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38 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1875–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. King of Prussia Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2021“The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another's prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Enterprises, Inc., 221 A.2d 123, 126 , (Pa. 1966) (affirming the denial of plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief due to laches, but remanding for further proceedings on plaintiff’s breach of contract claim). [J-92-2020] - 13 reasonablen 2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed | 11 | 18 |
Class of Two Hundred Administrative Faculty Members v. Scanlongreen2 sentences2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed 2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed | 5 | 9 |
In Re Estate of Marushakgreen2 sentences2025See In re Marushak’s Estate, 413 A.2d 649, 651 (Pa. 1980) (“The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to act to another’s prejudice.”). 2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed | 5 | 6 |
Brodt v. Browngreen2 sentences1974See Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391 , 172 A. 2d 152 (1961) and Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143 , 53 A. 2d 143 (1947). 1974See Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391 , 172 A. 2d 152 (1961) and Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143 , 53 A. 2d 143 (1947). | 3 | 3 |
Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlengreen2 sentences1974See Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391 , 172 A. 2d 152 (1961) and Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143 , 53 A. 2d 143 (1947). 1974See Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391 , 172 A. 2d 152 (1961) and Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143 , 53 A. 2d 143 (1947). | 3 | 3 |
Siegel v. Engstromgreen2 sentences2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed 2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed | 2 | 6 |
Mowrey Estategreen2 sentences2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed 2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: "The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed *1130 since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another's prejudice." Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980) | 2 | 5 |
Young v. Hallgreen2 sentences1971Tax bills for the fiscal year 1968-69 were dated October 1, 1968 and were mailed on or about that date. “ ‘Laches requires not only a passage of time, but also a resultant prejudice to the party asserting the doctrine, Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180 [ 205 A. 2d 429 (1964)]Young v. Hall, 421 Pa. 214, 216 [ 218 A. 2d 781, 783 (1966)]. ‘The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of du 1971Tax bills for the fiscal year 1968-69 were dated October 1, 1968 and were mailed on or about that date. “ ‘Laches requires not only a passage of time, but also a resultant prejudice to the party asserting the doctrine, Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180 [ 205 A. 2d 429 (1964)]Young v. Hall, 421 Pa. 214, 216 [ 218 A. 2d 781, 783 (1966)]. ‘The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of du | 2 | 2 |
Weinberg v. Commonwealth, State Board of Examiners of Public Accountantsgreen2 sentences2004In Weinberg v. Pennsylvania State Board of Examiners of Public Accountants, 509 Pa. 143 , 501 A.2d 239 (1985), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined the criteria necessary to establish the equitable doctrine of laches: As a unanimous Court recently reiterated in Class of Two Hundred Administrative Faculty Members v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103 (1983): "The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining part 2004In Weinberg v. Pennsylvania State Board of Examiners of Public Accountants, 509 Pa. 143 , 501 A.2d 239 (1985), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined the criteria necessary to establish the equitable doctrine of laches: As a unanimous Court recently reiterated in Class of Two Hundred Administrative Faculty Members v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103 (1983): "The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining part | 1 | 5 |
