insuring clause in Tennessee

1999The insuring clause of the Allstate policy provided: “Allstate will pay all sums arising from an accidental loss which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage covered by this part of the policy.” The applicable exclusion provides, “We do not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, occupancy . . . loading or unloading of any motorized land vehicle or trailer.” Id. at 884 .

1999The insuring clause of the Allstate policy provided: “Allstate will pay all sums arising from an accidental loss which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage covered by this part of the policy.” The applicable exclusion provides, “We do not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, occupancy ... loading or unloading of any motorized land vehicle or trailer.” Id. at 884 .

1991The dissent’s basic premise was that “there is a distinction between the coverage afforded by an insurance contract and an exclusionary provision.” Id. at 356 .

1991As authority for this distinction, the court erroneously found “we have no case in Tennessee in which the doctrine of estoppel was made the basis of recovery except where the loss was within the coverage provided by the insuring clause of the contract.” Id. 410 S.W.2d at 733 .

1990The definition of property damage in the policy, as in the instant case, is: “injury to or destruction of tangible property.” Id. at 763 .

1966We do not think Swift & Co. v. Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82 , 158 S.W. 480 , is in point.

1958Any one using them for a purpose not connected with a business properly carried on there would be a trespasser or at best a licensee. ’ ’ The second reason is well stated in Murphey v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 98 Ind.App. 668 , 186 N.E. 902, 903 , wherein it is said: “Under the insuring clause of the policy involved here, applellee becomes liable if, and only if, the insured be ‘ struck or knocked down or run over while walking or standing on a public highway’.

1958Any one using them for a purpose not connected with a business properly carried on there would be a trespasser or at best a licensee. ’ ’ The second reason is well stated in Murphey v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 98 Ind.App. 668 , 186 N.E. 902, 903 , wherein it is said: “Under the insuring clause of the policy involved here, applellee becomes liable if, and only if, the insured be ‘ struck or knocked down or run over while walking or standing on a public highway’.

1954The fair import of the language of the policy, which, needless to say, contains a very narrow assumption of risk on the part of the defendant, is that it covers a building so dom inantly used as to be known and characterized as a ‘ church, theatre, library, school or municipal administration building.’ ” In the subsequent case of Spiller v. Washington National Insurance Co., 240 Mo. App. 226 , 206 S. W. (2d) 581, 586 , the same Missouri Court recognized and applied the “dominant use” rule in defining “office building”.

1954The fair import of the language of the policy, which, needless to say, contains a very narrow assumption of risk on the part of the defendant, is that it covers a building so dom inantly used as to be known and characterized as a ‘ church, theatre, library, school or municipal administration building.’ ” In the subsequent case of Spiller v. Washington National Insurance Co., 240 Mo. App. 226 , 206 S. W. (2d) 581, 586 , the same Missouri Court recognized and applied the “dominant use” rule in defining “office building”.

1951The brief further recites that this question was settled by American Automobile Insurance Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 605 , 45 S. W. (2d) 52 .

1951The brief further recites that this question was settled by American Automobile Insurance Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 605 , 45 S. W. (2d) 52 .