12 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1920–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Laibe Corp.green2 sentences2025See, e.g., In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010). 2025See, e.g., In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding). | 2 | 2 |
Kane v. National Union Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences2009See id. 2009See id. | 2 | 2 |
Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc.green1 sentence2023See Drye, 364 S.W.2d at 209–10. | 1 | 1 |
Wynne v. Fischergreen2 sentences1994Wynne v. Fischer, 809 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied). 1994Wynne v. Fischer, 809 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex.App.Dallas 1991, writ denied). | 1 | 1 |
State Mortgage Corp. v. Ludwiggreen2 sentences1941See State Mortgage Corporation v. Ludwig, 121 Tex. 268 , 48 S.W.2d 950 , point 8, and cases cited. 1941See State Mortgage Corporation v. Ludwig, 121 Tex. 268 , 48 S.W.2d 950 , point 8, and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Enrique Del Pozo Y Marcos v. Wilson Cypress Co.
green
1 sentence2020App. 2013) (relying in part upon the default judgm ent case Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W .2d 535, 538 (Tex. 1998) as support for the application of the equitable doctrine of laches in an application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus); Del Pozo v. W ilson Cypress Co., 269 U.S. 82 , 86–87, 89 (1925) (relying on laches and adverse possession in deciding suit to quiet title to a confirm ed land grant in Florida). 4 See, e.g., State ex. rel. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
H. B. Zachry Co. v. Ceco Steel Products Corp.
green
1 sentence1968Zachry Co. v. Ceco Steel Products Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 404 S.W.2d 113 , writ ref., n. r. e. We consider this a proper case for the application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Clegg v. Brannan
green
2 sentences1949This theory of partial performance fails to meet the test as restated in De Lange v. Ogden, Tex.Civ.App., 106 S.W.2d 385, 391 , which reads: “ * * * that where one stands on performance to supply the want of mutuality or obligations in a contract, ‘that acts of performance must he sufficient to identify the contract in themselves, and with no other view than to fulfill the particular contract to be enforced.’ Clegg v. Brannan, 111 Tex. 367 , 234 S.W. 1076 .” See also Johnson v. Breckenridge-Stephens Title-Co., Tex.Com. 1949This theory of partial performance fails to meet the test as restated in De Lange v. Ogden, Tex.Civ.App., 106 S.W.2d 385, 391 , which reads: “ * * * that where one stands on performance to supply the want of mutuality or obligations in a contract, ‘that acts of performance must he sufficient to identify the contract in themselves, and with no other view than to fulfill the particular contract to be enforced.’ Clegg v. Brannan, 111 Tex. 367 , 234 S.W. 1076 .” See also Johnson v. Breckenridge-Stephens Title-Co., Tex.Com. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
De Lange v. Ogden
green
1 sentence1949This theory of partial performance fails to meet the test as restated in De Lange v. Ogden, Tex.Civ.App., 106 S.W.2d 385, 391 , which reads: “ * * * that where one stands on performance to supply the want of mutuality or obligations in a contract, ‘that acts of performance must he sufficient to identify the contract in themselves, and with no other view than to fulfill the particular contract to be enforced.’ Clegg v. Brannan, 111 Tex. 367 , 234 S.W. 1076 .” See also Johnson v. Breckenridge-Stephens Title-Co., Tex.Com. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Howell v. Thompson
green
1 sentence1949As held in Howell v. Thompson, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 597, 600 , recognized by appellant, a contract to adopt is an essential element to give rise to an adoption by estoppel. . | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Jones v. Guy
green
2 sentences1949The application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel as discussed or cited in Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398 , 143 S.W.2d 906, 908 , 142 A.L.R. 77, does not arise in the absence of establishment of the alleged contract to adopt. 1949The application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel as discussed or cited in Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398 , 143 S.W.2d 906, 908 , 142 A.L.R. 77, does not arise in the absence of establishment of the alleged contract to adopt. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Hutchings v. Slemons
green
2 sentences1949Under such conditions this record will not support the application of the equitable principle as restated in Hutchings v. Slemons, 141 Tex. 448 , 174 S.W.2d 487, 489 , 148 A.L.R. 1320 , which plaintiffs'seek here to invoke. 1949Under such conditions this record will not support the application of the equitable principle as restated in Hutchings v. Slemons, 141 Tex. 448 , 174 S.W.2d 487, 489 , 148 A.L.R. 1320 , which plaintiffs'seek here to invoke. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Texas Company v. W.H. Daugherty
green
2 sentences1920The instrument does not undertake to grant the oil and gas in prsesenti, but, upon me contrary, the lands were granted and demised “for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for oil and gas, and of laying pipe lines, and of building tanks,” etc. Elsewhere in the contract the right of the lessee is designated as “privilege.” Viewing the instrument as a whole and in the light most favorable to the lessee, it cannot be regarded as a conveyance of the 'oil and gas as a present interest in the land itself, but it confers upon him a 'mere right, franchise, or privilege to enter upon the 1920The instrument does not undertake to grant the oil and gas in prsesenti, but, upon me contrary, the lands were granted and demised “for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for oil and gas, and of laying pipe lines, and of building tanks,” etc. Elsewhere in the contract the right of the lessee is designated as “privilege.” Viewing the instrument as a whole and in the light most favorable to the lessee, it cannot be regarded as a conveyance of the 'oil and gas as a present interest in the land itself, but it confers upon him a 'mere right, franchise, or privilege to enter upon the | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.