Stoddard v. Emerygreen1 sentence2021But that doctrine has no application in a case when the parties have expressly agreed[.]” Stoddard v. Emery, 128 Pa. 436, 442 (Pa. 1889). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Jonesgreen2 sentences1997“The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite period of time has elapsed, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to act at another’s prejudice.” In re Jones, 442 Pa.Super. 463 , 660 A.2d 76, 82 (1995) (citation omitted). 1997“The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite period of time has elapsed, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to act at another’s prejudice.” In re Jones, 442 Pa.Super. 463 , 660 A.2d 76, 82 (1995) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Sprague v. Caseygreen2 sentences1991Thus, it is clear that the application of the defense of laches requires not only an unjustified delay, but also that the opposing party’s position or rights be prejudiced as a result of that delay____ Moreover, “[t]he question of laches is factual and is determined by examining the circumstances of each case.” Weinberg, 509 Pa. at 148 , 501 A.2d at 242 , citing Class of Two Hundred Administrative Faculty Members v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983) (citations omitted); See also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38 , 550 A.2d 184 (1988); Richland Township Planning Commission v. Bobi 1991Thus, it is clear that the application of the defense of laches requires not only an unjustified delay, but also that the opposing party’s position or rights be prejudiced as a result of that delay____ Moreover, “[t]he question of laches is factual and is determined by examining the circumstances of each case.” Weinberg, 509 Pa. at 148 , 501 A.2d at 242 , citing Class of Two Hundred Administrative Faculty Members v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983) (citations omitted); See also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38 , 550 A.2d 184 (1988); Richland Township Planning Commission v. Bobi | 1 | 1 |
Lincoln Bank v. C & H AGENCY, INC.green2 sentences1989Conversely, of course, “[t]he criterion of laches is prejudice, and laches will not be imputed to a plaintiff where no injury results to the defendant by reason of the delay.” Lincoln Bank v. C & H Agency, Inc., 500 Pa. 294, 302 , 456 A.2d 136, 140 (1982), quoting Heinly v. Keck, 192 Pa.Super. 537, 540 , 161 A.2d 655, 657 (1960); see also Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 685 , 334 A.2d 585, 587 (1975). 1989Conversely, of course, “[t]he criterion of laches is prejudice, and laches will not be imputed to a plaintiff where no injury results to the defendant by reason of the delay.” Lincoln Bank v. C & H Agency, Inc., 500 Pa. 294, 302 , 456 A.2d 136, 140 (1982), quoting Heinly v. Keck, 192 Pa.Super. 537, 540 , 161 A.2d 655, 657 (1960); see also Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 685 , 334 A.2d 585, 587 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Kay v. Kaygreen2 sentences1989Conversely, of course, “[t]he criterion of laches is prejudice, and laches will not be imputed to a plaintiff where no injury results to the defendant by reason of the delay.” Lincoln Bank v. C & H Agency, Inc., 500 Pa. 294, 302 , 456 A.2d 136, 140 (1982), quoting Heinly v. Keck, 192 Pa.Super. 537, 540 , 161 A.2d 655, 657 (1960); see also Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 685 , 334 A.2d 585, 587 (1975). 1989Conversely, of course, “[t]he criterion of laches is prejudice, and laches will not be imputed to a plaintiff where no injury results to the defendant by reason of the delay.” Lincoln Bank v. C & H Agency, Inc., 500 Pa. 294, 302 , 456 A.2d 136, 140 (1982), quoting Heinly v. Keck, 192 Pa.Super. 537, 540 , 161 A.2d 655, 657 (1960); see also Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 685 , 334 A.2d 585, 587 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Heinly v. Keckgreen2 sentences1989Conversely, of course, “[t]he criterion of laches is prejudice, and laches will not be imputed to a plaintiff where no injury results to the defendant by reason of the delay.” Lincoln Bank v. C & H Agency, Inc., 500 Pa. 294, 302 , 456 A.2d 136, 140 (1982), quoting Heinly v. Keck, 192 Pa.Super. 537, 540 , 161 A.2d 655, 657 (1960); see also Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 685 , 334 A.2d 585, 587 (1975). 1989Conversely, of course, “[t]he criterion of laches is prejudice, and laches will not be imputed to a plaintiff where no injury results to the defendant by reason of the delay.” Lincoln Bank v. C & H Agency, Inc., 500 Pa. 294, 302 , 456 A.2d 136, 140 (1982), quoting Heinly v. Keck, 192 Pa.Super. 537, 540 , 161 A.2d 655, 657 (1960); see also Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 685 , 334 A.2d 585, 587 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Leedom v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed 2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed | 5 | 1980–2008 |
Holiday Lounge, Inc. v. Shaler Enterprises Corp.
