criminal case error in Georgia

1942In Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ), it was held: “Where remarks are made by the trial judge to counsel in a criminal case in the hearing of the jurors, which counsel contend were of such a character as to prejudice the minds of the jurors hearing them against the cause of their client, they should either move for a postponement of the hearing in order that other jurors may be empaneled than those present when the remark is made, or, if the jurors have actually been selected and empaneled to try the particular case, a motion should be made to have a mistrial declared; and upon the

1942In Perdue v. State, 135 Ga. 277 ( 69 S. E. 184 ), it was held: “Where remarks are made by the trial judge to counsel in a criminal case in the hearing of the jurors, which counsel contend were of such a character as to prejudice the minds of the jurors hearing them against the cause of their client, they should either move for a postponement of the hearing in order that other jurors may be empaneled than those present when the remark is made, or, if the jurors have actually been selected and empaneled to try the particular case, a motion should be made to have a mistrial declared; and upon the

2018Id. at 348-349 , 110 S.Ct. 668 .

2018Id. at 348-349 , 110 S.Ct. 668 .

1975So far as the defendant had any right to be heard under the constitution, he must be deemed to have waived it by escaping from custody and failing to appear and prosecute his exceptions in person, according to the order of court under which he was committed.’ "In Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 , Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: 'It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.

1893So far as the defendant had any right to be heard under the constitution, he must be deemed to have waived it by escaping from custody and failing to appear and prosecute his exceptions in person, according to the order of court under which he was committed.” In Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97 , Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the 'convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.

1950R. 17 ), applied in a criminal case the rule of civil litigation, as follows: `A final judgment on the merits, determining any issue of law or fact after a contest over it, forever sets at rest and fixes it as a fact or as the law in any other litigation between the parties.' See also U. S. v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85 (37 Sup. Ct. 68, 61 L. ed. 161, 3 A.L.R. 516 , 519); Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255 ( 73 So. 137 ); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909 ( 59 S. W. 524 , 45 L.

1950R. 17 ), applied in a criminal case the rule of civil litigation, as follows: ‘A final judgment on the merits, determining any issue of law or fact after a contest over it, forever sets at rest and fixes it as a fact or as the law in any other litigation between the parties.’ See also U. S. v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85 (37 Sup. Ct. 68, 61 L. ed. 161, 3 A.L.R. 516 , 519); Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255 ( 73 So. 137 ); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909 ( 59 S. W. 524 , 45 L.

1950R. 17 ), applied in a criminal case the rule of civil litigation, as follows: `A final judgment on the merits, determining any issue of law or fact after a contest over it, forever sets at rest and fixes it as a fact or as the law in any other litigation between the parties.' See also U. S. v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85 (37 Sup. Ct. 68, 61 L. ed. 161, 3 A.L.R. 516 , 519); Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255 ( 73 So. 137 ); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909 ( 59 S. W. 524 , 45 L.

1950R. 17 ), applied in a criminal case the rule of civil litigation, as follows: ‘A final judgment on the merits, determining any issue of law or fact after a contest over it, forever sets at rest and fixes it as a fact or as the law in any other litigation between the parties.’ See also U. S. v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85 (37 Sup. Ct. 68, 61 L. ed. 161, 3 A.L.R. 516 , 519); Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255 ( 73 So. 137 ); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909 ( 59 S. W. 524 , 45 L.

1950R. 17 ), applied in a criminal case the rule of civil litigation, as follows: ‘A final judgment on the merits, determining any issue of law or fact after a contest over it, forever sets at rest and fixes it as a fact or as the law in any other litigation between the parties.’ See also U. S. v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85 (37 Sup. Ct. 68, 61 L. ed. 161, 3 A.L.R. 516 , 519); Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255 ( 73 So. 137 ); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909 ( 59 S. W. 524 , 45 L.

