criminal case error in New York

2004See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States , 507 U.S. 234 , 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993) [FN2] ; Bohanan v. Nebraska , 125 U.S. 692 , 8 S. Ct. 1390 (1887); see also Eisler v. United States , 338 U.S. 189 , 69 S. Ct. 1453 (1949).

2004See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States , 507 U.S. 234 , 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993) [FN2] ; Bohanan v. Nebraska , 125 U.S. 692 , 8 S. Ct. 1390 (1887); see also Eisler v. United States , 338 U.S. 189 , 69 S. Ct. 1453 (1949).

2004Pursuant to CPL 330.30(1), upon a defendant's motion after a guilty verdict and before [*2]sentence, a court may set aside or modify the verdict upon: "(1) Any ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court." See also People v. Ventura , 66 N.Y.2d 693 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1985). [FN1] A court clearly has discretion "to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond

2004Pursuant to CPL 330.30(1), upon a defendant's motion after a guilty verdict and before [*2]sentence, a court may set aside or modify the verdict upon: "(1) Any ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court." See also People v. Ventura , 66 N.Y.2d 693 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1985). [FN1] A court clearly has discretion "to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond

2000While recognizing that precluding a defense witness in a criminal case is error, some reviewing courts have determined the error to be harmless in light of the subject matter of the excluded testimony and the otherwise overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt (see, People v Gilmore, 66 NY2d 863, 867 ; People v Hilts, 237 AD2d 737 , lvs denied 89 NY2d 1094 , 1095; People v Lloyde, 106 AD2d 405, 406 ; People v Daly, supra, at 804).

2000A review of these cases, however, reveals that the excluded testimony would have either been inconsequential (People v Hilts, supra), cumulative (People v Lloyde, supra), offered to rebut the inference of guilt from flight (People v Gilmore, supra-, People v Lloyde, supra), offered to show voluntary surrender rather than arrest (People v Gilmore, supra) or offered to explain the absence of a witness from trial (People v Daly, supra).

2000While recognizing that precluding a defense witness in a criminal case is error, some reviewing courts have determined the error to be harmless in light of the subject matter of the excluded testimony and the otherwise overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt (see, People v Gilmore, 66 NY2d 863, 867 ; People v Hilts, 237 AD2d 737 , lvs denied 89 NY2d 1094 , 1095; People v Lloyde, 106 AD2d 405, 406 ; People v Daly, supra, at 804).

2000A review of these cases, however, reveals that the excluded testimony would have either been inconsequential (People v Hilts, supra), cumulative (People v Lloyde, supra), offered to rebut the inference of guilt from flight (People v Gilmore, supra-, People v Lloyde, supra), offered to show voluntary surrender rather than arrest (People v Gilmore, supra) or offered to explain the absence of a witness from trial (People v Daly, supra).

2000While recognizing that precluding a defense witness in a criminal case is error, some reviewing courts have determined the error to be harmless in light of the subject matter of the excluded testimony and the otherwise overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt (see, People v Gilmore, 66 NY2d 863, 867 ; People v Hilts, 237 AD2d 737 , lvs denied 89 NY2d 1094 , 1095; People v Lloyde, 106 AD2d 405, 406 ; People v Daly, supra, at 804).

2000A review of these cases, however, reveals that the excluded testimony would have either been inconsequential (People v Hilts, supra), cumulative (People v Lloyde, supra), offered to rebut the inference of guilt from flight (People v Gilmore, supra-, People v Lloyde, supra), offered to show voluntary surrender rather than arrest (People v Gilmore, supra) or offered to explain the absence of a witness from trial (People v Daly, supra).

1992P., concurs in a memorandum as follows: The refusal of this particular court to utilize in a criminal case the standard charge on a host of relatively uncomplicated, standard subjects is a recurring theme, which has, on other occasions, warranted reversal (see, e.g., People v Garcia, 160 AD2d 354 , appeal dismissed 76 NY2d 934 ; People v Wright, 174 AD2d 522 [the "no inference” charge regarding a defendant’s decision not to testify]; People v Rawlins, 166 AD2d 64 [credibility charge and circumstantial evidence charge]).

1992P., concurs in a memorandum as follows: The refusal of this particular court to utilize in a criminal case the standard charge on a host of relatively uncomplicated, standard subjects is a recurring theme, which has, on other occasions, warranted reversal (see, e.g., People v Garcia, 160 AD2d 354 , appeal dismissed 76 NY2d 934 ; People v Wright, 174 AD2d 522 [the "no inference” charge regarding a defendant’s decision not to testify]; People v Rawlins, 166 AD2d 64 [credibility charge and circumstantial evidence charge]).

1992P., concurs in a memorandum as follows: The refusal of this particular court to utilize in a criminal case the standard charge on a host of relatively uncomplicated, standard subjects is a recurring theme, which has, on other occasions, warranted reversal (see, e.g., People v Garcia, 160 AD2d 354 , appeal dismissed 76 NY2d 934 ; People v Wright, 174 AD2d 522 [the "no inference” charge regarding a defendant’s decision not to testify]; People v Rawlins, 166 AD2d 64 [credibility charge and circumstantial evidence charge]).

