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25 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co.green2 sentences2006Corp. , 737 S.W.2d at 381 B 82 (construing the insuring agreement provision and an exclusion); Unitramp, Ltd. , 146 F.3d at 313 n.1 (construing the A occurrence @ clause); Snug Harbor , 968 F.2d at 542 n.9 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Pilgrim Enters., Inc. , 24 S.W.3d at 499 (construing the A occurrence @ and A bodily injury or property damage @ clauses); see also Am. 2006Corp., 737 S.W.2d at 381-82 (construing the insuring agreement provision and an exclusion); Unitramp, Ltd., 146 F.3d at 313 n. 1 (construing the “occurrence” clause); Snug Harbor, 968 F.2d at 542 n. 9 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 24 S.W.3d at 499 (construing the “occurrence” and “bodily injury or property damage” clauses); see also Am. | 2 | 2 |
Cullen/Frost Bank of Dallas, N.A. v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co.green2 sentences2006See Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc. , 1996 WL 87205at *1 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Cullen/Frost Bank of Dallas , 852 S.W.2d at 256 B 58 (construing the insuring clause and the terms A property damage @ and A occurrence @ ); Dorchester Dev. 2006See Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 1996 WL 87205at *1 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Cullen/Frost Bank of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d at 256-58 (construing the insuring clause and the terms “property damage” and “occurrence”); Dorchester Dev. | 1 | 2 |
Dorchester Development Corp. v. Safeco Insurancegreen2 sentences2006Corp. , 737 S.W.2d at 381 B 82 (construing the insuring agreement provision and an exclusion); Unitramp, Ltd. , 146 F.3d at 313 n.1 (construing the A occurrence @ clause); Snug Harbor , 968 F.2d at 542 n.9 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Pilgrim Enters., Inc. , 24 S.W.3d at 499 (construing the A occurrence @ and A bodily injury or property damage @ clauses); see also Am. 2006Corp., 737 S.W.2d at 381-82 (construing the insuring agreement provision and an exclusion); Unitramp, Ltd., 146 F.3d at 313 n. 1 (construing the “occurrence” clause); Snug Harbor, 968 F.2d at 542 n. 9 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 24 S.W.3d at 499 (construing the “occurrence” and “bodily injury or property damage” clauses); see also Am. | 1 | 2 |
Bob Greene, as Next Friend of Lewayne Greene v. Farmers Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2016In doing so, the Greene court read the vacancy clause together with the dwelling coverage’s insuring clause, including the definition of “residence premises.” 4 See id. 2016See id. | 1 | 1 |
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Morielred2 sentences1999INS.CODE art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4). [19] The policy provided: "Coverage is not provided for sickness or disorder involving the following unless loss incurred six months after the Policy Date: hernia, varicose veins, hemorrhoids, reproductive organs, appendix, tonsils, adenoids or gallbladder." [20] The insuring clause, which is the first paragraph of the policy, stated that it provided benefits only for accidental bodily injury and "sickness, which first manifests itself more than thirty (30) days after the effective date of this Policy, hereinafter referred to as such sickness." In the definiti 1999The insuring clause, which is the first paragraph of the policy, stated that it provided benefits only for accidental bodily injury and "sickness, which first manifests itself more than thirty (30) days after the effective date of this Policy, hereinafter referred to as such sickness.” In the definitions section, the policy defined “[sjickness” as an "illness or disease of a member of the Family Group which first manifests itself more than 30 days after the Policy date and while the policy is in force.” Other provisions stated that coverage extended to services and supplies “necessary for the | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolaugreen2 sentences1999INS.CODE art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4). [19] The policy provided: "Coverage is not provided for sickness or disorder involving the following unless loss incurred six months after the Policy Date: hernia, varicose veins, hemorrhoids, reproductive organs, appendix, tonsils, adenoids or gallbladder." [20] The insuring clause, which is the first paragraph of the policy, stated that it provided benefits only for accidental bodily injury and "sickness, which first manifests itself more than thirty (30) days after the effective date of this Policy, hereinafter referred to as such sickness." In the definiti 1999The insuring clause, which is the first paragraph of the policy, stated that it provided benefits only for accidental bodily injury and "sickness, which first manifests itself more than thirty (30) days after the effective date of this Policy, hereinafter referred to as such sickness.” In the definitions section, the policy defined “[sjickness” as an "illness or disease of a member of the Family Group which first manifests itself more than 30 days after the Policy date and while the policy is in force.” Other provisions stated that coverage extended to services and supplies “necessary for the | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Pan American Insurance Co.green1 sentence1997Co., 437 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex.1969) (“The term ‘use’ is the general catchall of the insuring clause, designed and construed to include all proper uses of the vehicle not falling within other terms of definition such as ownership and maintenance.”). | 1 | 1 |
