fdic defense in Texas

12 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurancegreen scotus · 1987 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990 2 sentences 1990See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 , 108 S.Ct. 396, 402 , 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987). 1990See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 , 108 S.Ct. 396, 402 , 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987).	2	2
Bevil v. Johnsongreen tex · 1957 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 2 sentences 1995In considering the FDIC’s challenge to the trial court’s action, we must begin with the recognition that a trial court not only has the inherent power to dismiss a cause for want of prosecution, Bevil v. Johnson, 157 Tex. 621 , 307 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1957), it is expressly granted that power. 1995In considering the FDIC’s challenge to the trial court’s action, we must begin with the recognition that a trial court not only has the inherent power to dismiss a cause for want of prosecution, Bevil v. Johnson, 157 Tex. 621 , 307 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1957), it is expressly granted that power.	1	1
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Millergreen ca5 · 1941 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 1 sentence 1994Borrowers/Guarantors do not seek an affirmative judgment against FDIC but merely to reduce or satisfy FDIC’s claim. “[Recoupment] is a doctrine of an intrinsically defensive nature founded upon an equitable reason, inhering in the same transaction, why plaintiffs claim in equity and good conscience should be reduced.” Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 676 , 62 S.Ct. 1047 , 86 L.Ed. 1750 (1942).	1	1
Hughes v. Hughesgreen texapp · 1971 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 1 sentence 1992Hughes v. Hughes, 473 S.W.2d 304, 306-07 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1971), modified on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.1972).	1	1
Ron Grubb v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationgreen ca1 · 1989 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990 1 sentence 1990Compare Langley, 484 U.S. at 93-95 , 108 S.Ct. at 404 -06 with Grubb, 868 F.2d at 1158-59 .	1	1
Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.red scotus · 1987 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990 1 sentence 1990Compare Langley, 484 U.S. at 93-95 , 108 S.Ct. at 404 -06 with Grubb, 868 F.2d at 1158-59 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Eagle Properties, Ltd. green txwd · 1985 2 sentences 2015Id. at 1037 . 1991Id. at 1037 .	2	1991–2015
Refior v. Lansing Drop Forge Co. green scotus · 1942 1 sentence 1994Borrowers/Guarantors do not seek an affirmative judgment against FDIC but merely to reduce or satisfy FDIC’s claim. “[Recoupment] is a doctrine of an intrinsically defensive nature founded upon an equitable reason, inhering in the same transaction, why plaintiffs claim in equity and good conscience should be reduced.” Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 676 , 62 S.Ct. 1047 , 86 L.Ed. 1750 (1942).	1	1994–1994
National Electric Products Corp. v. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. green scotus · 1942 1 sentence 1994Borrowers/Guarantors do not seek an affirmative judgment against FDIC but merely to reduce or satisfy FDIC’s claim. “[Recoupment] is a doctrine of an intrinsically defensive nature founded upon an equitable reason, inhering in the same transaction, why plaintiffs claim in equity and good conscience should be reduced.” Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 676 , 62 S.Ct. 1047 , 86 L.Ed. 1750 (1942).	1	1994–1994
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States green scotus · 1942 1 sentence 1994Borrowers/Guarantors do not seek an affirmative judgment against FDIC but merely to reduce or satisfy FDIC’s claim. “[Recoupment] is a doctrine of an intrinsically defensive nature founded upon an equitable reason, inhering in the same transaction, why plaintiffs claim in equity and good conscience should be reduced.” Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 676 , 62 S.Ct. 1047 , 86 L.Ed. 1750 (1942).	1	1994–1994
River Consulting, Inc. v. Sullivan green texapp · 1992 1 sentence 1993Subsequently, the state court of appeals granted the FDIC’s motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 848 S.W.2d 165 .	1	1993–1993
Swilley v. Hughes green tex · 1972 1 sentence 1992Hughes v. Hughes, 473 S.W.2d 304, 306-07 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1971), modified on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.1972).	1	1992–1992
Tri-M Erectors, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc. green texapp · 1990 1 sentence 1992See Tex.R.Civ.P. 162; Tri-M, 788 S.W.2d at 908 .	1	1992–1992
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. T.F. Stone-Liberty Land Associates green texapp · 1990 2 sentences 1990Stone, 787 S.W.2d at 483-84 . 1990Stone, 787 S.W.2d at 483-84 .	1	1990–1990
Coleman v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. green texapp · 1988 2 sentences 1990After hearing, the trial court granted the FDIC’s motion and rendered judgment against the guarantors. 1 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that “the duty of good faith obtained in this case, and that whether or not [the FDIC] breached that duty by undue delay in foreclosing, is a material question of fact left to be determined.” 762 S.W.2d 243, 245 . 1990After hearing, the trial court granted the FDIC's motion and rendered judgment against the guarantors. [1] The court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that "the duty of good faith obtained in this case, and that whether or not [the FDIC] breached that duty by undue delay in foreclosing, is a material question of fact left to be determined." 762 S.W.2d 243, 245 .	1	1990–1990
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority green tex · 1979 1 sentence 1980City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979).	1	1980–1980

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 12u.s.c.1821 (5) USC § 12u.s.c.1823 (5) USC § 12u.s.c.1819 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 12 (1980–2015) NY 4 (1986–1996) CO 2 (1994–1995) CA 2 (1988–1989) CT 2 (1997–2002) IL 2 (1984–1988) NE 2 (1993–1993) NM 2 (1989–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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