5 Alabama opinions name it 1 courts 1993–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sellers v. Noahgreen2 sentences1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex 1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex | 1 | 2 |
Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Lab.green1 sentence2013Returning to the instant case, we have previously stated that “ ‘[prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect.’ ” Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 447 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Ala.1984) (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 , 1274 (5th Cir.1974)). | 1 | 1 |
Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2010This Court thoroughly examined the exception to the expert-testimony requirement in medical-malpractice actions "`where the want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of the average layman and thus requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.'" 896 So.2d at 392 (quoting Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall, 481 So.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Ala.1985)). 2010This Court thoroughly examined the exception to the expert-testimony requirement in medical-malpractice actions “ ‘where the want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of the average layman and thus requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.’ ” 896 So.2d at 392 (quoting Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall, 481 So.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Ala.1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Holt v. Godsilgreen2 sentences2008The four categories stated in Anderson were as follows: "`"`1) where a foreign instrumentality is found in the plaintiff's body following surgery; 2) where the injury complained of is in no way connected to the condition for which the plaintiff *1140 sought treatment; 3) where the plaintiff employs a recognized standard or authoritative medical text or treatise to prove what is or is not proper practice; and 4) where the plaintiff is himself or herself a medical expert qualified to evaluate the doctor's allegedly negligent conduct.'" "` Allred [v. Shirley], 598 So.2d [1347,] at 1350 [(Ala.1992 2008The four categories stated in Anderson were as follows: “ ‘ “ T) where a foreign instrumentality is found in the plaintiffs body following surgery; 2) where the injury complained of is in no way connected to the condition for which the plaintiff sought treatment; 3) where the plaintiff employs a recognized standard or authoritative medical text or treatise to prove what is or is not proper practice; and 4) where the plaintiff is himself or herself a medical expert qualified to evaluate the doctor’s allegedly negligent conduct.’ ” “ ‘Allred [v. Shirley], 598 So.2d [1347,] at 1350 [(Ala.1992)] ( | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Conradigreen1 sentence2004See id. "`When the Legislature readopts a code section, or incorporates it into a subsequent Code, prior decisions of this court permeate the statute, and it is presumed that the legislature deliberately adopts the statute with knowledge of the court's interpretation thereof.'" Jones v. Conradi , 673 So.2d 389 , 392 (Ala. 1995) (quoting Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens , 282 Ala. 492 , 495-96 , 213 So.2d 225 , 227-28 (1968)). | 1 | 1 |
Edgehill Corporation v. Hutchensgreen2 sentences2004See id. "`When the Legislature readopts a code section, or incorporates it into a subsequent Code, prior decisions of this court permeate the statute, and it is presumed that the legislature deliberately adopts the statute with knowledge of the court's interpretation thereof.'" Jones v. Conradi , 673 So.2d 389 , 392 (Ala. 1995) (quoting Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens , 282 Ala. 492 , 495-96 , 213 So.2d 225 , 227-28 (1968)). 2004See id. "`When the Legislature readopts a code section, or incorporates it into a subsequent Code, prior decisions of this court permeate the statute, and it is presumed that the legislature deliberately adopts the statute with knowledge of the court's interpretation thereof.'" Jones v. Conradi , 673 So.2d 389 , 392 (Ala. 1995) (quoting Edgehill Corp. v. Hutchens , 282 Ala. 492 , 495-96 , 213 So.2d 225 , 227-28 (1968)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Parrish v. Spink
green
2 sentences1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex 1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex | 2 | 1993–2004 |
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories
green
1 sentence2013Returning to the instant case, we have previously stated that “ ‘[prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect.’ ” Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 447 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Ala.1984) (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 , 1274 (5th Cir.1974)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Loeb v. Cappelluzzo
green
1 sentence2013Regardless, however, this Court recognized in Ex parte HealthSouth that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not the only foundation for the exception to the expert-testimony rule in an AMLA case, stating: “[The petitioner] is correct that the AMLA requires expert testimony in medical-malpractice cases, but this Court has recognized exceptions to that rale, when medical expertise is not necessary to prove the plaintiffs ease, such as here when nurses have failed to respond to a routine, custodial call from a patient. [The petitioner] itself points to cases in the line of Anderson and Loeb [v. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Valentine v. Watters
