proviso clause in Pennsylvania

1941In Bellevue Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 245 Pa. 114 , 91 A. 236 , (1914) it held that the proviso to clause 7 of section 34 of the Act of 1874, supra, which granted power and jurisdiction to the court of common pleas of the proper county to hear, inquire and determine Avhether the charges of the company for gas and water were just and reasonable was repealed by the Public Service Company Law which conferred that power upon the Public Service Commission.

1941In Bellevue Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., 245 Pa. 114 , 91 A. 236 , (1914) it held that the proviso to clause 7 of section 34 of the Act of 1874, supra, which granted power and jurisdiction to the court of common pleas of the proper county to hear, inquire and determine Avhether the charges of the company for gas and water were just and reasonable was repealed by the Public Service Company Law which conferred that power upon the Public Service Commission.

1941In New Brighton Borough v. New Brighton Water Co., 247 Pa. 232 , 93 A. 327 , (1915) it held that proceedings for the acquisition of water works by a municipality since the Public Service Company Law of July 26, 1913, P. L. 1374, will be invalid unless they have been previously sanctioned by the Public Service Commission, thereby making the securing of such approval, in the shape of a certificate of public convenience, the first step in the procedure to be followed.

1941In New Brighton Borough v. New Brighton Water Co., 247 Pa. 232 , 93 A. 327 , (1915) it held that proceedings for the acquisition of water works by a municipality since the Public Service Company Law of July 26, 1913, P. L. 1374, will be invalid unless they have been previously sanctioned by the Public Service Commission, thereby making the securing of such approval, in the shape of a certificate of public convenience, the first step in the procedure to be followed.

1992But that area of our jurisdiction is subject to the important proviso that the claim be not one actually sounding in eminent domain, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(ii), Lerro v. Department of Transportation, 32 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 372, 379 A.2d 652 (1977), and also that it not be, as covered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(iii) above, an action for damages from negligent injuries pursuant to Chapter 85 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8501-8528, the chapter which relates to sovereign immunity and waives that immunity as to specified categories of claims.

1992But that area of our jurisdiction is subject to the important proviso that the claim be not one actually sounding in eminent domain, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(ii), Lerro v. Department of Transportation, 32 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 372, 379 A.2d 652 (1977), and also that it not be, as covered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(iii) above, an action for damages from negligent injuries pursuant to Chapter 85 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8501-8528, the chapter which relates to sovereign immunity and waives that immunity as to specified categories of claims.

1988To agree with this view would raise an inconsistency and perhaps make plain nonsense out of the proviso clause which follows “that any person may pursue, in the alternative, a claim for compensation under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.” We need not be concerned with this, however, since this Court, to our satisfaction, has resolved this question by our decision in the case of Commonwealth v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Bushing's, Inc.), 101 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 336 , 516 A.2d 122 (1986).

1988To agree with this view would raise an inconsistency and perhaps make plain nonsense out of the proviso clause which follows “that any person may pursue, in the alternative, a claim for compensation under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.” We need not be concerned with this, however, since this Court, to our satisfaction, has resolved this question by our decision in the case of Commonwealth v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Bushing's, Inc.), 101 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 336 , 516 A.2d 122 (1986).

1981The Appellant further relies upon the following cases, arguing that they also support its position in this case: *450 Insurance Co. of North America v. Black, 606 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1979); State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 268 Md. 535 , 302 A.2d 627 (1973); and Bright v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 444 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1971).

1981The Appellant further relies upon the following cases, arguing that they also support its position in this case: *450 Insurance Co. of North America v. Black, 606 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1979); State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 268 Md. 535 , 302 A.2d 627 (1973); and Bright v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 444 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1971).

1981The Appellant further relies upon the following cases, arguing that they also support its position in this case: *450 Insurance Co. of North America v. Black, 606 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1979); State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 268 Md. 535 , 302 A.2d 627 (1973); and Bright v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 444 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1971).

1981The Appellant further relies upon the following cases, arguing that they also support its position in this case: *450 Insurance Co. of North America v. Black, 606 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1979); State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 268 Md. 535 , 302 A.2d 627 (1973); and Bright v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 444 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1971).

1980There is nothing in the record to indicate that the spacing is intentional rather than inadvertent.” McMichael, supra. That the proviso clause was intended by the insurance company to encompass both (b)(1) and (b)(2) does appear relatively clear to this court who has already had the benefit of hearing argument on both sides.

1957In framing these acts, the Joint State Government Commission intended (1) to raise the amount of the spouse’s allowance from $5,000 to $10,000; (2) to define “heirs” and specify that “heirs” are determined at the time “when the conveyance to the class is to take effect in enjoyment”; and (3) to resolve the doubt existing in the law as to the right of a spouse other than the spouse of testator or conveyor to the $10,000 allowance by including an express proviso clause in section 14(4) of the Wills Act of 1947: “Provided, however, That the share of a spouse, other than the spouse of the testator

1957The majority opinion reasons (1) “the use of the word ‘heirs’ has been held to be the heirs as ascertained by the statutes of distribution unless a contrary intention is indicated by the conveying instrument”; (2) the applicable statute of distribution is the one in effect at life tenant’s death; (3) section 2 of the applicable Intestate Act of 1947 gives the surviving spouse $10,000, plus one half of the estate, and (4) the Estates Act of 1947 which excludes the right of a spouse other than the spouse of the conveyor to the $10,000 allowance does not apply in this case because . . this Court

1950If it is not so devoted and it comes within the proviso clause of § 1775, it would be taxable as so-called “productive land,” as explained in Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 337 , it being agreed that the university has and will continue to hold real estate the income of which is more than $6000 annually.

1939Ev., sec. 202; Com. v. Wenzel, 24 Pa. Superior Ct. 467 .

1905Unless there was such provision to enable the voter, not satisfied to vote any ticket on the ballot or for any names appearing on it, to make up an entire ticket of his own choice, the election as to him would not be equal, for he would not be able to express his own individual will in his own way: Independence Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 108 .

1888This is precisely what was done in The County of Erie v. The Commissioners of Erie, 113 Pa. 368 , and what was attempted in The County of Erie v. The City of Erie, 113 Pa. 360 .

1888This is precisely what was done in The County of Erie v. The Commissioners of Erie, 113 Pa. 368 , and what was attempted in The County of Erie v. The City of Erie, 113 Pa. 360 .