1950R. 17 ), applied in a criminal case the rule of civil litigation, as follows: ‘A final judgment on the merits, determining any issue of law or fact after a contest over it, forever sets at rest and fixes it as a fact or as the law in any other litigation between the parties.’ See also U. S. v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85 (37 Sup. Ct. 68, 61 L. ed. 161, 3 A.L.R. 516 , 519); Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255 ( 73 So. 137 ); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909 ( 59 S. W. 524 , 45 L.

1943In Bell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 216 ( 169 S. E. 732 ), this court said: “In charging the jury in a criminal case it was error under the Penal Code (1910), § 1058 [Code, § 81-1104], for the court ‘to assume or seem to assume -that a transaction was a crime.’ Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (4) ( 123 S. E. 126 ); Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551 (3); Phillips v. State, 131 Ga. 426 ( 62 S. E. 239 ).” Of course, an assault is a crime, and “is an attempt to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Code, § 26-1401.

1933In charging the jury in a criminal case it is error under the Penal Code (1910), § 1058, for the court “to assume or seem to assume that a transaction was a crime.” Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (4) ( 123 S. E. 126 ) ; Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551 (3); Phillips v. State, 131 Ga. 426 ( 62 S. E. 239 ). (a) Where, as in this ease, the defendant admits that he killed the deceased with a pistol, but in no way admits that the killing was a crime, and contends in his statement (a) that he fired the fatal shot under a real or apparent necessity to prevent a felony from being committed upon him, and (h)

1943In Bell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 216 ( 169 S. E. 732 ), this court said: “In charging the jury in a criminal case it was error under the Penal Code (1910), § 1058 [Code, § 81-1104], for the court ‘to assume or seem to assume -that a transaction was a crime.’ Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (4) ( 123 S. E. 126 ); Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551 (3); Phillips v. State, 131 Ga. 426 ( 62 S. E. 239 ).” Of course, an assault is a crime, and “is an attempt to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Code, § 26-1401.

1943In Bell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 216 ( 169 S. E. 732 ), this court said: “In charging the jury in a criminal case it was error under the Penal Code (1910), § 1058 [Code, § 81-1104], for the court ‘to assume or seem to assume -that a transaction was a crime.’ Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (4) ( 123 S. E. 126 ); Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551 (3); Phillips v. State, 131 Ga. 426 ( 62 S. E. 239 ).” Of course, an assault is a crime, and “is an attempt to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Code, § 26-1401.

1943In Bell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 216 ( 169 S. E. 732 ), this court said: “In charging the jury in a criminal case it was error under the Penal Code (1910), § 1058 [Code, § 81-1104], for the court ‘to assume or seem to assume -that a transaction was a crime.’ Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (4) ( 123 S. E. 126 ); Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551 (3); Phillips v. State, 131 Ga. 426 ( 62 S. E. 239 ).” Of course, an assault is a crime, and “is an attempt to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Code, § 26-1401.

1943In Bell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 216 ( 169 S. E. 732 ), this court said: “In charging the jury in a criminal case it was error under the Penal Code (1910), § 1058 [Code, § 81-1104], for the court ‘to assume or seem to assume -that a transaction was a crime.’ Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (4) ( 123 S. E. 126 ); Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551 (3); Phillips v. State, 131 Ga. 426 ( 62 S. E. 239 ).” Of course, an assault is a crime, and “is an attempt to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Code, § 26-1401.

1911We can hardly conceive of a criminal case where an instruction in the language of this code section would be axxthorized.” And in Knox v. State, 112 Ga. 373 ( 37 S. E. 416 ), Mr. Justice Little states that this section of the code is entirely inapplicable to criminal cases.

1911We can hardly conceive of a criminal case where an instruction in the language of this code section would be axxthorized.” And in Knox v. State, 112 Ga. 373 ( 37 S. E. 416 ), Mr. Justice Little states that this section of the code is entirely inapplicable to criminal cases.

2015On appeal, we review the denial of a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2015On appeal, we review the denial of a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2009As the Supreme Court stated in 1909, “We can hardly conceive of a criminal case where an instruction in [this] language . . . would be authorized.” Mills, 133 Ga. at 157-158 .