green
2 sentences2010This Court thoroughly examined the exception to the expert-testimony requirement in medical-malpractice actions "`where the want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of the average layman and thus requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.'" 896 So.2d at 392 (quoting Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall, 481 So.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Ala.1985)). 2010This Court thoroughly examined the exception to the expert-testimony requirement in medical-malpractice actions “ ‘where the want of skill or lack of care is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of the average layman and thus requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.’ ” 896 So.2d at 392 (quoting Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall, 481 So.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Ala.1985)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Anderson v. Alabama Reference Laboratories
green
2 sentences2008HealthSouth argued that Heath was required to present expert testimony because the facts of her case did not fit within one of the four categories of cases identified in Anderson v. Alabama Reference Laboratories, 778 So.2d 806 (Ala. 2000), as exceptions to the expert-testimony requirement in a medical-malpractice action. 2008HealthSouth argued that Heath was required to present expert testimony because the facts of her case did not fit within one of the four categories of cases identified in Anderson v. Alabama Reference Laboratories, 778 So.2d 806 (Ala.2000), as exceptions to the expert-testimony requirement in a medical-malpractice action. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ex Parte HealthSouth Corp.
green
2 sentences2008The four categories stated in Anderson were as follows: "`"`1) where a foreign instrumentality is found in the plaintiff's body following surgery; 2) where the injury complained of is in no way connected to the condition for which the plaintiff *1140 sought treatment; 3) where the plaintiff employs a recognized standard or authoritative medical text or treatise to prove what is or is not proper practice; and 4) where the plaintiff is himself or herself a medical expert qualified to evaluate the doctor's allegedly negligent conduct.'" "` Allred [v. Shirley], 598 So.2d [1347,] at 1350 [(Ala.1992 2008The four categories stated in Anderson were as follows: “ ‘ “ T) where a foreign instrumentality is found in the plaintiffs body following surgery; 2) where the injury complained of is in no way connected to the condition for which the plaintiff sought treatment; 3) where the plaintiff employs a recognized standard or authoritative medical text or treatise to prove what is or is not proper practice; and 4) where the plaintiff is himself or herself a medical expert qualified to evaluate the doctor’s allegedly negligent conduct.’ ” “ ‘Allred [v. Shirley], 598 So.2d [1347,] at 1350 [(Ala.1992)] ( | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Snow v. Allen
green
2 sentences2004Parrish v. Spink , 284 Ala. 263 , 266-67 , 224 So.2d 621 , 623 (1969); Snow v. Allen , 227 Ala. 615 , 151 So. 468 (1933); Sellers v. Noah , 209 Ala. 103 , 95 So. 167 (1923). 2004Parrish v. Spink , 284 Ala. 263 , 266-67 , 224 So.2d 621 , 623 (1969); Snow v. Allen , 227 Ala. 615 , 151 So. 468 (1933); Sellers v. Noah , 209 Ala. 103 , 95 So. 167 (1923). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Powell v. Mullins
green
2 sentences1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex 1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Stoudenmeier v. Williamson
green
2 sentences1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." [3] It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several e 1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Lloyd Noland Foundation, Inc. v. Harris
green
2 sentences1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex 1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Watts v. Sullivan
neutral
2 sentences1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex 1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Ravi v. Williams
neutral
2 sentences1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." [3] It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several e 1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Zills v. Brown
green
2 sentences1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." [3] It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several e 1993Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts , § 32 at p. 188 (5th ed. 1984), wherein the authors describe the alleged "conspiracy of silence" as: "The well known reluctance of doctors to testify against one another, which has been mentioned now and then in the decisions, may make this [expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff] difficult or impossible to obtain, especially in a jurisdiction with a narrow locality rule, and so in some instances effectively deprive the plaintiff of any remedy for a real and grievous wrong." 3 It should be remembered also that Alabama recognizes several ex | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.