6 “Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantive rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”7 (10) “A general unanimity instruction is required in ev

2024The trial court told the jury that they were “speaking with one voice” to reach a decision on the evidence. 12 The trial court clerk asked the foreman, “Has the jury agreed upon the verdict?[,]” to which the foreman replied, “Yes, they have.”13 The clerk then asked, “So say you all?[,]” to which the jury replied, “Yes.”14 Additionally, the verdict form stated that “[y]our verdict must be unanimous” directly above the line for the foreperson’s signature.15 All Superior Court jurors also receive a handbook prior to their service informing them that “[j]urors should seek to unanimously agree to a

2024And because a general-unanimity instruction was not provided, Hale claims that this case is distinguishable from the “typical claim” based on the absence of a specific-unanimity instruction.5 (9) Because Hale did not object to the absence of a general-unanimity instruction or request a specific-unanimity instruction, we review his claim for plain error.6 “Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantive rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”7 (10) “A general unanimity instruction is required in ev

2015The jury was given a general unanimity instruction, which is usually sufficient.6 The Superior Court also reinforced the unanimity requirement when charging the jury on accomplice liability. 7 Finally, unlike Probst, where the jury could have determined guilt based on multiple shooters involved in different incidents involving conceptually different actions, the State in Turner’s case proceeded on a theory that there were two shooters (Turner and Iban Rice) involved with one 3 547 A.2d 114, 119 (Del. 1988). 4 Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010) (citing Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 10

2025Due to the possibility of nonunanimous verdict, when one count encompasses two separate incidents, the trial judge must instruct the jurors that if a guilty verdict is returned, the jurors must be unanimous on which incident they find the defendant guilty.'' However, there is no danger of nonunanimous verdict when one charge encompasses only a single incident. !? 9 Hale v. State, 2024 WL 5116860 , at *3 (Del. 2024) (quoting Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 1998). 10 Td. quoting State v. Edwards, 524 A.2d 648, 653 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987). 11 Id Td. at *4 quoting Owens v. United States, 49

2024And because a general-unanimity instruction was not provided, Hale claims that this case is distinguishable from the “typical claim” based on the absence of a specific-unanimity instruction.5 (9) Because Hale did not object to the absence of a general-unanimity instruction or request a specific-unanimity instruction, we review his claim for plain error.6 “Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantive rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”7 (10) “A general unanimity instruction is required in ev

2020In Dougherty, the defendant was charged with second-degree conspiracy and the overt act alleged was “engaging in conduct constituting burglary second degree, an attempt to commit that crime, or ‘some other 54 Id. at 122 (quoting Cicaglione v. State, 474 A.2d 126, 130 (Del. 1984). 55 Id. 56 Id. at 124 16 overt act’ in pursuance of the conspiracy.”57 The defendant unsuccessfully moved for judgment of acquittal and never requested a specific-unanimity jury instruction.58 Therefore, the trial judge gave only a general-unanimity jury instruction.59 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial cou

2020In Dougherty, the defendant was charged with second-degree conspiracy and the overt act alleged was “engaging in conduct constituting burglary second degree, an attempt to commit that crime, or ‘some other 54 Id. at 122 (quoting Cicaglione v. State, 474 A.2d 126, 130 (Del. 1984). 55 Id. 56 Id. at 124 16 overt act’ in pursuance of the conspiracy.”57 The defendant unsuccessfully moved for judgment of acquittal and never requested a specific-unanimity jury instruction.58 Therefore, the trial judge gave only a general-unanimity jury instruction.59 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial cou

2015The jury was given a general unanimity instruction, which is usually sufficient.6 The Superior Court also reinforced the unanimity requirement when charging the jury on accomplice liability. 7 Finally, unlike Probst, where the jury could have determined guilt based on multiple shooters involved in different incidents involving conceptually different actions, the State in Turner’s case proceeded on a theory that there were two shooters (Turner and Iban Rice) involved with one 3 547 A.2d 114, 119 (Del. 1988). 4 Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010) (citing Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 10

2015The jury was given a general unanimity instruction, which is usually sufficient.6 The Superior Court also reinforced the unanimity requirement when charging the jury on accomplice liability. 7 Finally, unlike Probst, where the jury could have determined guilt based on multiple shooters involved in different incidents involving conceptually different actions, the State in Turner’s case proceeded on a theory that there were two shooters (Turner and Iban Rice) involved with one 3 547 A.2d 114, 119 (Del. 1988). 4 Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010) (citing Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 10

2015The jury was given a general unanimity instruction, which is usually sufficient.6 The Superior Court also reinforced the unanimity requirement when charging the jury on accomplice liability. 7 Finally, unlike Probst, where the jury could have determined guilt based on multiple shooters involved in different incidents involving conceptually different actions, the State in Turner’s case proceeded on a theory that there were two shooters (Turner and Iban Rice) involved with one 3 547 A.2d 114, 119 (Del. 1988). 4 Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010) (citing Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 10

1994See Liu v. State, Del.Supr., 628 A.2d 1376 (1993); Pope v. State, Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 73 (1993).

1993“However, this rule is inapplicable where there are factors in a case which create the potential that the jury will be confused.” Id. (citing United States v. Se-ros, 3rd Cir., 833 F.2d 455, 460 (1987)).

1988See Shivers v. United States, 533 A.2d 258, 261-63 (D.C.1987).

1988See Shivers v. United States, 533 A.2d 258, 261-63 (D.C.1987).