green
2 sentences2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed 2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: "The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed *1130 since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another's prejudice." Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980) | 4 | 1976–2008 |
Truver v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed 2008Faculty Members of State Colleges in Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983), stated: “The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another’s prejudice.” Wilson v. King of Prussia Ent., Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 133 , 221 A.2d 123, 126 (1966); accord, In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607 , 413 A.2d 649 (1980); Leed | 3 | 1983–2008 |
Miller v. Hawkins
green
2 sentences1971Tax bills for the fiscal year 1968-69 were dated October 1, 1968 and were mailed on or about that date. “ ‘Laches requires not only a passage of time, but also a resultant prejudice to the party asserting the doctrine, Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180 [ 205 A. 2d 429 (1964)]Young v. Hall, 421 Pa. 214, 216 [ 218 A. 2d 781, 783 (1966)]. ‘The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of du 1971Tax bills for the fiscal year 1968-69 were dated October 1, 1968 and were mailed on or about that date. “ ‘Laches requires not only a passage of time, but also a resultant prejudice to the party asserting the doctrine, Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180 [ 205 A. 2d 429 (1964)]Young v. Hall, 421 Pa. 214, 216 [ 218 A. 2d 781, 783 (1966)]. ‘The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of du | 2 | 1969–1971 |
Richland Township Planning Commission v. Bobiak
green
1 sentence1991Thus, it is clear that the application of the defense of laches requires not only an unjustified delay, but also that the opposing party’s position or rights be prejudiced as a result of that delay____ Moreover, “[t]he question of laches is factual and is determined by examining the circumstances of each case.” Weinberg, 509 Pa. at 148 , 501 A.2d at 242 , citing Class of Two Hundred Administrative Faculty Members v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 275, 279 , 466 A.2d 103, 105 (1983) (citations omitted); See also Sprague v. Casey, 520 Pa. 38 , 550 A.2d 184 (1988); Richland Township Planning Commission v. Bobi | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Appeal of Plantier
green
2 sentences1989Id., 509 Pa. at 148 , 501 A.2d at 242 . 1989Id., 509 Pa. at 148 , 501 A.2d at 242 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
In Re Estate of Pedrick
green
2 sentences1986Also, we wish to mention that the recent decision of our Supreme Court in Estate of Pedrick, 505 Pa. 530 , 482 A.2d 215 (1984), in which the application of the equitable doctrine of clean hands precluded the scrivener-beneficiary from probating the decedent’s Will, is inapplicable here. 1986Also, we wish to mention that the recent decision of our Supreme Court in Estate of Pedrick, 505 Pa. 530 , 482 A.2d 215 (1984), in which the application of the equitable doctrine of clean hands precluded the scrivener-beneficiary from probating the decedent’s Will, is inapplicable here. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Reynolds v. Sims
green
1 sentence1973The question of *156 laches is factual and to be determined by an examination of the circumstances. . . .” In three of the reapportionment cases cited herein-before, namely Reynolds v. Sims, supra, Butcher v. Bloom, supra and McLaughlin v. Osser, supra, the courts clearly stated that when the State’s election machinery is already in motion, equitable considerations permit a court to consider the factual circumstances, the mechanics and the complexities of the law. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Mulholland v. Pittsburgh National Bank
green
2 sentences1967The question of laches is factual and to be determined by an examination of the circumstances: [citing an authority].” Where a cestui que trust seeks to enforce his alleged rights against a trustee, either actual or by operation of law, the burden is upon the trustee, who relies on laches, to show that an inordinate length of time has elapsed since the cause of action arose and that, due to changes which have accrued during such lapse of time, the trustee has been prejudiced: Mulholland v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 418 Pa. 96 , 209 A. 2d 857 (1965); Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Bird Coal Co., 334 Pa 1967The question of laches is factual and to be determined by an examination of the circumstances: [citing an authority].” Where a cestui que trust seeks to enforce his alleged rights against a trustee, either actual or by operation of law, the burden is upon the trustee, who relies on laches, to show that an inordinate length of time has elapsed since the cause of action arose and that, due to changes which have accrued during such lapse of time, the trustee has been prejudiced: Mulholland v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 418 Pa. 96 , 209 A. 2d 857 (1965); Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Bird Coal Co., 334 Pa | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Bird Coal Co.
