reasonable procedural rule in Tennessee

2013It is clear, however, “that a state may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication, such as statutes of limitations, and a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural rule without violating due process rights.” Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Logan, 455 U.S. at 437 ).

2001Indeed, the state may even “terminate a [post-conviction] claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural rule without violating due process rights.” Id. at 208 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982)).

2026As such, the General Assembly “may set up reasonable procedural requirements” for post-conviction claims and those claims “may be terminated for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural rule without violating due process rights.” Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn. 2000) (internal citation omitted).

2026The legislature “may set up reasonable procedural requirements, such as a statute of limitations, and that a [post-conviction] claim may be terminated for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural rule.” Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn. 2000) (internal citation omitted).

2022It is clear, however, “that a state may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication, such as statutes of limitations, and a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural rule without violating due process rights.” Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992).

2013It is clear, however, “that a state may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication, such as statutes of limitations, and a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural rule without violating due process rights.” Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Logan, 455 U.S. at 437 ).

2001The only due process protection afforded a defendant in the post-conviction context is that a procedural rule cannot deny the defendant an “‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” See House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)) (emphasis in original).

2001The only due process protection afforded a defendant in the post-conviction context is that a procedural rule cannot deny the defendant an “ ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” See House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn.1995) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)) (emphasis in original).

2000“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tenn.1993) (citation omitted).

2000“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tenn. 1993) (citation omitted).

2001The only due process protection afforded a defendant in the post-conviction context is that a procedural rule cannot deny the defendant an “ ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” See House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn.1995) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)) (emphasis in original).

2001The only due process protection afforded a defendant in the post-conviction context is that a procedural rule cannot deny the defendant an “ ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” See House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn.1995) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)) (emphasis in original).

2013When a state terminates a claim for failure to comply with procedural requirements, the procedural due process “question, then, is ‘whether the state’s policy reflected in the statute affords a fair and reasonable opportunity for . . . bringing . . . suit.’” Id. (quoting Pickett v. Brown, 638 S.W.2d 369, 376 (Tenn. 1982) rev’d on other grounds 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983)).

1998Moreover, in Carter v. State, 917 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn. 1997), the Court upheld as constitutional the new one-year statute of limitations enacted in 1995, finding that the statute adequately protected the rights of those who file petitions for post-conviction relief.