peculiar risk doctrine in Pennsylvania

2006Although the applicability of the peculiar risk doctrine is a mixed question of law and fact, the trial judge may decide the issue as a matter of law, but only in "clear cases." Emery v. Leavesly McCollum, 725 A.2d 807, 814 (Pa.Super.1999) ( en banc ) (citing Mentzer v. Ognibene, 408 Pa.Super. 578 , 597 A.2d 604 , 610 n. 6 (1991), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 530 Pa. 660 , 609 A.2d 168 (1992)).

2006Although the applicability of the peculiar risk doctrine is a mixed question of law and fact, the trial judge may decide the issue as a matter of law, but only in “clear cases.” Emery v. Leavesly McCollum, 725 A.2d 807, 814 (Pa.Super.1999) (en banc) (citing Mentzer v. Ognibene, 408 Pa.Super. 578 , 597 A.2d 604 , 610 n. 6 (1991), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 530 Pa. 660 , 609 A.2d 168 (1992)).

2001Indeed, in their brief, Ap-pellees argue, inter aim, that “the evidence at trial failed to justify a charge on the peculiar risk doctrine in any event.” (Appellees’ Brief at 12.) ¶ 43 We have stated that the peculiar risk doctrine is an exception to “[t]he established law in Pennsylvania [that] provides that an employer or an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.” Edwards v. Franklin & Marshall College, 444 Pa.Super. 1, 4 , 663 A.2d 187, 189 (1995).

2001Indeed, in their brief, Ap-pellees argue, inter aim, that “the evidence at trial failed to justify a charge on the peculiar risk doctrine in any event.” (Appellees’ Brief at 12.) ¶ 43 We have stated that the peculiar risk doctrine is an exception to “[t]he established law in Pennsylvania [that] provides that an employer or an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.” Edwards v. Franklin & Marshall College, 444 Pa.Super. 1, 4 , 663 A.2d 187, 189 (1995).

2001See Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 424 Pa.Super. 439, 445 , 622 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1993) (“[T]he tenor of our law is that the violation of safety conditions alone cannot be the basis for a finding that the Peculiar Risk Doctrine applies, as many, if not most, industrial [accidents] result from a failure to follow ... safety regulations.”); Peffer, 406 Pa.Super. at 465 , 594 A.2d at 713 (“Violation of .safety conditions alone, however, cannot be a basis for carving out exceptions to the rule that the owner is not liable for injuries incurred by employees of a subcontractor, as to do so would nulli

2001See Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 424 Pa.Super. 439, 445 , 622 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1993) (“[T]he tenor of our law is that the violation of safety conditions alone cannot be the basis for a finding that the Peculiar Risk Doctrine applies, as many, if not most, industrial [accidents] result from a failure to follow ... safety regulations.”); Peffer, 406 Pa.Super. at 465 , 594 A.2d at 713 (“Violation of .safety conditions alone, however, cannot be a basis for carving out exceptions to the rule that the owner is not liable for injuries incurred by employees of a subcontractor, as to do so would nulli

2001See Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 424 Pa.Super. 439, 445 , 622 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1993) (“[T]he tenor of our law is that the violation of safety conditions alone cannot be the basis for a finding that the Peculiar Risk Doctrine applies, as many, if not most, industrial [accidents] result from a failure to follow ... safety regulations.”); Peffer, 406 Pa.Super. at 465 , 594 A.2d at 713 (“Violation of .safety conditions alone, however, cannot be a basis for carving out exceptions to the rule that the owner is not liable for injuries incurred by employees of a subcontractor, as to do so would nulli

2001See Lorah v. Luppold Roofing Co., 424 Pa.Super. 439, 445 , 622 A.2d 1383, 1386 (1993) (“[T]he tenor of our law is that the violation of safety conditions alone cannot be the basis for a finding that the Peculiar Risk Doctrine applies, as many, if not most, industrial [accidents] result from a failure to follow ... safety regulations.”); Peffer, 406 Pa.Super. at 465 , 594 A.2d at 713 (“Violation of .safety conditions alone, however, cannot be a basis for carving out exceptions to the rule that the owner is not liable for injuries incurred by employees of a subcontractor, as to do so would nulli

2004Rather, the risk or danger arose out of a failure to use standard precautions. 221 Mont. 519 , 720 P.2d 270, 275 (1986) (emphasis added). 13 The Beckman court decided that in Bechtel, it had misconstrued the interplay of “ordinary” and “special” precautions, explaining that The distinction described in the Restatement between “ordinary” or standard and “special” precautions depends on whether the precaution is meant to counter a common or a peculiar risk.

2004Rather, the risk or danger arose out of a failure to use standard precautions. 221 Mont. 519 , 720 P.2d 270, 275 (1986) (emphasis added). 13 The Beckman court decided that in Bechtel, it had misconstrued the interplay of “ordinary” and “special” precautions, explaining that The distinction described in the Restatement between “ordinary” or standard and “special” precautions depends on whether the precaution is meant to counter a common or a peculiar risk.

2002Thus, we cannot disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the pleadings do not support the inference that PECO, in its capacity as landowner, could be hable to Appellant under the peculiar risk doctrine. ¶ 32 Nevertheless, a landowner acting solely in its capacity as landowner, “owes a duty to warn an unknowing independent contractor of existing dangerous conditions on the landowner’s premises where such conditions are known or discoverable to the owner.” Colloi v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 332 Pa.Super. 284 , 481 A.2d 616, 619 (1984).

2002Thus, we cannot disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the pleadings do not support the inference that PECO, in its capacity as landowner, could be hable to Appellant under the peculiar risk doctrine. ¶ 32 Nevertheless, a landowner acting solely in its capacity as landowner, “owes a duty to warn an unknowing independent contractor of existing dangerous conditions on the landowner’s premises where such conditions are known or discoverable to the owner.” Colloi v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 332 Pa.Super. 284 , 481 A.2d 616, 619 (1984).