green
Positive treatment
Doctrinal family (anchor): Matter of H. ↗
Issue: evidence at the fact-finding hearingNY ↗
Issue: license privilegeNY ↗
Issue: fellow officer ruleNY ↗
Issue: speedy dispositional hearingNY ↗
78.5 score
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987
2006
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Snipe (Julian)
The intent elements of attempted unlawful imprisonment in the second degree ( see Penal Law §§ 110/135.05) and harassment in the second degree ( see Penal Law § 240.26[1]) were satisfied by the testimony of two police officers, who responded to a radio call of a domestic dispute in progress, that they heard "fearful, frantic crying from children" inside the apartment and a "female occupant" screaming "get off me, get off me"; that despite knocking on the door repeatedly for over five minutes and announcing themselves as police, no one answered; that one of the officers peered through a smal…
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Cromwell S.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a person under the age of 16.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Dzahiah W.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity as the person who committed the acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of assault in the third degree and menacing in the third degree (see Matter of Jarett W., 137 AD3d 1154, 1154-1155 [2016]; Matter of Jamal G., 127 AD3d 1081, 1082 [2015]; Matter of Anthony A., 121 AD3d 885, 886 [2014]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Jayson P.
Viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal mischief in the fourth degree.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Aaliyah R.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity as the person who committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (see Matter of Jarett W., 137 AD3d 1154, 1154-1155 [2016]; Matter of Jamal G., 127 AD3d 1081, 1082 [2015]; Matter of Anthony A., 121 AD3d 885, 886 [2014]; see also Pe…
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Tyshawn B.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Ashley P., 74 AD3d 1075, 1075-1076 [2010]; Matter of Eddie J., 68 AD3d 870 [2009]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant, in concert with another, forcibly stole property from the victim (see Penal Law § 160.10 [1]; see also Matter of Corey S., 139 AD3d 533 [2016]; Matter of Virginia B., 21 AD3d 1029, 1030 [2005]; People v Thomas, 273 AD2d 161 [2000]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Christian C.
The appellant’s contention that he was deprived of his right to a speedy dispositional hearing is unpreserved for appellate review (see Matter of Jacob LL., 129 AD3d 1407, 1408 [2015]; Matter of Michael P., 213 AD2d 717 , 718 [1995]) and, in any event, is without merit (see Family Ct Act § 350.1; Matter of Andre M., 299 AD2d 967, 968 [2002]). *582 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, wo…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Jordan R.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts wbich, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal sexual act in the first degree (two counts) (see Penal Law §§ 130.50 [3]; see also 130.00 [2] [a]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Marlon C.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest (see Penal Law §§ 195.05, 205.30; Matter *942 of Tori S., 119 AD3d 697 [2014]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Tyrone M.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Dayshawn S., 122 AD3d 748, 749 [2014]), we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to establish that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted incest in the third degree and attempted sexual abuse in the third degree (see generally People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 190 [1989]; People v Wiley, 119 AD3d 821, 822 [2014]; Matter of Jonathan F., 72 AD3d 963 [2010]; Matter of Deshon A., 39 AD3…
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Cited as authority (rule)
In re Tasheema B.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support a finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted gang assault in the first degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.07) and attempted assault in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [1]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Tyrone M.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Dayshawn S., 122 AD3d 748, 749 [2014]), we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to establish that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted incest in the third degree and attempted sexual abuse in the third degree (see generally People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 190 [1989]; People v Wiley, 119 AD3d 821, 822 [2014]; Matter of Jonathan F., 72 AD3d 963 [2010]; Matter of Deshon A., 39 AD3…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Tasheema B.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support a finding that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted gang assault in the first degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.07) and attempted assault in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [1]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Jarell W.
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity *1155 as the person who committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of robbery in the second degree (see Matter of Juan J., 81 NY2d 739, 740-741 [1992]; Matter of Malik S.R., 73 AD3d 1182 [2010]; Matter of Jonathan V., 43 AD3d 470 [2007]; Matter of Louis C., 6 AD3d 430 [2004]; cf. Penal Law §§ 20.00, 160.10 [1]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Shannel P.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), I find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of aggravated cruelty to animals, in violation of Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a (1), and overdriving, torturing, and injuring animals in violation of Agriculture and Markets Law § 353.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Lesean C.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), criminal possession of a firearm (Penal Law § 265.01-b), and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01 [1]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Jose E.T.
