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6 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Orange County Social Services Agency v. Lorenzo M.green2 sentences2008See In re Jennifer A., 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 708 , 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 54, 65 (2002) (citing California Court Rule 1439(i) and finding that a parent could waive application of the Act's procedural requirements so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary); see also, e.g., In re Riva M., 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 592, 597 (1991) (finding the father forfeited any error in the use of the clear-and-convincing standard and the failure to require expert testimony by not objecting). 2008See In re Jennifer A., 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 708 , 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 54, 65 (2002) (citing California Court Rule 1439(i) and finding that a parent could waive application of the Act's procedural requirements so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary); see also, e.g., In re Riva M., 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 592, 597 (1991) (finding the father forfeited any error in the use of the clear-and-convincing standard and the failure to require expert testimony by not objecting). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Jennifer A.green2 sentences2008See In re Jennifer A., 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 708 , 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 54, 65 (2002) (citing California Court Rule 1439(i) and finding that a parent could waive application of the Act's procedural requirements so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary); see also, e.g., In re Riva M., 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 592, 597 (1991) (finding the father forfeited any error in the use of the clear-and-convincing standard and the failure to require expert testimony by not objecting). 2008See In re Jennifer A., 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 708 , 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 54, 65 (2002) (citing California Court Rule 1439(i) and finding that a parent could waive application of the Act's procedural requirements so long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary); see also, e.g., In re Riva M., 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412 , 286 Cal.Rptr. 592, 597 (1991) (finding the father forfeited any error in the use of the clear-and-convincing standard and the failure to require expert testimony by not objecting). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer
green
2 sentences2003In support of the expert testimony requirement, the majority relies on Voykin v. DeBoer, 192 Ill. 2d 49 (2000). 2003In support of the expert testimony requirement the majority relies on Voykin v. DeBoer, 192 Ill.2d 49 , 248 Ill.Dec. 277 , 733 N.E.2d 1275 (2000). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Hill v. Squibb & Sons, ER
green
2 sentences1991(See Hill v. Squibb & Sons, E.R., 181 Mont. at 206 , 592 P.2d at 1388 .) These courts have also held that requiring expert testimony in failure-to-warn cases involving prescription drugs is analogous to the expert testimony requirement in medical malpractice actions. 1991(See Hill v. Squibb & Sons, E.R., 181 Mont. at 206 , 592 P.2d at 1388 .) These courts have also held that requiring expert testimony in failure-to-warn cases involving prescription drugs is analogous to the expert testimony requirement in medical malpractice actions. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Walski v. Tiesenga
green
2 sentences1979We note initially that this requirement “is broadly recognized throughout the country. [Citations.]” (Walski v. Tiesenga (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 249, 257 , 381 N.E.2d 279, 282 ; Annot., 81 A.L.R. 2d 597 (1962); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 515 (1971).) Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the expert testimony requirement elevates custom and practice to conclusive evidence of due care, and, thereby, permits the medical profession to set its own standards. 1979We note initially that this requirement “is broadly recognized throughout the country. [Citations.]” (Walski v. Tiesenga (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 249, 257 , 381 N.E.2d 279, 282 ; Annot., 81 A.L.R. 2d 597 (1962); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 515 (1971).) Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the expert testimony requirement elevates custom and practice to conclusive evidence of due care, and, thereby, permits the medical profession to set its own standards. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.