general unanimity instruction in Michigan

2024As this Court reasoned in Gadomski, 232 Mich App at 31 , a defendant is properly convicted of CSC-II “even if some of jurors believed that he committed the offense solely based on one aggravating circumstance, while the rest of the jurors believed that he committed the offense based on another one of the aggravating circumstances.” In this case, the trial court did not plainly err by giving the general unanimity instruction.

2024Generally, in cases “where materially identical evidence is presented with respect to each act, and there is no juror confusion, a general unanimity instruction will suffice.” Id. at 512-513 .2 A specific unanimity instruction, on the other hand, instructs the jury that “it must unanimously agree on the same specific act” if “the prosecution offers evidence of multiple acts by a defendant, each of which would satisfy the actus reus element of a single charged offense.” Gadomski, 232 Mich App at 30 .

2024Defendant’s reliance on People v Yarger, 193 Mich App 532 ; 485 NW2d 119 (1992), is misplaced.

1994In this case, we must determine whether a general unanimity instruction to the jury was adequate in light of the pattern of conduct offered as evidence of a single charged offense. in In finding that the trial court erred in this case, and that reversal was required, the Court of Appeals relied exclusively on Yarger, supra, and reasoned: Error occurred, because the jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree on which of the separate act(s) was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2024Id.

2022Id.

2024Where materially identical evidence is presented with respect to each act, and there is no juror confusion, a general unanimity instruction will suffice.” People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 719 ; 873 NW2d 855 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024Where materially identical evidence is presented with respect to each act, and there is no juror confusion, a general unanimity instruction will suffice.” People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 719 ; 873 NW2d 855 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025This Court has held: there are six elements necessary to establish third-degree fleeing and eluding: (1) the law enforcement officer must have been in uniform and performing his lawful duties and his vehicle must have been adequately identified as a law enforcement vehicle, (2) the defendant must have been driving a motor vehicle, (3) the officer, with his hand, voice, siren, or emergency lights must have ordered the defendant to stop, (4) the defendant must have been aware that he had been ordered to stop, (5) the defendant must have refused to obey the order by trying to flee from the office

2025This Court has held: there are six elements necessary to establish third-degree fleeing and eluding: (1) the law enforcement officer must have been in uniform and performing his lawful duties and his vehicle must have been adequately identified as a law enforcement vehicle, (2) the defendant must have been driving a motor vehicle, (3) the officer, with his hand, voice, siren, or emergency lights must have ordered the defendant to stop, (4) the defendant must have been aware that he had been ordered to stop, (5) the defendant must have refused to obey the order by trying to flee from the office

2023Indeed, “a party may not harbor error at trial and then use that error as an appellate parachute.” People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 726 ; 790 NW2d 662 (2010).

2023Indeed, “a party may not harbor error at trial and then use that error as an appellate parachute.” People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 726 ; 790 NW2d 662 (2010).

2019“In interpreting the first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute, Michigan courts have consistently held that the Legislature intended to punish separately each criminal sexual penetration.” People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 608 ; 493 NW2d 471 (1992).

2019“In interpreting the first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute, Michigan courts have consistently held that the Legislature intended to punish separately each criminal sexual penetration.” People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 608 ; 493 NW2d 471 (1992).

2015People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663-664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004); People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425 ; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).

2015People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663-664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004); People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425 ; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).

2015People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663-664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004); People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425 ; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).

2015Kowalski, 489 Mich at 503-505 ; Carter, 462 Mich at 214-215 .

2015People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663-664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004); People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425 ; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).

2015It is undisputed that a common-law misconduct in office charge against a law enforcement officer as defined may be based on alternate theories of “(1) malfeasance, -2- committing a wrongful act, or (2) misfeasance, performing a lawful act in a wrongful manner, or (3) nonfeasance, failing to do an act required by the duties of the office.” People v Milton, 257 Mich App 467, 470-471 ; 668 NW2d 387 (2003).

2015It is undisputed that a common-law misconduct in office charge against a law enforcement officer as defined may be based on alternate theories of “(1) malfeasance, -2- committing a wrongful act, or (2) misfeasance, performing a lawful act in a wrongful manner, or (3) nonfeasance, failing to do an act required by the duties of the office.” People v Milton, 257 Mich App 467, 470-471 ; 668 NW2d 387 (2003).

2015Kowalski, 489 Mich at 503-505 ; Carter, 462 Mich at 214-215 .

2015A court is permitted to impose “a consecutive sentence . . . only if specifically authorized by statute.” People v Ryan, 295 Mich App 388, 401 ; 819 NW2d 55 (2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

2015A court is permitted to impose “a consecutive sentence . . . only if specifically authorized by statute.” People v Ryan, 295 Mich App 388, 401 ; 819 NW2d 55 (2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

1997However, we conclude that Johnson and People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393 ; 551 NW2d 478 (1996) (see earlier discussion), are apposite, but Cooks is not.

1997However, we conclude that Johnson and People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393 ; 551 NW2d 478 (1996) (see earlier discussion), are apposite, but Cooks is not.

1994That situation arises where the complex nature of the evidence, a discrepancy between the evidence and the indictment, or some other particular factor creates a genuine possibility of juror confusion"); and United States v Natelli, 527 F2d 311, 324 (CA 2, 1975), cert den 425 US 934 (1976) (where the government offered two statements as evidence of an alleged falsely prepared proxy statement, the court found no error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jurors that "they must be unanimous on which, if either, of the two specifications had been proven materially false").

1994That situation arises where the complex nature of the evidence, a discrepancy between the evidence and the indictment, or some other particular factor creates a genuine possibility of juror confusion”); and United States v Natelli, 527 F2d 311, 324 (CA 2, 1975), cert den 425 US 934 (1976) (where the government offered two statements as evidence of an alleged falsely prepared proxy statement, the court found no error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jurors that "they must be unanimous on which, if either, of the two specifications had been proven materially false”).

1994See, e.g., United States v Schiff, 801 F2d 108, 115 (CA 2, 1986), cert den 480 US 945 (1987) (general unanimity charge found sufficient where "the alleged acts were closely interrelated and carried out by a single individual"); United States v Frazin, 780 F2d 1461, 1468 (CA 9, 1986), cert den 479 US 844 (1986) (a general unanimity instruction was sufficient in a mail and wire fraud prosecution in which there existed evidence of misrepresentations to numerous investors, in light of the rule that "a specific instruction that the jury must agree on a particular set of facts is required only where

1994See, e.g., United States v Schiff, 801 F2d 108, 115 (CA 2, 1986), cert den 480 US 945 (1987) (general unanimity charge found sufficient where "the alleged acts were closely interrelated and carried out by a single individual”); United States v Frazin, 780 F2d 1461, 1468 (CA 9, 1986), cert den 479 US 844 (1986) (a general unanimity instruction was sufficient in a mail and wire fraud prosecution in which there existed evidence of misrepresentations to numerous investors, in light of the rule that "a specific instruction that the jury must agree on a particular set of facts is required only where