Evana Plantation, Inc. v. Yorkshire Ins.green1 sentence1993Id. at 800-01. | 1 | 1 |
Emp'rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Mission Equities Corp.green2 sentences1988Gyler v. Mission Insurance Co., 10 Cal.3d 216, 220 , 514 P.2d 1219 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 139, 141 (1973) (any implication restricting coverage must be rejected since it was not conspicuous, plain, and clear, being found in a part of the policy far below the basic insuring clause and not set off in bold type); Chamberlin v. Smith, 72 Cal.App.3d 835, 849-51 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 493, 501-02 (1973); Employers Reinsurance v. Mission Equities Corp., 74 Cal.App.3d 826, 829 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 727, 729 (1977) (the use of the terminology within the policy of negligent acts or claims which “may be made” or “may have b 1988Gyler v. Mission Insurance Co., 10 Cal.3d 216, 220 , 514 P.2d 1219 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 139, 141 (1973) (any implication restricting coverage must be rejected since it was not conspicuous, plain, and clear, being found in a part of the policy far below the basic insuring clause and not set off in bold type); Chamberlin v. Smith, 72 Cal.App.3d 835, 849-51 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 493, 501-02 (1973); Employers Reinsurance v. Mission Equities Corp., 74 Cal.App.3d 826, 829 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 727, 729 (1977) (the use of the terminology within the policy of negligent acts or claims which “may be made” or “may have b | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. OFFICE OF HEALTH SERVICES, ETC.green1 sentence1988Brown Const. Co. v. D & M Mechanical Contr., Inc., 222 So.2d 93, 97-98 (La.Ct.App.1969) (claim must be filed during policy period in order for subsequent claim relating to original claim to be deemed made within the policy period; not an “occurrence” policy which applies regardless of the date of discovery); Hunter v. Office of Health Services, etc., 385 So.2d 928, 937 (La.Ct.App.1980) (although excess policies were of the “occurrence” type, the underlying primary policies had been attached to and incorporated into them by reference, thus making the excess coverage dependent on the coverage pr | 1 | 1 |
Gereboff v. Home Indemnity Co.green2 sentences1988Co., 465 F.2d 22 , 25 (9th Cir.1972) (“claims-made” policy; no coverage for claim after close of the period of coverage afforded by the policy); Gereboff v. Home Indemnity Co., 119 R.I. 814 , 383 A.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1978) (court rejected insured’s contention that the words “pri- or to the termination of the policy” ambiguous thus making it impossible to classify policy either as “occurrence” or “claims-made”; court stated that terms, when read in context, were clear). 1988Co., 465 F.2d 22 , 25 (9th Cir.1972) (“claims-made” policy; no coverage for claim after close of the period of coverage afforded by the policy); Gereboff v. Home Indemnity Co., 119 R.I. 814 , 383 A.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1978) (court rejected insured’s contention that the words “pri- or to the termination of the policy” ambiguous thus making it impossible to classify policy either as “occurrence” or “claims-made”; court stated that terms, when read in context, were clear). | 1 | 1 |
Samuel N. Zarpas, Inc. v. Morrowgreen1 sentence1988Super. 406 , 247 A.2d 370, 375 (Law Div. 1968) (summary judgment granted in which acts or omissions which caused the accident occurred during the policy period, but were not reported during the policy period provided no coverage; the insuring clause not rendered uncertain or unambiguous by other provisions of the policy); Samuel N. Zarpas, Inc. v. Morrow, 215 F.Supp. 887, 888-89 (D.C.N.J.1963) (language clearly implied a “claims-made” policy; notice provision requiring immediate notification to insurer would be rendered meaningless if policy was an “occurrence” policy); Cornell, Howland, Hayes | 1 | 1 |
