Byrd motion in Ohio

2026The State relies upon State v. Rydarowicz, 2023-Ohio-916 (7th Dist.), to support the admissibility of lay opinions from medical professionals without requiring expert qualification.

2026Byrd’s assignments of error catalogue her arguments against summary judgment— that the statute of limitations has run on the lawsuit, that interest was improperly added back to 2015 when she was not served at the correct address, and that the trial court erred in rescheduling a hearing on summary judgment without proper notice. {¶ 12} This court has previously held that “a motion for relief from judgment is not a substitute for a direct appeal from the judgment challenged.” Suon v. Mong, 2018-Ohio- 4187, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), quoting Colley v. Bazell, 61 Ohio St.2d 243 , 245 (1980), citing Bosco

2026Byrd’s assignments of error catalogue her arguments against summary judgment— that the statute of limitations has run on the lawsuit, that interest was improperly added back to 2015 when she was not served at the correct address, and that the trial court erred in rescheduling a hearing on summary judgment without proper notice. {¶ 12} This court has previously held that “a motion for relief from judgment is not a substitute for a direct appeal from the judgment challenged.” Suon v. Mong, 2018-Ohio- 4187, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), quoting Colley v. Bazell, 61 Ohio St.2d 243 , 245 (1980), citing Bosco

2025See Crim.R. 12(K); State v. Port Clinton Fisheries, 12 Ohio St.3d 114 (1984), syllabus.

2020Byrd, 2018-Ohio-1069, at ¶ 57 .

2017Spradlin at ¶ 34-35. {¶ 23} In overruling Byrd’s motion to suppress relating to the warrantless entry into her residence, the trial court found (Dkt. 21, p. 6): -13- The protective sweep conducted in this case falls, it seems to this writer, somewhere between State v. Sharpe and State v. Spradlin, [ 187 Ohio App.3d 767 , 2010-Ohio-2140 , 933 N.E.2d 1131 (2d Dist.)], but, in the end, it is concluded that Detective Stutz and the other officers had, using the Second District’s language, a reasonable and articulable suspicion that other persons were in the home and that these persons could pose a

2017Spradlin at ¶ 34-35. {¶ 23} In overruling Byrd’s motion to suppress relating to the warrantless entry into her residence, the trial court found (Dkt. 21, p. 6): -13- The protective sweep conducted in this case falls, it seems to this writer, somewhere between State v. Sharpe and State v. Spradlin, [ 187 Ohio App.3d 767 , 2010-Ohio-2140 , 933 N.E.2d 1131 (2d Dist.)], but, in the end, it is concluded that Detective Stutz and the other officers had, using the Second District’s language, a reasonable and articulable suspicion that other persons were in the home and that these persons could pose a

2016Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer may stop or detain an individual without probable cause when the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot.

2012The trial court did not issue a decision regarding Byrd’s motion to reconsider before he filed a notice of appeal with this Court. {¶ 6} It is from this judgment that Byrd now appeals. {¶ 7} Byrd’s sole assignment of error is as follows: {¶ 8} “APPELLANT’S SENTENCE WAS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.” {¶ 9} In his sole assignment, Byrd contends that the trial court violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by imposing a harsher sentence without an explanation of its reasons for doing so, after he had successfully appealed his sentence to this Court,

2012The trial court did not issue a decision regarding Byrd’s motion to reconsider before he filed a notice of appeal with this Court. {¶ 6} It is from this judgment that Byrd now appeals. {¶ 7} Byrd’s sole assignment of error is as follows: {¶ 8} “APPELLANT’S SENTENCE WAS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.” {¶ 9} In his sole assignment, Byrd contends that the trial court violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by imposing a harsher sentence without an explanation of its reasons for doing so, after he had successfully appealed his sentence to this Court,

2012Byrd I, 2011-Ohio-2060 .