green
2 sentences1967The question of laches is factual and to be determined by an examination of the circumstances: [citing an authority].” Where a cestui que trust seeks to enforce his alleged rights against a trustee, either actual or by operation of law, the burden is upon the trustee, who relies on laches, to show that an inordinate length of time has elapsed since the cause of action arose and that, due to changes which have accrued during such lapse of time, the trustee has been prejudiced: Mulholland v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 418 Pa. 96 , 209 A. 2d 857 (1965); Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Bird Coal Co., 334 Pa 1967The question of laches is factual and to be determined by an examination of the circumstances: [citing an authority].” Where a cestui que trust seeks to enforce his alleged rights against a trustee, either actual or by operation of law, the burden is upon the trustee, who relies on laches, to show that an inordinate length of time has elapsed since the cause of action arose and that, due to changes which have accrued during such lapse of time, the trustee has been prejudiced: Mulholland v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 418 Pa. 96 , 209 A. 2d 857 (1965); Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Bird Coal Co., 334 Pa | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Ottman v. Nixon-Nirdlinger
green
2 sentences1953Thus in Ottman et al. v. Nixon-Nirdlinger et al., 301 Pa. 234 , 151 A. 879 , where there was privity of estate and the undisclosed principal had beneficial enjoyment of the property, an undisclosed principal acting through a straw man was held to be subject to suit on a sealed contract to which it was not a party, but this decision did not destroy the efficacy of straw transactions. 1953Thus in Ottman et al. v. Nixon-Nirdlinger et al., 301 Pa. 234 , 151 A. 879 , where there was privity of estate and the undisclosed principal had beneficial enjoyment of the property, an undisclosed principal acting through a straw man was held to be subject to suit on a sealed contract to which it was not a party, but this decision did not destroy the efficacy of straw transactions. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Harvey Estate
green
2 sentences1952We so decided in Harvey Estate, 350 Pa. 53 , 38 A. 2d 262, p. 58 , where it is said: ". . . in our opinion the application of the equitable doctrine of contribution demands that the tax be borne commensurately by those whose gifts contribute to the tax burden and conversely that there be eliminated from such burden all whose legacies do not in any way create or add to the tax." *387 Appellants maintain with vigor that testatrix "otherwise directs in her will," when she provides that her residuary estate be divided into equal shares and thus precludes tax proration under the act. 1952We so decided in Harvey Estate, 350 Pa. 53 , 38 A. 2d 262, p. 58 , where it is said: ". . . in our opinion the application of the equitable doctrine of contribution demands that the tax be borne commensurately by those whose gifts contribute to the tax burden and conversely that there be eliminated from such burden all whose legacies do not in any way create or add to the tax." *387 Appellants maintain with vigor that testatrix "otherwise directs in her will," when she provides that her residuary estate be divided into equal shares and thus precludes tax proration under the act. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Willock's Estate
green
1 sentence1934The right to sue is based in part on the principle stated in Willock’s Est. [ 58 Pa. Superior Ct. 159 ], supra, that a party may sue on a promise made on sufficient consideration for his use and benefit though it be made to another and not to himself; this is an application of the equitable doctrine that a creditor may avail himself o‘f any security which his debtor holds from a third person for the payment of a debt. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Shelly's Appeal
green
1 sentence1899The debtor was common to both and this is a fair case for the application of the equitable principle which forces Betz upon the fund which Peterson could not touch-Shelly’s Appeal, 36 Pa. 373 . | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Schrack v. Shriner
neutral
1 sentence1894This was so far qualified in Schrack v. Shriner et al., 100 Pa. 451 , as to make the knowledge of the holder of the mortgage an element to be considered in the application of the equitable doctrine. | 1 | 1894–1894 |
| Himes v. Barnitz green | 1 | 1875–1875 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.