cause within rule in Texas

1964We are of the view that under the testimony in this, record that Hopper and Hawkins were independent contractors and not the agents of appellee, and that this view brings this cause within the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Pitchfork Land & Cattle Company v. King, 162 Tex. 331 , 346 S.W.2d 598, 603 ; Cunningham v. The International Railroad Co., 51 Tex. 503 , 32 Am.

1964We are of the view that under the testimony in this, record that Hopper and Hawkins were independent contractors and not the agents of appellee, and that this view brings this cause within the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Pitchfork Land & Cattle Company v. King, 162 Tex. 331 , 346 S.W.2d 598, 603 ; Cunningham v. The International Railroad Co., 51 Tex. 503 , 32 Am.

1964In Howard v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 473 , (writ ref.) we find this statement of the rule as to conflicts in verdicts: “The test in such case is, whether taking the finding alone in the one instance, a judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff; and taking it alone in the other, judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant.” This statement of the rule was approved by our Supreme Court in Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64 , 183 S.W.2d 453 .

1964We are of the view that under the testimony in this, record that Hopper and Hawkins were independent contractors and not the agents of appellee, and that this view brings this cause within the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Pitchfork Land & Cattle Company v. King, 162 Tex. 331 , 346 S.W.2d 598, 603 ; Cunningham v. The International Railroad Co., 51 Tex. 503 , 32 Am.

1964In Howard v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 473 , (writ ref.) we find this statement of the rule as to conflicts in verdicts: “The test in such case is, whether taking the finding alone in the one instance, a judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff; and taking it alone in the other, judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant.” This statement of the rule was approved by our Supreme Court in Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64 , 183 S.W.2d 453 .

1964In Howard v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 473 , (writ ref.) we find this statement of the rule as to conflicts in verdicts: “The test in such case is, whether taking the finding alone in the one instance, a judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff; and taking it alone in the other, judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant.” This statement of the rule was approved by our Supreme Court in Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64 , 183 S.W.2d 453 .

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962We are of the view that the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings the cause within the rule announced in Davis v. Ferguson Seed Farms, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 655 , n. w. h., wherein the Beaumont court made the following statement of the rule: “The general rule is that when the purchaser discloses to the seller that the article is intended for a special use, and the seller sells it to the purchaser for that purpose and for a sound price, [the exact situation here] there is an implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purposes for which it is sold, and free from hidden defect

1962See also: Hoffman v. Dixon, 105 Wis. 315 , 81 N.W. 491 .

1962See also: Hoffman v. Dixon, 105 Wis. 315 , 81 N.W. 491 .

1959The foregoing factual situation here brings this cause within the doctrine announced by our Supreme Court, Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 324 S.W.2d 200 .

1959We think the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings this cause within the rule announced in Root & Fehl v. Murray Tool Co., Com.App., 26 S.W.2d 189, 191 , 75 A.L.R. 902 .

1959We think the foregoing undisputed factual situation brings this cause within the rule announced in Root & Fehl v. Murray Tool Co., Com.App., 26 S.W.2d 189, 191 , 75 A.L.R. 902 .

1958Dunnam, Jr., “Notary Public, McLennan County, Texas.” We believe the foregoing undisputed record brings this cause within the doctrine announced by our Supreme Court in Beeks v. Odom, 70 Tex. 183 , 7 S.W. 702, 703 .

1958Dunnam, Jr., “Notary Public, McLennan County, Texas.” We believe the foregoing undisputed record brings this cause within the doctrine announced by our Supreme Court in Beeks v. Odom, 70 Tex. 183 , 7 S.W. 702, 703 .

1955Kerr, who was plaintiff in the District Court suit, was not a party to this litigation and that fact alone brings the cause within the doctrine announced in Pure Oil Co. v. Reece, Tex.Com.App., 124 Tex. 476 , 78 S.W.2d 932 ; Williams v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co., Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W.2d 995 (writ ref. worn).

1955Kerr, who was plaintiff in the District Court suit, was not a party to this litigation and that fact alone brings the cause within the doctrine announced in Pure Oil Co. v. Reece, Tex.Com.App., 124 Tex. 476 , 78 S.W.2d 932 ; Williams v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co., Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W.2d 995 (writ ref. worn).

1955We think the record here made brings this cause within the rule announced in Associates Investment Co. v. Baker, Tex.Civ.App., 221 S.W.2d 363 , er. dis., and Associates Investment Co. v. Sosa, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 703 , er. dis., and cases there cited.

1955We think the record here made brings this cause within the rule announced in Associates Investment Co. v. Baker, Tex.Civ.App., 221 S.W.2d 363 , er. dis., and Associates Investment Co. v. Sosa, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 703 , er. dis., and cases there cited.

