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12 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Medox, Inc.green2 sentences2009The policy containing the excess clause, however, is not considered to be other valid and collectible primary insurance for the purpose of triggering the operation of the pro rata clause, because when a stated contingency occurs, that is, when there is other valid and collectible primary insurance available to the insured, the policy containing the excess clause becomes secondary coverage only. [ Jones v. Medox, Inc., 430 A. 2d 488, 491 (D.C.1981) (footnote omitted).] Criticism of the majority rule focuses on what critics claim is its circularity of reasoning. 2009Id. at 492 . | 1 | 1 |
Dolan v. City of Tigardgreen2 sentences2008The pro-rata requirement also comports with the "rough proportionality” mandated by Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 , 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2319-20 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 320 (1994) (requiring municipality to “make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development"). 3 Despite some suggestion in the record that the initial conditions themselves exceeded Toll Brothers’ fair share, there has never been a challenge to those conditions. 2008The pro-rata requirement also comports with the "rough proportionality” mandated by Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 , 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2319-20 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 320 (1994) (requiring municipality to “make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development"). 3 Despite some suggestion in the record that the initial conditions themselves exceeded Toll Brothers’ fair share, there has never been a challenge to those conditions. | 1 | 1 |
Lundy v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green1 sentence1987Co., 92 N.J. 550, 555 (1983), against any reduction in the amounts mandated by the statute), which reads as follows: Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph [the escape-excess provision], if the insured has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable lim | 1 | 1 |
McFarland v. Chicago Exp., Inc. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co. Of Boston, Massgreen1 sentence1959See McFarland v. Chicago Exp., supra; American Surety Company of New York v. Canal Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Theobold v. Angelos
green
2 sentences1988According to the comment, the pro tanto principle was designed to ameliorate the sometimes harsh result created by the pro rata rule of Theobold v. Angelos, supra , and has continued efficacy within the context of comparative negligence principles. 1980The comment to N.J.S.A. 59:9-3 states that the pro tanto rule was adopted to avoid the sometimes harsh result created by the pro rata rule of Theobold v. Angelos, 40 N.J. 295 (1963), aff'd after remand 44 N.J. 228 (1965), when a plaintiff settled for an amount less than the settling party's pro rata share. | 2 | 1980–1988 |
Theobald v. Angelos
green
2 sentences1983We emphasize that a settlement by plaintiff with a joint tortfeasor, whether for more or less of the pro rata claim or the percentage of negligence fixed by a jury under the Comparative Negligence Act, "bars an action for contribution against the settling wrong-doer." Theobald v. Angelos, supra 44 N.J. at 232 . 1980The comment to N.J.S.A. 59:9-3 states that the pro tanto rule was adopted to avoid the sometimes harsh result created by the pro rata rule of Theobold v. Angelos, 40 N.J. 295 (1963), aff'd after remand 44 N.J. 228 (1965), when a plaintiff settled for an amount less than the settling party's pro rata share. | 2 | 1980–1983 |
W9/PHC REAL ESTATE LP v. Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2018But, "the general rule in New Jersey [is] that where an excess clause and a pro rata clause appear in concurrently effective policies, the pro rata clause is disregarded and full effect is given to the excess clause, making the pro rata clause the primary insurance." Id. at 199-200 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Atlantic Mut. Ins. v. Continental Nat. Am. Ins.
green
2 sentences2009The court held that the former insurer was responsible for the entire loss, stating: "In situations where one policy contains a pro rata clause, and the other an excess clause, the excess clause governs and the insurer under the excess clause is not liable until the company having the pro rata clause has paid to the extent of its policy limit." Id. at 245 , 302 A. 2d 177 . 2009The court held that the former insurer was responsible for the entire loss, stating: "In situations where one policy contains a pro rata clause, and the other an excess clause, the excess clause governs and the insurer under the excess clause is not liable until the company having the pro rata clause has paid to the extent of its policy limit." Id. at 245 , 302 A. 2d 177 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence1981Co., 28 N.J. 554 (1959), Where problems of conflicting "other insurance provisions have arisen, many courts appear to have assumed that one, but not both, of such provisions must *353 yield in order to establish one policy as the "primary" insurance upon which the "other insurance" provision of the "secondary" policy might operate. [at 559] Concluding, however, that the usually proffered bases for such a result have been fundamentally artificial, our Supreme Court adopted the pro rata rule, reasoning that The excess insurance provisions are mutually repugnant, and as against each other are imp | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Jones
green
2 sentences1974For affirmance — None. 1 The paragraph quoted is a standard endorsement in the insurance industry and is known as an “excess escape clause.” It was followed by a paragraph, not here applicable, generally known as a pro rata clause, providing that, except for the condition in the prior paragraph, if the insured has “other similar insurance available” the damages are not to be deemed to exceed the limits of the higher limited policy and the company is liable only for the proportion of such damages which the limits of the policy bear to the sum of the limits of all insurance applicable. 2 Alabama 1974For affirmance — None. 1 The paragraph quoted is a standard endorsement in the insurance industry and is known as an “excess escape clause.” It was followed by a paragraph, not here applicable, generally known as a pro rata clause, providing that, except for the condition in the prior paragraph, if the insured has “other similar insurance available” the damages are not to be deemed to exceed the limits of the higher limited policy and the company is liable only for the proportion of such damages which the limits of the policy bear to the sum of the limits of all insurance applicable. 2 Alabama | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Darrow
green
2 sentences1974Connecticut — Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Darrow, 161 Conn. 169 , 286 A. 2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1971). 1974Connecticut — Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Darrow, 161 Conn. 169 , 286 A. 2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1971). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Woodrich Construction Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America
green
1 sentence1961That is the rule adopted by this court in fire insurance cases, based not upon the nature of the insurance, but upon the contract which the companies had made. " (Emphasis supplied) At page 24 the court concluded that since neither policy called for excess coverage on the facts before it, "each must be held bound by what it said. * * * The liability is concurrent, and should be prorated between them." In Woodrich Construction Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 252 Minn. 86 , 89 N.W. 2 d 412 ( Sup. Ct. 1958), a comprehensive general liability policy and three automobile liability | 1 | 1961–1961 |
American Surety Co. of NY v. American Indem. Co.
green
1 sentence1961American Surety Co. of N.Y. v. American Indemnity Co., *274 8 N.J. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Fisher v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of London
neutral
1 sentence1959The loss occurred while American was on the risk and its co-insurer was off. * * * When policies cover different risks the insurance is not concurrent and the pro-rata clause does not apply." From 1892 ( L. 1892, c. 231, p. 366) until 1944 the New Jersey standard policy provided "This company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of any loss * * * by fire than the amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole insurance, whether valid or not, or by solvent or insolvent insurers, covering such property." Fisher v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of London, 103 N.J.L. 184 ( E. & A. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.