1973In the case of Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366 ( 127 SE2d 900 ), this court said that an acquittal for the crime of murder in a criminal case did not bar a civil action under the statute in which it might be proved that the party acquitted of murder still might be barred from inheriting from the deceased.

1973In the case of Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366 ( 127 SE2d 900 ), this court said that an acquittal for the crime of murder in a criminal case did not bar a civil action under the statute in which it might be proved that the party acquitted of murder still might be barred from inheriting from the deceased.

1970Where during the trial of a criminal case a hearing is held outside the presence of the jury with reference to the voluntariness of a statement made by the defendant and at such hearing it is undisputed that prior to making such statement the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and thereafter voluntarily made a statement the requirements of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908, 1 ALR3rd 1205) are met, and the admission of such statement, and the facts surrounding it, into evidence is not error.

1970Where during the trial of a criminal case a hearing is held outside the presence of the jury with reference to the voluntariness of a statement made by the defendant and at such hearing it is undisputed that prior to making such statement the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and thereafter voluntarily made a statement the requirements of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908, 1 ALR3rd 1205) are met, and the admission of such statement, and the facts surrounding it, into evidence is not error.

1943In Ogle v. State, 35 Ga. App. 368 ( 133 S. E. 266 ), the court said: “On the trial of one charged with assault and battery it was error for the court to charge the jury that ‘it the parly assaulted in this case, Roy Wilherson, if when he was assaulted he was defending his mother, attempting to defend his mother against an assault that was being made by the wife of the defendant in this case, or anybody else, he would have a right to defend his mother’ (italics ours), this charge (as alleged in the motion for a new trial) being an intimation of an opinion that Boy Wilkerson (the party alleged t

1943In Ogle v. State, 35 Ga. App. 368 ( 133 S. E. 266 ), the court said: “On the trial of one charged with assault and battery it was error for the court to charge the jury that ‘it the parly assaulted in this case, Roy Wilherson, if when he was assaulted he was defending his mother, attempting to defend his mother against an assault that was being made by the wife of the defendant in this case, or anybody else, he would have a right to defend his mother’ (italics ours), this charge (as alleged in the motion for a new trial) being an intimation of an opinion that Boy Wilkerson (the party alleged t

1943In Bell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 216 ( 169 S. E. 732 ), this court said: “In charging the jury in a criminal case it was error under the Penal Code (1910), § 1058 [Code, § 81-1104], for the court ‘to assume or seem to assume -that a transaction was a crime.’ Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (4) ( 123 S. E. 126 ); Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551 (3); Phillips v. State, 131 Ga. 426 ( 62 S. E. 239 ).” Of course, an assault is a crime, and “is an attempt to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Code, § 26-1401.

1943In Bell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 216 ( 169 S. E. 732 ), this court said: “In charging the jury in a criminal case it was error under the Penal Code (1910), § 1058 [Code, § 81-1104], for the court ‘to assume or seem to assume -that a transaction was a crime.’ Freeman v. State, 158 Ga. 369 (4) ( 123 S. E. 126 ); Minor v. State, 58 Ga. 551 (3); Phillips v. State, 131 Ga. 426 ( 62 S. E. 239 ).” Of course, an assault is a crime, and “is an attempt to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” Code, § 26-1401.

1943In Ogle v. State, 35 Ga. App. 368 ( 133 S. E. 266 ), the court said: “On the trial of one charged with assault and battery it was error for the court to charge the jury that ‘it the parly assaulted in this case, Roy Wilherson, if when he was assaulted he was defending his mother, attempting to defend his mother against an assault that was being made by the wife of the defendant in this case, or anybody else, he would have a right to defend his mother’ (italics ours), this charge (as alleged in the motion for a new trial) being an intimation of an opinion that Boy Wilkerson (the party alleged t

