insuring clause in Missouri

2019See 4 Ruiz suggests that the probate court’s approval of his request for attorneys’ fees against Decedent’s estate—and the lack of a counterclaim by Decedent’s estate—provided him a reasonable belief that no claim would be raised against him resulting from his representation of Decedent. 13 Wittner, 969 S.W.2d at 754 ; Grissom, 371 S.W.3d at 874 ; Landry, 292 S.W.3d at 356 ; see also Bryan Bros.

2019See 4 Ruiz suggests that the probate court’s approval of his request for attorneys’ fees against Decedent’s estate—and the lack of a counterclaim by Decedent’s estate—provided him a reasonable belief that no claim would be raised against him resulting from his representation of Decedent. 13 Wittner, 969 S.W.2d at 754 ; Grissom, 371 S.W.3d at 874 ; Landry, 292 S.W.3d at 356 ; see also Bryan Bros.

2014Deemed a "non-owner" exclusion, it states that coverage does not apply to: Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of any vehicle, other than your insured car, which is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or any resident of your household. 8 Judge Ahuja's dissenting opinion posits that the majority "offers no rationale for looking at the policy's insuring clause to expand the universe of 'designated' vehicles, while not also looking to the policy's exclusions, which specify that coverage does not extend to other owned vehicles." Our opinion is not a "pick

2014Deemed a "non-owner" exclusion, it states that coverage does not apply to: Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of any vehicle, other than your insured car, which is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or any resident of your household. 8 Judge Ahuja's dissenting opinion posits that the majority "offers no rationale for looking at the policy's insuring clause to expand the universe of 'designated' vehicles, while not also looking to the policy's exclusions, which specify that coverage does not extend to other owned vehicles." Our opinion is not a "pick

1995An insuring clause “occurrence provision” identical to the policy provision in the case at bar was construed in D.T.S., 867 S.W.2d at 643 .

1994The Ward court found: “While admittedly covered by the insuring clause, [husband’s] derivative damages do not constitute separate and distinct ‘bodily injury.’ ” Id.

1981Transport Indemnity Co. v. Teter, 575 S.W.2d 780 [1-3] (Mo.App.1978).

1979Co. of New York v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167 , 44 S.Ct. 90 , 68 L.Ed. 235 (1923).

1979Co. of New York v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167 , 44 S.Ct. 90 , 68 L.Ed. 235 (1923).

1975Co. of Newark, N. J. v. Orr, 379 F.2d 865 (1967) (8th Cir.), a case based on Missouri law, an insuring clause which provided for payment of loss, including death, “resulting directly and independently of all other causes from accidental bodily injury” was construed to require the proof of “accidental means.” But recovery was allowed. .

1971In Winterton v. Van Zandt, Mo., 351 S.W.2d 696 [1, 2], the court held that in view of that act liability policies will be liberally construed to grant coverage since “the provisions of that act are indicative of the public policy of this state to assure financial remuneration to the extent and under the conditions therein provided for damages sustained through the negligent operation of motor vehicles upon the public highways of this state * * Giving defendant Riley the benefit of liberal interpretation to which he is entitled we hold that under the facts of this case the coverage given by the

1964An Illinois appellate court in Kaplan v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 Ill.App.2d 400 , 182 N.E.2d 766 , considered an identical insuring clause ar.d reached a like result.

1964An Illinois appellate court in Kaplan v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 Ill.App.2d 400 , 182 N.E.2d 766 , considered an identical insuring clause ar.d reached a like result.

1958As is to be seen the first paragraph of the insuring clause covers direct loss of gasoline sold “but not delivered.” Appellant lays stress upon the words appearing in the remaining portions of the clause, to-wit: “in or on” assured’s truck and “only while actually in transit.” The case of Loesch v. Union Casualty & Surety Company, 176 Mo. 654 , 75 S.W. 621, 624 , dealt with the words “in transit.” The policy of insurance involved in that case designated insured’s occupation as “stock dealer, not working nor tending in transit.” It called for a death benefit of $5,000 arising out of accidental

1958As is to be seen the first paragraph of the insuring clause covers direct loss of gasoline sold “but not delivered.” Appellant lays stress upon the words appearing in the remaining portions of the clause, to-wit: “in or on” assured’s truck and “only while actually in transit.” The case of Loesch v. Union Casualty & Surety Company, 176 Mo. 654 , 75 S.W. 621, 624 , dealt with the words “in transit.” The policy of insurance involved in that case designated insured’s occupation as “stock dealer, not working nor tending in transit.” It called for a death benefit of $5,000 arising out of accidental

1932Where the provisions of the policy are ; plain, unambiguous and unequivocal, it is the duty of the court to apply its terms as written and not to construe them. [State ex rel. v. Trimble, 297 Mo. 659 ; State ex rel. v. Cox, 322 Mo. 38 .] Plaintiff seems to lay stress on the word “also” as contained in the insuring clause of the policy, but he does not attempt to -inform the court as to his construction of that word, except to say, negatively, that taken in connection with the text it does not mean “hereinafter described in the schedule.” We think its meaning, is apparent.

1932Where the provisions of the policy are ; plain, unambiguous and unequivocal, it is the duty of the court to apply its terms as written and not to construe them. [State ex rel. v. Trimble, 297 Mo. 659 ; State ex rel. v. Cox, 322 Mo. 38 .] Plaintiff seems to lay stress on the word “also” as contained in the insuring clause of the policy, but he does not attempt to -inform the court as to his construction of that word, except to say, negatively, that taken in connection with the text it does not mean “hereinafter described in the schedule.” We think its meaning, is apparent.