Chamberlin v. Smithgreen2 sentences1988Gyler v. Mission Insurance Co., 10 Cal.3d 216, 220 , 514 P.2d 1219 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 139, 141 (1973) (any implication restricting coverage must be rejected since it was not conspicuous, plain, and clear, being found in a part of the policy far below the basic insuring clause and not set off in bold type); Chamberlin v. Smith, 72 Cal.App.3d 835, 849-51 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 493, 501-02 (1973); Employers Reinsurance v. Mission Equities Corp., 74 Cal.App.3d 826, 829 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 727, 729 (1977) (the use of the terminology within the policy of negligent acts or claims which “may be made” or “may have b 1988Gyler v. Mission Insurance Co., 10 Cal.3d 216, 220 , 514 P.2d 1219 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 139, 141 (1973) (any implication restricting coverage must be rejected since it was not conspicuous, plain, and clear, being found in a part of the policy far below the basic insuring clause and not set off in bold type); Chamberlin v. Smith, 72 Cal.App.3d 835, 849-51 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 493, 501-02 (1973); Employers Reinsurance v. Mission Equities Corp., 74 Cal.App.3d 826, 829 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 727, 729 (1977) (the use of the terminology within the policy of negligent acts or claims which “may be made” or “may have b | 1 | 1 |
JM Brown Const. Co. v. D & M Mechanical Contr., Inc.green1 sentence1988Brown Const. Co. v. D & M Mechanical Contr., Inc., 222 So.2d 93, 97-98 (La.Ct.App.1969) (claim must be filed during policy period in order for subsequent claim relating to original claim to be deemed made within the policy period; not an “occurrence” policy which applies regardless of the date of discovery); Hunter v. Office of Health Services, etc., 385 So.2d 928, 937 (La.Ct.App.1980) (although excess policies were of the “occurrence” type, the underlying primary policies had been attached to and incorporated into them by reference, thus making the excess coverage dependent on the coverage pr | 1 | 1 |
Rotwein v. General Accident Group & Cas.green1 sentence1988Super. 406 , 247 A.2d 370, 375 (Law Div. 1968) (summary judgment granted in which acts or omissions which caused the accident occurred during the policy period, but were not reported during the policy period provided no coverage; the insuring clause not rendered uncertain or unambiguous by other provisions of the policy); Samuel N. Zarpas, Inc. v. Morrow, 215 F.Supp. 887, 888-89 (D.C.N.J.1963) (language clearly implied a “claims-made” policy; notice provision requiring immediate notification to insurer would be rendered meaningless if policy was an “occurrence” policy); Cornell, Howland, Hayes | 1 | 1 |
Gyler v. Mission Insurancegreen2 sentences1988Gyler v. Mission Insurance Co., 10 Cal.3d 216, 220 , 514 P.2d 1219 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 139, 141 (1973) (any implication restricting coverage must be rejected since it was not conspicuous, plain, and clear, being found in a part of the policy far below the basic insuring clause and not set off in bold type); Chamberlin v. Smith, 72 Cal.App.3d 835, 849-51 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 493, 501-02 (1973); Employers Reinsurance v. Mission Equities Corp., 74 Cal.App.3d 826, 829 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 727, 729 (1977) (the use of the terminology within the policy of negligent acts or claims which “may be made” or “may have b 1988Gyler v. Mission Insurance Co., 10 Cal.3d 216, 220 , 514 P.2d 1219 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 139, 141 (1973) (any implication restricting coverage must be rejected since it was not conspicuous, plain, and clear, being found in a part of the policy far below the basic insuring clause and not set off in bold type); Chamberlin v. Smith, 72 Cal.App.3d 835, 849-51 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 493, 501-02 (1973); Employers Reinsurance v. Mission Equities Corp., 74 Cal.App.3d 826, 829 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 727, 729 (1977) (the use of the terminology within the policy of negligent acts or claims which “may be made” or “may have b | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Building Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences2011Coverage under the insuring clause Lexington contends that the products liability insuring clause does not cover Al-bemarle’s claims because, according to Lexington, “all of [Albemarle’s] allegations and damages arose from or flowed from its need to repair or replace [National’s] damaged product — the defective DHT.” Lexington cites Building Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 712 F.Supp.2d 628 (S.D.Tex.2010), for the proposition that allegations of a defective product are not allegations of “property damage,” and thus do not give rise to the duty to defend. 2011Coverage under the insuring clause Lexington contends that the products liability insuring clause does not cover Albemarle’s claims because, according to Lexington, “all of [Albemarle’s] allegations and damages arose from or flowed from its need to repair or replace [National’s] damaged product—the defective DHT.” Lexington cites Building Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 712 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
First National Bank in Dallas v. Whirlpool Corp.