1992P., concurs in a memorandum as follows: The refusal of this particular court to utilize in a criminal case the standard charge on a host of relatively uncomplicated, standard subjects is a recurring theme, which has, on other occasions, warranted reversal (see, e.g., People v Garcia, 160 AD2d 354 , appeal dismissed 76 NY2d 934 ; People v Wright, 174 AD2d 522 [the "no inference” charge regarding a defendant’s decision not to testify]; People v Rawlins, 166 AD2d 64 [credibility charge and circumstantial evidence charge]).

1989Collateral estoppel will only be applied in a criminal case to bar a subsequent prosecution if a fact which was a sine qua non of a conviction in the second trial was necessarily resolved in defendant’s favor in the first trial (see, People v Goodman, 69 NY2d 32, 38-40 ).

1987It has long been held that a judgment in a criminal case does not bar recovery in a civil action based upon the same facts, and conversely, recovery in a civil action is no bar to criminal prosecution (People v Goldstein, 79 Misc 2d 996, 999 , affd 89 Misc 2d 761 ; People v Topping Bros., 79 Misc 2d 260 ; People v Hacker, 76 Misc 2d 610 ; City of Buffalo v Till, 192 App Div 99, 108 ; People v Snyder, 90 App Div 422 ).

1987It has long been held that a judgment in a criminal case does not bar recovery in a civil action based upon the same facts, and conversely, recovery in a civil action is no bar to criminal prosecution (People v Goldstein, 79 Misc 2d 996, 999 , affd 89 Misc 2d 761 ; People v Topping Bros., 79 Misc 2d 260 ; People v Hacker, 76 Misc 2d 610 ; City of Buffalo v Till, 192 App Div 99, 108 ; People v Snyder, 90 App Div 422 ).

1987It has long been held that a judgment in a criminal case does not bar recovery in a civil action based upon the same facts, and conversely, recovery in a civil action is no bar to criminal prosecution (People v Goldstein, 79 Misc 2d 996, 999 , affd 89 Misc 2d 761 ; People v Topping Bros., 79 Misc 2d 260 ; People v Hacker, 76 Misc 2d 610 ; City of Buffalo v Till, 192 App Div 99, 108 ; People v Snyder, 90 App Div 422 ).

1987It has long been held that a judgment in a criminal case does not bar recovery in a civil action based upon the same facts, and conversely, recovery in a civil action is no bar to criminal prosecution (People v Goldstein, 79 Misc 2d 996, 999 , affd 89 Misc 2d 761 ; People v Topping Bros., 79 Misc 2d 260 ; People v Hacker, 76 Misc 2d 610 ; City of Buffalo v Till, 192 App Div 99, 108 ; People v Snyder, 90 App Div 422 ).

1987It has long been held that a judgment in a criminal case does not bar recovery in a civil action based upon the same facts, and conversely, recovery in a civil action is no bar to criminal prosecution (People v Goldstein, 79 Misc 2d 996, 999 , affd 89 Misc 2d 761 ; People v Topping Bros., 79 Misc 2d 260 ; People v Hacker, 76 Misc 2d 610 ; City of Buffalo v Till, 192 App Div 99, 108 ; People v Snyder, 90 App Div 422 ).

1987It has long been held that a judgment in a criminal case does not bar recovery in a civil action based upon the same facts, and conversely, recovery in a civil action is no bar to criminal prosecution (People v Goldstein, 79 Misc 2d 996, 999 , affd 89 Misc 2d 761 ; People v Topping Bros., 79 Misc 2d 260 ; People v Hacker, 76 Misc 2d 610 ; City of Buffalo v Till, 192 App Div 99, 108 ; People v Snyder, 90 App Div 422 ).

1980(See People v Tarsia, 67 AD2d 210, 212 ; emphasis added.) 3 Thus, in view of these cases decided since Leone , this court is constrained to exclude the polygraph results at trial.

1979Evidence obtained through the use of a polygraph test is generally inadmissible in a criminal case because the test’s reliability has not yet been sufficiently established to give it an evidentiary standing in the administration of the criminal law (People v Leone, 25 NY2d 511 ), and the same rule must be applied to the stress test herein since the People concede its lack of reliability.

1977Co. ( 134 App Div 475 ), wherein Hillmon is cited; it is a civil case, involving a defense of intentional suicide in an action on a life insurance policy, in which Hillmon is utilized in the context of showing, as part of the res gestae, the decedent’s financial and mental condition immediately prior to the time of his death; thus, while Goldschmidt does offer a very limited precedent for invoking this doctrine in New York, it cannot be seen as controlling in the criminal case at bar. .

1974(Dalton v. Van Dien, 72 Misc 2d 287 ; Cooper v. Mallory, 51 Misc 2d 749 ; City of New York v. Carolla, 48 Misc 2d 140 ; William Reilly Constr.

1974(Dalton v. Van Dien, 72 Misc 2d 287 ; Cooper v. Mallory, 51 Misc 2d 749 ; City of New York v. Carolla, 48 Misc 2d 140 ; William Reilly Constr.

1974(Dalton v. Van Dien, 72 Misc 2d 287 ; Cooper v. Mallory, 51 Misc 2d 749 ; City of New York v. Carolla, 48 Misc 2d 140 ; William Reilly Constr.

1929(People v. Luhrs, 29 N. Y.

1929(Matter of Picker, 130 App. Div. 88 .) Proceeding on Sunday by a justice of a court of Special Sessions in a criminal case was error for which the judgment should be reversed.