In any event, viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of petit larceny.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Lavon S.
In any event, viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the subject determinations made in the fact-finding order.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Arel J.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Dayshawn S., 122 AD3d 748, 749 [2014]), we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant was attempting to open a window of the subject building and that he did not have a license or privilege to enter the building (see Matter of Lonique M., 93 AD3d 203, 207 [2012]; People v Thornton, 4 AD3d 561 [2004]; People v Battle, 202 AD2d 1045 [1994]; People v Quinones, 173 AD2d 395, 396 [1991]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Ruhul S.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.60 [2]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Dashawn B. (Anonymous)
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the second degree and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (see Matter of Myron J., 123 AD3d at 1031-1032 ; People v Toney, 12 AD3d 623, 624 [2004]; People v Wilson, 10 AD3d 460,…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Eljihn C. (Anonymous)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Jamal G., 127 AD3d 1081, 1082 [2015]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was one of the perpetrators who *821 committed the acts complained of (see Matter of Jamal G., 127 AD3d at 1082 ; Matter of Tyquan C., 123 AD3d 502, 503 [2014]; Matter of Anthony A., 121 AD3d 885, 886 [2014]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Trevor S.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), criminal possession of a firearm (Penal Law § 265.01-b), criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 165.45 [2]), and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal L…
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Juan P.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted assault in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [2]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see Penal Law § 265.01 [1]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Tiyana D.R.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted assault in the third degree (see Matter of Kevin M., 64 AD3d 655 [2009]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Isaiah D.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]), petit larceny under an accessorial liability theory (Penal Law §§ 20.00, 155.25), forcible touching (Penal Law § 130.52), and sexual abuse in the third degree (Penal Law § 130.55).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Tevin K.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10 [1]) and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 165.40).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Jamal G.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity as one of the perpetrators who committed the acts complained of (see Matter of Tyquan C., 123 AD3d 502, 503 [2014]; Matter of Anthony A., 121 AD3d 885, 886 [2014]; Matter of Shaquary B., 110 AD3d 1065 [2013]; Matter of Dajahn M., 110 AD3d 812 , 813 [2013]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Jose T.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the second degree, attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and attempted assault in the third degree.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Dillon R.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree, menacing in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth *782 degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree (see Family Ct Act § 342.2 [2]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Jaquan F.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, be *657 yond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Dayshawn S.
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the subject crimes.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Ya-Sin S.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under an accomplice liability theory (see Penal Law §§ 265.00 [15]; 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]; 20.00).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Anthony A.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity as the person who committed the acts complained of (see Matter of Jayson V., 117 AD3d 960 [2014]; Matter of Javier C., 116 AD3d 1039 [2014]; Matter of Shaquary B., 110 AD3d 1065 [2013]; Matter of Dajahn M., 110 AD3d 812 [2013]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Rani Z.
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal contempt in the second degree (see Penal Law § 215.50 [3]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Jonathan E.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.
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Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of Tori S.
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest (see Penal Law §§ 195.05, 205.30).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Russell F.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), the evidence was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the appellant’s identity and that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the second degree, petit larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (see People v Daddona, 81 NY2d 990 [1993]; Matter of Uriah M., 107 AD3d 997 , 999 [2013]; Matter of Trayvond W., 71 AD3d 683 [2010]; People v John, 51 AD3d 819, 819-820 [2008]).
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Cited as authority (rule)
In re Russell F.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), the evidence was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the appellant’s identity and that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the second degree, petit larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (see People v Daddona, 81 NY2d 990 [1993]; Matter of Uriah M., 107 AD3d 997 , 999 [2013]; Matter of Trayvond W., 71 AD3d 683 [2010]; People v John, 51 AD3d 819, 819-820 [2008]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Jayson V.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity as the person who committed the acts complained of (see Matter of Shaquary B., 110 AD3d 1065 [2013]; Matter of Dajahn M., 110 AD3d 812 , 813 [2013]; Matter of Kalexis R., 79 AD3d 755, 756 [2010]; Matter of Rodolfo M., 79 AD3d 752 [2010]; Matter of Brooklyn B., 77 AD3d 934, 935 [2010]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Jayson V.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity as the person who committed the acts complained of (see Matter of Shaquary B., 110 AD3d 1065 [2013]; Matter of Dajahn M., 110 AD3d 812 , 813 [2013]; Matter of Kalexis R., 79 AD3d 755, 756 [2010]; Matter of Rodolfo M., 79 AD3d 752 [2010]; Matter of Brooklyn B., 77 AD3d 934, 935 [2010]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Javier C.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity as the person who committed the acts complained of under a theory of accomplice liability (see Matter of Tyrika L., 110 AD3d 886 , 887 [2013]; Matter of Louis C., 6 AD3d 430 , 431 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Javier C.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s identity as the person who committed the acts complained of under a theory of accomplice liability (see Matter of Tyrika L., 110 AD3d 886 , 887 [2013]; Matter of Louis C., 6 AD3d 430 , 431 [2004]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Leonce K.O.
