expert testimony requirement in Pennsylvania

2015In a medical malpractice suit for negligence, the expert testimony requirement “means that a plaintiff must present medical expert testimony to establish that the care and treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant fell short of the required standards of care and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiffs injury.” Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145 _ An expert may not base his opinion regarding causation on mere speculation or conjecture.

2004P.C., 573 Pa. 245, 255 , 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (2003) (“The expert testimony requirement in a medical malpractice action means that a plaintiff must present medical expert testimony to establish that the care and treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant fell short of the required standard of care and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

1966As we said in Donaldson v. Maffucci, 397 Pa. 548, 553 , 156 A. 2d 835 (1959), and cases cited therein: "In the absence of a special contract, a physician or surgeon is neither a warrantor of a cure nor a guarantor of the result of his treatment. . ." Furthermore, a physician is bound by the expert testimony rule so well explained by Chief Justice STERN in Robinson v. Wirts, 387 Pa. 291 , 127 A. 2d 706 (1956): ". . . no presumption or inference of negligence arises merely because the medical care or surgical operation terminated in an unfortunate result which might have occurred even though pro

1966As we said in Donaldson v. Maffucci, 397 Pa. 548, 553 , 156 A. 2d 835 (1959), and cases cited therein: "In the absence of a special contract, a physician or surgeon is neither a warrantor of a cure nor a guarantor of the result of his treatment. . ." Furthermore, a physician is bound by the expert testimony rule so well explained by Chief Justice STERN in Robinson v. Wirts, 387 Pa. 291 , 127 A. 2d 706 (1956): ". . . no presumption or inference of negligence arises merely because the medical care or surgical operation terminated in an unfortunate result which might have occurred even though pro

2018A “narrow exception” to the expert testimony requirement exists “in instances of obvious negligence, i.e., circumstances in which the medical and factual issues presented are such that a lay juror could recognize negligence just as well as any expert.” Fessenden v. Robert Packer Hosp., 97 A.3d 1225, 1230 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 437 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Pa. 1981)).

2018A “narrow exception” to the expert testimony requirement exists “in instances of obvious negligence, i.e., circumstances in which the medical and factual issues presented are such that a lay juror could recognize negligence just as well as any expert.” Fessenden v. Robert Packer Hosp., 97 A.3d 1225, 1230 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 437 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Pa. 1981)).

2014See Commonwealth v. Miller, 430 Pa.Super. 297 , 634 A.2d 614, 622 (1993) (en banc) (reasoning that expert testimony as to battered person syndrome was "not introduced to improperly bolster the credibility of the defendant, but rather, to aid the jury in evaluating the defendant’s behavior and state of mind given the abusive environment which existed”); Commonwealth v. Pitts, 740 A.2d 726, 732-34 (Pa.Super.1999) (relying on Miller's reasoning to admit the expert testimony of a defense psychiatrist as to the diagnosis and symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome, because such testimony would e

2014See Commonwealth v. Miller, 430 Pa.Super. 297 , 634 A.2d 614, 622 (1993) (en banc) (reasoning that expert testimony as to battered person syndrome was "not introduced to improperly bolster the credibility of the defendant, but rather, to aid the jury in evaluating the defendant’s behavior and state of mind given the abusive environment which existed”); Commonwealth v. Pitts, 740 A.2d 726, 732-34 (Pa.Super.1999) (relying on Miller's reasoning to admit the expert testimony of a defense psychiatrist as to the diagnosis and symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome, because such testimony would e

2014See Commonwealth v. Miller, 430 Pa.Super. 297 , 634 A.2d 614, 622 (1993) (en banc) (reasoning that expert testimony as to battered person syndrome was "not introduced to improperly bolster the credibility of the defendant, but rather, to aid the jury in evaluating the defendant’s behavior and state of mind given the abusive environment which existed”); Commonwealth v. Pitts, 740 A.2d 726, 732-34 (Pa.Super.1999) (relying on Miller's reasoning to admit the expert testimony of a defense psychiatrist as to the diagnosis and symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome, because such testimony would e

2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious

2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hosp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) ("Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert `who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.'" (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which "the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious

2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious

2003See also Checchio v. Frankford Hasp., 717 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super.1998) (“Where the alleged negligence is medical in nature, the plaintiff must present evidence from an expert ‘who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 8 The narrow exception to the expert testimony requirement is conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa in which “the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care so obvious

1991Pa. Rules of Appellate Procedure.”) See Damiano v. Damiano, 378 Pa.Super. 106, 110 , 548 A.2d 298, 300 (1988) (“We may consider only the facts that appear on the official record, and the responsibility for providing a record that is comprehensive and complete rests with the appellant.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 357 Pa.Super. 462 , and Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 115 , 317 A.2d 258, 264 (1974)). *217 Appellant’s third contention is that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of defense witness, Linda Page, an employee of CYS.

1991Pa. Rules of Appellate Procedure.”) See Damiano v. Damiano, 378 Pa.Super. 106, 110 , 548 A.2d 298, 300 (1988) (“We may consider only the facts that appear on the official record, and the responsibility for providing a record that is comprehensive and complete rests with the appellant.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 357 Pa.Super. 462 , and Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 115 , 317 A.2d 258, 264 (1974)). *217 Appellant’s third contention is that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of defense witness, Linda Page, an employee of CYS.

1991Pa. Rules of Appellate Procedure.”) See Damiano v. Damiano, 378 Pa.Super. 106, 110 , 548 A.2d 298, 300 (1988) (“We may consider only the facts that appear on the official record, and the responsibility for providing a record that is comprehensive and complete rests with the appellant.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 357 Pa.Super. 462 , and Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 115 , 317 A.2d 258, 264 (1974)). *217 Appellant’s third contention is that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of defense witness, Linda Page, an employee of CYS.

1991Pa. Rules of Appellate Procedure.”) See Damiano v. Damiano, 378 Pa.Super. 106, 110 , 548 A.2d 298, 300 (1988) (“We may consider only the facts that appear on the official record, and the responsibility for providing a record that is comprehensive and complete rests with the appellant.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 357 Pa.Super. 462 , and Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 115 , 317 A.2d 258, 264 (1974)). *217 Appellant’s third contention is that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of defense witness, Linda Page, an employee of CYS.