12 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Haugan v. Home Indemnity Companygreen2 sentences2020Co., 197 N.W.2d 18, 22 (S.D. 1972)). 2020Co., 197 N.W.2d 18, 22 (S.D. 1972)). | 2 | 2 |
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.green2 sentences2020An exclusion "is a limitation or restriction on the insuring clause." Weedo, 81 N.J. at 247 (quoting Haugan v. Home Indem. 2020An exclusion "is a limitation or restriction on the insuring clause." Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, 81 N.J. 233, 247 (1979) (quoting Haugan v. Home Indem. | 1 | 3 |
Feuchtbaum v. Constantinigreen1 sentence2021A-1154-20 8 Plaintiffs correctly argue that, in the eyes of the law, they obtained an interest in any contract possessed by defendants that would, in the words of Rule 4:10-2(b), make the other contracting party "liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action." There is no novelty in this argument; the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "upon the happening of an accident the injured third party acquires an interest in the [tortfeasor's] policy." Estate of Gardinier, 40 N.J. at 265 ; see Feuchtbaum v. Constantini, 59 N.J. 167, 177 (1971); Burd v. Sussex Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Symington v. Walle Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence1998Co., 563 N.W.2d 400, 404 (N.D.1997) (where the insuring clause provided coverage for “direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property ... caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss,” the policy was not an all-risk policy). | 1 | 1 |
Tomaiuoli v. US Fidelity and Guaranty Co.green1 sentence1966Tomaiuoli v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 75 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Mazzilli v. Acc. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Winterthurgreen1 sentence1963Co. of Winterthur, 35 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1961), the "proper interpretation [of the insuring clause] should be that domicile should control as of the time of the issuance of the policy, and not as of the time of the loss." His argument runs that the intention of one taking insurance on personal property is to insure the property against loss, and when, as here, the insured property is described in detail, the location of it at the time of loss becomes unimportant notwithstanding the domiciliary provision. | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.green1 sentence1961Kennedy v. U.S. Fidelity, etc., Co., 113 N.J.L. 431, 435 ( E. & A. 1934); Brindley v. Firemen's Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1979Where the policy thus requires some accidental cause, the test is whether the events preceding the injury would be *390 perceived by an average policyholder as "accidental," in light of "the limiting language of the insuring clause." 41 N.J. at 568 . 1966The average policyholder could not reasonably reach a conclusion of coverage in the particular circumstances here "in the light of and having in mind the limiting language of the insuring clause." Harris v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., supra, 41 N.J., at p. 568 . | 4 | 1966–1979 |
In Re the Estate of Gardinier
green
1 sentence2021A-1154-20 8 Plaintiffs correctly argue that, in the eyes of the law, they obtained an interest in any contract possessed by defendants that would, in the words of Rule 4:10-2(b), make the other contracting party "liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action." There is no novelty in this argument; the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "upon the happening of an accident the injured third party acquires an interest in the [tortfeasor's] policy." Estate of Gardinier, 40 N.J. at 265 ; see Feuchtbaum v. Constantini, 59 N.J. 167, 177 (1971); Burd v. Sussex Mut. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Reeder
green
1 sentence2006In Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 270 Cal.Rptr. 719 , that opinion did not purport to analyze the "occurrence" element of the insuring clause, but rested on the "property damage" element, ruling that there was "property damage" when the contractor's defective work caused physical damage to other parts of the property being worked on. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
NEWARK INS. v. Acupac Packaging
green
1 sentence2006Ordinarily, the coverage is for tort liability for physical damage to others and not for contractual liability of the insured for economic loss because the product or completed work is not that for which the damaged person bargained. [ Id. at 391, 746 A. 2d 47 .] In Hartford Ins. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.