green
2 sentences2009A statutory mechanic’s hen may therefore attach to items that have become fixtures and such hen will be superior to a prior deed-of-trust hen when the fixtures can be removed without material injury to the land and pre-existing improvements or to the fixtures themselves. 8 See id. at 269 . *296 Paragraph 6 of the insuring clause covers loss or damage arising from “a statutory or constitutional mechanic’s, contractor’s, or materialman’s lien for labor or material” having its inception (statutorily defined in section 53.124(a)) on or before the date of the policy, when such lien has priority ove 2009Such a “mechanic’s lien” will have priority over any prior lien, including a “lien of the insured mortgage,” when the “mechanic’s lien” is on improvements (including fixtures) that can be removed without material injury to the land and pre-existing improvements or to the improvements themselves, i.e., “removable improvements.” See Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d at 269 ; see also Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 53.123. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Snug Harbor, Ltd. v. Zurich Insurance
green
2 sentences2006Corp. , 737 S.W.2d at 381 B 82 (construing the insuring agreement provision and an exclusion); Unitramp, Ltd. , 146 F.3d at 313 n.1 (construing the A occurrence @ clause); Snug Harbor , 968 F.2d at 542 n.9 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Pilgrim Enters., Inc. , 24 S.W.3d at 499 (construing the A occurrence @ and A bodily injury or property damage @ clauses); see also Am. 2006Corp., 737 S.W.2d at 381-82 (construing the insuring agreement provision and an exclusion); Unitramp, Ltd., 146 F.3d at 313 n. 1 (construing the “occurrence” clause); Snug Harbor, 968 F.2d at 542 n. 9 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 24 S.W.3d at 499 (construing the “occurrence” and “bodily injury or property damage” clauses); see also Am. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
American Home Assurance Company, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee v. Unitramp Limited and Unitramp, S.A., Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants
green
2 sentences2006Corp. , 737 S.W.2d at 381 B 82 (construing the insuring agreement provision and an exclusion); Unitramp, Ltd. , 146 F.3d at 313 n.1 (construing the A occurrence @ clause); Snug Harbor , 968 F.2d at 542 n.9 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Pilgrim Enters., Inc. , 24 S.W.3d at 499 (construing the A occurrence @ and A bodily injury or property damage @ clauses); see also Am. 2006Corp., 737 S.W.2d at 381-82 (construing the insuring agreement provision and an exclusion); Unitramp, Ltd., 146 F.3d at 313 n. 1 (construing the “occurrence” clause); Snug Harbor, 968 F.2d at 542 n. 9 (construing the insuring agreement provision); Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 24 S.W.3d at 499 (construing the “occurrence” and “bodily injury or property damage” clauses); see also Am. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
International Travelers' Ass'n v. Francis
green
2 sentences1944The foregoing insuring clause is similar in all material respects to the one considered by the Supreme Court in the case of International Travelers’ Ass’n v. Francis, 119 Tex. 1 , 23 S.W.2d 282 . *982 The clause was there held to insure against the loss of life resulting from .an intentional act, such as pulling a tooth, because such a result was so rare, unusual and extraordinary as to constitute the loss of life from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means. 1944The foregoing insuring clause is similar in all material respects to the one considered by the Supreme Court in the case of International Travelers’ Ass’n v. Francis, 119 Tex. 1 , 23 S.W.2d 282 . *982 The clause was there held to insure against the loss of life resulting from .an intentional act, such as pulling a tooth, because such a result was so rare, unusual and extraordinary as to constitute the loss of life from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means. | 2 | 1942–1944 |
National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Dominguez
green
2 sentences1999The insuring clause, which is the first paragraph of the policy, stated that it provided benefits only for accidental bodily injury and "sickness, which first manifests itself more than thirty (30) days after the effective date of this Policy, hereinafter referred to as such sickness.” In the definitions section, the policy defined “[sjickness” as an "illness or disease of a member of the Family Group which first manifests itself more than 30 days after the Policy date and while the policy is in force.” Other provisions stated that coverage extended to services and supplies “necessary for the 1999Id. at 377 . . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Central Louisiana Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse
green
1 sentence1994Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.