1955We think the evidence tendered and the findings of the jury bring this cause within the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134 , 189 S.W.2d 471 ; Faville v. Robinson, 111 Tex. 48 , 227 S.W. 938 and Naumovich v. Reese, Tex.Civ.App., 247 S.W.2d 417 (no-writ history).

1955We think the evidence tendered and the findings of the jury bring this cause within the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134 , 189 S.W.2d 471 ; Faville v. Robinson, 111 Tex. 48 , 227 S.W. 938 and Naumovich v. Reese, Tex.Civ.App., 247 S.W.2d 417 (no-writ history).

1955We think the evidence tendered and the findings of the jury bring this cause within the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134 , 189 S.W.2d 471 ; Faville v. Robinson, 111 Tex. 48 , 227 S.W. 938 and Naumovich v. Reese, Tex.Civ.App., 247 S.W.2d 417 (no-writ history).

1955Kerr, who was plaintiff in the District Court suit, was not a party to this litigation and that fact alone brings the cause within the doctrine announced in Pure Oil Co. v. Reece, Tex.Com.App., 124 Tex. 476 , 78 S.W.2d 932 ; Williams v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co., Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W.2d 995 (writ ref. worn).

1955We think the evidence tendered and the findings of the jury bring this cause within the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134 , 189 S.W.2d 471 ; Faville v. Robinson, 111 Tex. 48 , 227 S.W. 938 and Naumovich v. Reese, Tex.Civ.App., 247 S.W.2d 417 (no-writ history).

1955We think the evidence tendered and the findings of the jury bring this cause within the rule announced by our Supreme Court in Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134 , 189 S.W.2d 471 ; Faville v. Robinson, 111 Tex. 48 , 227 S.W. 938 and Naumovich v. Reese, Tex.Civ.App., 247 S.W.2d 417 (no-writ history).

1951These facts bring the cause within the rule stated by the Supreme Court in Southern Trust & Mortgage Co. v. Daniel, 143 Tex. 321 , 184 S.W.2d 465 , 467: “The rule is settled in this state that a mortgagee with power to sell may purchase at his own sale made at public auction, and that a deed of trust is in legal effect but a mortgage with power of sale. * * * Under that rule, if the petitioner were a beneficiary under the deed of trust, the sale to it could not be impeached.” See also Heiner et ux. v. Homeland Realty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 795 ; Kaiser v. Hutcheson, TexCiv.App., 112 S.W

1951These facts bring the cause within the rule stated by the Supreme Court in Southern Trust & Mortgage Co. v. Daniel, 143 Tex. 321 , 184 S.W.2d 465 , 467: “The rule is settled in this state that a mortgagee with power to sell may purchase at his own sale made at public auction, and that a deed of trust is in legal effect but a mortgage with power of sale. * * * Under that rule, if the petitioner were a beneficiary under the deed of trust, the sale to it could not be impeached.” See also Heiner et ux. v. Homeland Realty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 795 ; Kaiser v. Hutcheson, TexCiv.App., 112 S.W

1951These facts bring the cause within the rule stated by the Supreme Court in Southern Trust & Mortgage Co. v. Daniel, 143 Tex. 321 , 184 S.W.2d 465 , 467: “The rule is settled in this state that a mortgagee with power to sell may purchase at his own sale made at public auction, and that a deed of trust is in legal effect but a mortgage with power of sale. * * * Under that rule, if the petitioner were a beneficiary under the deed of trust, the sale to it could not be impeached.” See also Heiner et ux. v. Homeland Realty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 795 ; Kaiser v. Hutcheson, TexCiv.App., 112 S.W

1941Our Supreme Court has recently construed Art. 1839, aforesaid, in Parks v. Purnell, 135 Tex. 182 , 141 S.W.2d 585 , point page 586, in which it held: “Of course the Court of Civil Appeals must not act arbitrarily and must only grant extensions for good cause.” We do not think appellant’s motion shows good cause, but, on the contrary, believe that the above facts bring this cause within the rule announced in Payne v. Campbell, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 693 , point 1-2, page 694.

1941Our Supreme Court has recently construed Art. 1839, aforesaid, in Parks v. Purnell, 135 Tex. 182 , 141 S.W.2d 585 , point page 586, in which it held: “Of course the Court of Civil Appeals must not act arbitrarily and must only grant extensions for good cause.” We do not think appellant’s motion shows good cause, but, on the contrary, believe that the above facts bring this cause within the rule announced in Payne v. Campbell, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 693 , point 1-2, page 694.

1941Our Supreme Court has recently construed Art. 1839, aforesaid, in Parks v. Purnell, 135 Tex. 182 , 141 S.W.2d 585 , point page 586, in which it held: “Of course the Court of Civil Appeals must not act arbitrarily and must only grant extensions for good cause.” We do not think appellant’s motion shows good cause, but, on the contrary, believe that the above facts bring this cause within the rule announced in Payne v. Campbell, Tex.Civ.App., 259 S.W. 693 , point 1-2, page 694.