2012The trial court did not issue a decision regarding Byrd’s motion to reconsider before he filed a notice of appeal with this Court. {¶ 6} It is from this judgment that Byrd now appeals. {¶ 7} Byrd’s sole assignment of error is as follows: {¶ 8} “APPELLANT’S SENTENCE WAS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.” {¶ 9} In his sole assignment, Byrd contends that the trial court violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by imposing a harsher sentence without an explanation of its reasons for doing so, after he had successfully appealed his sentence to this Court,

2012The trial court did not issue a decision regarding Byrd’s motion to reconsider before he filed a notice of appeal with this Court. {¶ 6} It is from this judgment that Byrd now appeals. {¶ 7} Byrd’s sole assignment of error is as follows: {¶ 8} “APPELLANT’S SENTENCE WAS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.” {¶ 9} In his sole assignment, Byrd contends that the trial court violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by imposing a harsher sentence without an explanation of its reasons for doing so, after he had successfully appealed his sentence to this Court,

2010(C.A.7, 1988), 859 F.2d 517, 521 . {¶ 37} Similarly, we can think of no reason that the Byrd doctrine should not be applied to retained, nonparty experts. {¶ 38} We hold that an affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert contradicting the former deposition testimony of that expert and submitted in opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently explains the reason for the contradiction.

2010(C.A.7, 1988), 859 F.2d 517, 521 . {¶ 37} Similarly, we can think of no reason that the Byrd doctrine should not be applied to retained, nonparty experts. {¶ 38} We hold that an affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert contradicting the former deposition testimony of that expert and submitted in opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently explains the reason for the contradiction.

2009Notice of plain error "is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." State v. Haney , Clermont App. No. CA2005-07-068, 2006-Ohio-3899, ¶ 50 , quoting State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 23} Here, plain error does not apply because even if the court had granted Byrd's motion and allowed any possible prior inconsistent statements to be used against Shepherd, the court had ample evidence before it to convict Byrd.

2009Notice of plain error "is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." State v. Haney , Clermont App. No. CA2005-07-068, 2006-Ohio-3899, ¶ 50 , quoting State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 23} Here, plain error does not apply because even if the court had granted Byrd's motion and allowed any possible prior inconsistent statements to be used against Shepherd, the court had ample evidence before it to convict Byrd.

2009After the defendant moved for summary judgment on January 30, 2008, the plaintiff filed Dr. Sickles’s contradictory affidavit on February 6, 2008, the same day the memorandum contra defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed. {¶ 69} The final step of the Byrd analysis requires that “[ojrdinarily, under [Civ.R.] 56(C), when an affidavit is inconsistent with affiant’s prior deposition testimony as to material facts and the affidavit neither suggests affiant was confused at the deposition nor offers a reason for the contradictions in her prior testimony, the affidavit does not create a gen

2009After the defendant moved for summary judgment on January 30, 2008, the plaintiff filed Dr. Sickles’s contradictory affidavit on February 6, 2008, the same day the memorandum contra defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed. {¶ 69} The final step of the Byrd analysis requires that “[ojrdinarily, under [Civ.R.] 56(C), when an affidavit is inconsistent with affiant’s prior deposition testimony as to material facts and the affidavit neither suggests affiant was confused at the deposition nor offers a reason for the contradictions in her prior testimony, the affidavit does not create a gen

1994Most recently, Byrd applied for a one-hundred-twenty-day stay of the proceedings in his federal habeas corpus case in order to comply with McCleskey v. Zant (1991), 499 U.S. 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1454 , 113 L.Ed.2d 517 .

1994Most recently, Byrd applied for a one-hundred-twenty-day stay of the proceedings in his federal habeas corpus case in order to comply with McCleskey v. Zant (1991), 499 U.S. 467 , 111 S.Ct. 1454 , 113 L.Ed.2d 517 .

1994Also on that date, we denied Byrd's motion for delayed reinstatement of his original appeal. 67 Ohio St.3d 1487 , 621 N.E.2d 409 , rehearing denied, 68 Ohio St.3d 1411 , 623 N.E.2d 567 .

1994Also on that date, we denied Byrd's motion for delayed reinstatement of his original appeal. 67 Ohio St.3d 1487 , 621 N.E.2d 409 , rehearing denied, 68 Ohio St.3d 1411 , 623 N.E.2d 567 .