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree (see Matter of Anthony S., 112 AD3d 948 , 948 [2013]; Matter of India G., 40 AD3d 856, 857 [2007]), and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (see Matter of India G., 40 AD3d at 857 ; Matter …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Leonce K.O.
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree (see Matter of Anthony S., 112 AD3d 948 , 948 [2013]; Matter of India G., 40 AD3d 856, 857 [2007]), and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (see Matter of India G., 40 AD3d at 857 ; Matter …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Justin D.
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted criminal sexual act in the first degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 130.50 [1]), sexual abuse in the first degree (see Penal Law § 130.65 [1]), rape in the third degree (see Penal Law § 130.25 [3]), attempted criminal sexual act in the third degree (see Penal Law …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Justin D.
In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted criminal sexual act in the first degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 130.50 [1]), sexual abuse in the first degree (see Penal Law § 130.65 [1]), rape in the third degree (see Penal Law § 130.25 [3]), attempted criminal sexual act in the third degree (see Penal Law …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Kaseem R.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Racheal M., 108 AD3d 770 , 771 [2013]; Matter of Ashley P., 74 AD3d 1075 [2010]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of assault in the second degree (see Penal Law § 120.05 [10]; Matter of Imani Mc., 78 AD3d 705, 706 [2010]; Matter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d at 1068).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Kaseem R.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Racheal M., 108 AD3d 770 , 771 [2013]; Matter of Ashley P., 74 AD3d 1075 [2010]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of assault in the second degree (see Penal Law § 120.05 [10]; Matter of Imani Mc., 78 AD3d 705, 706 [2010]; Matter of Stanley F., 76 AD3d at 1068).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re Anthony S.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, and menacing in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 160.15 [4]; 160.10 [2] [b]; 120.14 [1]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of David H., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.
Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa Concur.
Cited by 336 opinions | Published
Carol Goldstein, Lenore Gittis and John F. McGlynn for appellant.
Doron Gopstein, Acting Corporation Counsel (Helen P. Brown of counsel), for respondent.
Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER, TITONE, HANCOCK, JR., and BELLACOSA concur.
[*793] MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by reversing the adjudication insofar as it is based on the finding of sexual abuse and vacating the dispositional order, and the matter remitted to Family Court, New York County, for a new dispositional hearing in accordance with this memorandum, and, as so modified, affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency, there is sufficient evidence to support the Family Court's finding that appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute unlawful imprisonment in the second degree (Penal Law § 135.05). A witness testified that she heard screaming emanating from above the fourth floor minutes before she saw appellant (then 12 years old) pull Amanda (then five years old) down the stairs. From this evidence the court inferred that the force caused the bruise on Amanda's forearm and the scratches on her neck, as well as the damage to the metal fasteners on her overalls. There was evidence to support the findings that appellant had received no permission from Amanda's mother to interfere with the child in this manner and was aware of the unlawfulness of his actions.
There is insufficient evidence, however, to support Family Court's additional finding that appellant committed acts[*794] which, if committed by an adult, would constitute attempted sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 130.65 [1]). Although the presentment agency was not obligated to prove a completed crime, and although the agency did prove use of force, there is no evidence that appellant attempted to subject Amanda to sexual contact (see, Penal Law § 130.00 [3]). Medical examination of the child shortly after the incident revealed no evidence of sexual contact. Family Court found that Amanda was incompetent to give unsworn testimony, and therefore did not consider her statements, and further found that in the circumstances the pubic hair was not reliable evidence against appellant. Finally, the child's overalls though dirty and damaged proved only that appellant unlawfully restrained Amanda, not that he attempted to engage in any sexual contact.
On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order modified, without costs, and matter remitted to the Family Court, New York County, for a new dispositional hearing in accordance with the memorandum herein and, as so modified, affirmed.