green
1 sentence1989Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d at 790 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
cluster 305058
green
1 sentence1988Co., 465 F.2d 22 , 25 (9th Cir.1972) (“claims-made” policy; no coverage for claim after close of the period of coverage afforded by the policy); Gereboff v. Home Indemnity Co., 119 R.I. 814 , 383 A.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1978) (court rejected insured’s contention that the words “pri- or to the termination of the policy” ambiguous thus making it impossible to classify policy either as “occurrence” or “claims-made”; court stated that terms, when read in context, were clear). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bryan v. United States Fire Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1984The court held that the insuring clause, stating that the property was insured “while occupied by the Insured principally for dwelling purposes,” meant that the property was not insured during such time that the insured was not occupying it principally for dwelling purposes, “as when sole occupancy and use was by a renter as his dwelling.” Id. at 705 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Equipment Rental Co.
green
1 sentence1973It is settled that the parties to an insurance contract may make their agreement in any legal form they choose, and “in the absence of statutory prohibitions, insurers may limit their liability and impose whatever conditions they please upon their obligations not inconsistent with public policy.” Hatch v. Turner, 145 Tex. 17 , 193 S.W.2d 668 (1946); Travelers Indemnity Company v. Equipment Rental Company, 345 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Civ.App. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Hatch v. Turner
green
2 sentences1973It is settled that the parties to an insurance contract may make their agreement in any legal form they choose, and “in the absence of statutory prohibitions, insurers may limit their liability and impose whatever conditions they please upon their obligations not inconsistent with public policy.” Hatch v. Turner, 145 Tex. 17 , 193 S.W.2d 668 (1946); Travelers Indemnity Company v. Equipment Rental Company, 345 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973It is settled that the parties to an insurance contract may make their agreement in any legal form they choose, and “in the absence of statutory prohibitions, insurers may limit their liability and impose whatever conditions they please upon their obligations not inconsistent with public policy.” Hatch v. Turner, 145 Tex. 17 , 193 S.W.2d 668 (1946); Travelers Indemnity Company v. Equipment Rental Company, 345 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Civ.App. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Sherman v. Provident American Insurance Company
green
2 sentences1970The appellant's answer contains the following allegations, to which plaintiff took no exception: "Said defendant herein does hereby specifically plead in defense to the plaintiff's action * * * (1) The provisions, limitations and exclusions contained in the insuring clause of said policy. (2) The provisions, limitations, and exclusions contained in Part I of said policy. (3) The provisions, limitations and exclusions contained in Part II of said policy. (4) The provisions, limitations and exclusions contained in Part III of said policy. (5) The provisions, limitations and exclusions contained 1970The appellant’s answer contains the following allegations, to which plaintiff took no exception: “Said defendant herein does hereby specifically plead in defense to the plaintiff’s action * * * (1) The provisions, limitations and exclusions contained in the insuring clause of said policy. (2) The provisions, limitations, and exclusions contained in Part I of said policy. (3) The provisions, limitations and exclusions contained in Part II of said policy. (4) The provisions, limitations and exclusions contained in Part III of said policy. (5) The provisions, limitations and exclusions contained | 1 | 1970–1970 |
World Fire & Marine Ins. v. Carolina Mills Distributing Co.
green
2 sentences1969In support of this contention appellants cite World Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Carolina Mills Distributing Company, 169 F.2d 826 , 4 A.L.R.2d 523 (8th Cir.). 1969In support of this contention appellants cite World Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Carolina Mills Distributing Company, 169 F.2d 826 , 4 A.L.R.2d 523 (8th Cir.). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Merryman v. Employers National Life Insurance Co. neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. Faulkner green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Brown v. Palatine Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Federal Surety Co. v. Waite neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| White v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Mitchell v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Burrus v. Continental Life Insurance green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| International Traveler's Ass'n v. Bettis green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.