1943In Ogle v. State, 35 Ga. App. 368 ( 133 S. E. 266 ), the court said: “On the trial of one charged with assault and battery it was error for the court to charge the jury that ‘it the parly assaulted in this case, Roy Wilherson, if when he was assaulted he was defending his mother, attempting to defend his mother against an assault that was being made by the wife of the defendant in this case, or anybody else, he would have a right to defend his mother’ (italics ours), this charge (as alleged in the motion for a new trial) being an intimation of an opinion that Boy Wilkerson (the party alleged t

1942Counsel, having failed to make such motion and having proceeded without objec *195 tion with the trial, can not, after conviction, raise the question as to the prejudicial nature of the remarks complained of, in a motion for a new trial.” In Kay v. Benson, 152 Ga. 185 (supra), it was held: “In the absence of a timely motion for mistrial, a new trial will not be granted because of questions propounded by the trial judge to a witness under examination.

1941However, we do not think that in a criminal case a presumption of good character should be considered as being in the nature of evidence, as in the case of the presumption of innocence {Richardson v. State, 8 Ga. App. 26 , 68 S. E. 518 ), which the State is allowed to rebut.

1941However, we do not think that in a criminal case a presumption of good character should be considered as being in the nature of evidence, as in the case of the presumption of innocence {Richardson v. State, 8 Ga. App. 26 , 68 S. E. 518 ), which the State is allowed to rebut.

1939L. 15, it is said: “It is also held that the advice of counsel is a good defense where the witness laid all the facts before his counsel and acted in good faith in getting his advice and the advice was not sought as a mere cover to secure immunity.” In Hearn v. Batchelor, 47 Ga. App. 213, 215 ( 170 S. E. 203 ), this court, in discussing a malicious prosecution case which is closely related to the principles governing the criminal case at bar, used this language: “Advice of a solicitor-general is a defense to an action for malicious prosecution only when the advice is given before the warrant i

1939L. 15, it is said: “It is also held that the advice of counsel is a good defense where the witness laid all the facts before his counsel and acted in good faith in getting his advice and the advice was not sought as a mere cover to secure immunity.” In Hearn v. Batchelor, 47 Ga. App. 213, 215 ( 170 S. E. 203 ), this court, in discussing a malicious prosecution case which is closely related to the principles governing the criminal case at bar, used this language: “Advice of a solicitor-general is a defense to an action for malicious prosecution only when the advice is given before the warrant i

1939L. 15, it is said: “It is also held that the advice of counsel is a good defense where the witness laid all the facts before his counsel and acted in good faith in getting his advice and the advice was not sought as a mere cover to secure immunity.” In Hearn v. Batchelor, 47 Ga. App. 213, 215 ( 170 S. E. 203 ), this court, in discussing a malicious prosecution case which is closely related to the principles governing the criminal case at bar, used this language: “Advice of a solicitor-general is a defense to an action for malicious prosecution only when the advice is given before the warrant i

1939L. 15, it is said: “It is also held that the advice of counsel is a good defense where the witness laid all the facts before his counsel and acted in good faith in getting his advice and the advice was not sought as a mere cover to secure immunity.” In Hearn v. Batchelor, 47 Ga. App. 213, 215 ( 170 S. E. 203 ), this court, in discussing a malicious prosecution case which is closely related to the principles governing the criminal case at bar, used this language: “Advice of a solicitor-general is a defense to an action for malicious prosecution only when the advice is given before the warrant i

1935Counsel, having failed to make such a motion and having proceeded without objection with the trial, can not, after conviction, raise the question as to the prejudicial nature of the remarks complained of, in a motion for a new trial.” See also Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 ( 107 S. E. 530 ).

1935Counsel, having failed to make such a motion and having proceeded without objection with the trial, can not, after conviction, raise the question as to the prejudicial nature of the remarks complained of, in a motion for a new trial.” See also Moore v. McAfee, 151 Ga. 270 ( 106 S. E. 274 ); Barnett v. Strain, 151 Ga. 553 ( 107 S. E. 530 ).