drafters rule in Texas

2015The requirement of corroboration is therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.135 While there is no definitive test to determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances exist, when analyzing the sufficiency of corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are relevant: (1) whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; (2) whether 132 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 . 133 Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 313 . 134 Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 748–49 (internal quotations omitted). 135 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 ; Lest

2008The requirement of corroboration is therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.”); see generally United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 691 (7th Cir.1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (discussing rationale for requiring corroboration). .

2008Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the admissibility of a fabrication.”); Lester v. State, 120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("The structure of the rule and its wording demonstrate the obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the rule regarded

2008App. 1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the admissibility of a fabrication."); Lester v. State , 120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("The structure of the rule and its wording demonstrate the obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the rule regarded a statement exposing the declarant to criminal liability, but exculpating the accused.

2010One of the original drafters of the standard, former state senator Jack Ogg, now seems to admit that he imagined an inquiry along these lines.”); see also Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 851 n.19 (future-dangerousness special issue presents a “much more abstract” question) (emphasis supplied).

2010One of the original drafters of the standard, former state senator Jack Ogg, now seems to admit that he imagined an inquiry along these lines."); see also Smith , 898 S.W.2d at 851 n.19 (future-dangerousness special issue presents a " much more abstract " question) (emphasis supplied). 6.

2004Id. at 685 (citation omitted). .

2004Id. at 685 (citation omitted). 13.

2015The requirement of corroboration is therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.135 While there is no definitive test to determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances exist, when analyzing the sufficiency of corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are relevant: (1) whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; (2) whether 132 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 . 133 Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 313 . 134 Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 748–49 (internal quotations omitted). 135 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 ; Lest

2008Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the admissibility of a fabrication.”); Lester v. State, 120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("The structure of the rule and its wording demonstrate the obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the rule regarded

2012See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 70-71 (1st Cir.2010) ("The Rule's enactment history indicates that `the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.'") (citation omitted); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that the concern of the drafters of the exception in Rule 803(8)(B) was "that repor

2012See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 70-71 (1st Cir.2010) ("The Rule's enactment history indicates that 'the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.' ") (citation omitted); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that the concern of the drafters of the exception in Rule 803(8)(B) was "that repo

2012See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 70-71 (1st Cir.2010) ("The Rule's enactment history indicates that `the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.'") (citation omitted); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that the concern of the drafters of the exception in Rule 803(8)(B) was "that repor

2012See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 70-71 (1st Cir.2010) ("The Rule's enactment history indicates that 'the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.' ") (citation omitted); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that the concern of the drafters of the exception in Rule 803(8)(B) was "that repo

2012Congress was aware of the inherent bias that might exist in reports prepared by law enforcement officials in anticipation of trial.") (citations omitted); United States v. Enterline, 894 F.2d 287, 290 (8th Cir.1990) ("It is clear that the exclusion [in Rule 803(8)(B)] concerns matters observed by the police at the scene of the crime.

2012Congress was aware of the inherent bias that might exist in reports prepared by law enforcement officials in anticipation of trial.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Enterline, 894 F.2d 287, 290 (8th Cir.1990) ("It is clear that the exclusion [in Rule 803(8)(B) ] concerns matters observed by the police at the scene of the crime.

2012See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 70-71 (1st Cir.2010) ("The Rule's enactment history indicates that `the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.'") (citation omitted); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that the concern of the drafters of the exception in Rule 803(8)(B) was "that repor

2012See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 70-71 (1st Cir.2010) ("The Rule's enactment history indicates that 'the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.' ") (citation omitted); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that the concern of the drafters of the exception in Rule 803(8)(B) was "that repo

2012See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 70-71 (1st Cir.2010) ("The Rule's enactment history indicates that `the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.'") (citation omitted); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that the concern of the drafters of the exception in Rule 803(8)(B) was "that repor

2012See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 70-71 (1st Cir.2010) ("The Rule's enactment history indicates that 'the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases.' ") (citation omitted); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (noting that the concern of the drafters of the exception in Rule 803(8)(B) was "that repo

2010One of the original drafters of the standard, former state senator Jack Ogg, now seems to admit that he imagined an inquiry along these lines.”); see also Smith, 898 *282 S.W.2d at 851 n. 19 (future-dangerousness special issue presents a "much more abstract" question) (emphasis supplied). 6 .

2010Estrada--7 know” its “common meaning.” See King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Crim.

2004Id. at 685 (citation omitted). [13] United States v. Medina-Estrada, 81 F.3d 981, 984 (10th Cir.1996) ("[s]ince FED.R.EVID. 410 does not apply at sentencing, it cannot prohibit the sentencing court's consideration of evidence relating to pleas of guilty which are later withdrawn"); United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 386-87 (10th Cir.1986) (stating that neither Rule 410 nor Rule 11(e)(6)(D) apply at federal sentencing stage). [14] 526 U.S. 314 , 119 S.Ct. 1307 , 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999). [15] The Supreme Court stated: Of course, a court may discharge its duty of ensuring a factual basis for

2004Id. at 685 (citation omitted). [13] United States v. Medina-Estrada, 81 F.3d 981, 984 (10th Cir.1996) ("[s]ince FED.R.EVID. 410 does not apply at sentencing, it cannot prohibit the sentencing court's consideration of evidence relating to pleas of guilty which are later withdrawn"); United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 386-87 (10th Cir.1986) (stating that neither Rule 410 nor Rule 11(e)(6)(D) apply at federal sentencing stage). [14] 526 U.S. 314 , 119 S.Ct. 1307 , 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999). [15] The Supreme Court stated: Of course, a court may discharge its duty of ensuring a factual basis for

1996Minutes of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee 540-41 (May 26-27, 1989); Minutes of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee 71 (Feb. 16, 1990); see also Kennedy, 837 S.W.2d at 98.

1993If the drafters of rule 215 intended to allow interference with the appellate process, they would not have included the final sentence of rule 215(2)(b)(8), which states: "Such an order shall be subject to review on appeal from the final judgment." See Lehtonen v. Clarke, 784 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.], writ denied).

1993If the drafters of rule 215 intended to allow interference with the appellate process, they would not have included the final sentence of rule 215(2)(b)(8), which states: “Such an order shall be subject to review on appeal from the final judgment.” See Lehtonen v. Clarke, 784 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.], writ denied).