84 Pennsylvania opinions name it 10 courts 1899–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilberti v. City of Pittsburghgreen2 sentences2013The majority reverses the Tax Appeal Board and the trial court because each used the Gilberti v. City of Pittsburgh, 511 Pa. 100 , 511 A.2d 1321 (1986), “base of operations” analysis to impose a business privilege tax on extraterritorial sales if attributable to an office in the taxing jurisdiction. 2013The majority reverses the Tax Appeal Board and the trial court because each used the Gilberti v. City of Pittsburgh, 511 Pa. 100 , 511 A.2d 1321 (1986), “base of operations” analysis to impose a business privilege tax on extraterritorial sales if attributable to an office in the taxing jurisdiction. | 5 | 11 |
O. H. Martin Co. v. Sharpsburg Boroughgreen2 sentences2003Martin Co. v. Sharpsburg Borough, 376 Pa. 242 , 102 A.2d 125, 126-27 (1954) (recognizing the important distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce when imposing a business privilege tax on gross receipts, and concluding that a Borough could impose a business privilege tax without apportionment because the ordinance taxed only those receipts derived from intrastate business, and therefore, there was no threat of the borough taxing outside its border); accord Wagman, Inc. v. Manchester Township, 112 Pa.Cmwlth. 357 , 535 A.2d 702, 706 (1988) (apportionment of business privilege tax not 2003Martin Co. v. Sharpsburg Borough, 376 Pa. 242 , 102 A.2d 125, 126-27 (1954) (recognizing the important distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce when imposing a business privilege tax on gross receipts, and concluding that a Borough could impose a business privilege tax without apportionment because the ordinance taxed only those receipts derived from intrastate business, and therefore, there was no threat of the borough taxing outside its border); accord Wagman, Inc. v. Manchester Township, 112 Pa.Cmwlth. 357 , 535 A.2d 702, 706 (1988) (apportionment of business privilege tax not | 3 | 5 |
SCHOOL DIST. CITY OF SCRANTON v. Dale and Dale Design and Development, Inc.green2 sentences2017See also Fish v. Township of Lower Merion, 633 Pa. 705 , 128 A.3d 764, 770-71 (2015) (holding that a township’s imposition of a business privilege tax on businesses whose sole income consisted of rent payments on leased real property was not barred by Section 301.1(f)(1) of the Local Tax Enabling Act (LTEA), Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(1), limiting its authority to "levy, assess, or collect ... any tax on ... leases or lease transactions[,];” School District of Scranton v. Dale & Dale Design & Development, Inc., 559 Pa. 398 , 741 A.2d 186, 189 (1999 2017After Provident subsequently acquired the properties by deed in lieu of foreclosure, the City assessed a realty transfer tax pursuant to Section 19-4103(1) of the Philadelphia (continued…) lease transactions[.];” School District of Scranton v. Dale & Dale Design & Development, Inc., 741 A.2d 186, 189 (Pa. 1999) (holding that a school district’s imposition of a business privilege tax on a contractor’s receipts from residential construction was not barred by Section 301.1(f)(11) of the LTEA, 53 P.S. §6924.301.1(f)(11), limiting its authority to “levy, assess, or collect a tax on the construction | 3 | 4 |
Cheltenham Township v. Cheltenham Cinema, Inc.green2 sentences2015See, e.g., Cheltenham Twp. v. Cheltenham Cinema, Inc., 548 Pa. 385, 697 A.2d 258 (1997) (upholding a business privilege tax as applied to the gross receipts of a movie theater, notwithstanding that the taxing authority was barred from taxing the sale of movie tickets, where the theater earned its gross receipts from ticket and concession sales). 2015See, e.g., Cheltenham Twp. v. Cheltenham Cinema, Inc., 548 Pa. 385, 697 A.2d 258 (1997) (upholding a business privilege tax as applied to the gross receipts of a movie theater, notwithstanding that the taxing authority was barred from taxing the sale of movie tickets, where the theater earned its gross receipts from ticket and concession sales). | 2 | 3 |
Airpark International I v. Interboro School Districtgreen2 sentences1999This very issue of a tax on individual business transactions of foreign-based corporations falling outside the scope of a municipality’s business privilege tax was addressed by this court in Airpark International v. Interboro School District, 677 A.2d 388 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), affirmed — Pa.-, 735 A.2d 646 (1999). 5 *1070 In Airpark Int’l, the trial court declared the taxing of fees paid for the transactions in parking lots to be a “business privilege tax” as opposed to a transaction tax. 1999A business privilege tax is a tax imposed on all of the gross receipts from all of the businesses’ activities anywhere, so long as the base of operations within the political subdivision contributes to those activities because the privilege of doing business is “far more than the sum of transactions ... performed within the territorial limits of the taxing entity.” [Gilberti v. City of Pittsburgh, 511 Pa. 100, 109 , 511 A.2d 1321, 1326 (1986) ] A transaction tax, however, is imposed on the receipts from the designated transactions that are actually performed within the taxing entity, because i | 2 | 3 |
G. A. & F. C. Wagman, Inc. v. Manchester Townshipgreen2 sentences2003Martin Co. v. Sharpsburg Borough, 376 Pa. 242 , 102 A.2d 125, 126-27 (1954) (recognizing the important distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce when imposing a business privilege tax on gross receipts, and concluding that a Borough could impose a business privilege tax without apportionment because the ordinance taxed only those receipts derived from intrastate business, and therefore, there was no threat of the borough taxing outside its border); accord Wagman, Inc. v. Manchester Township, 112 Pa.Cmwlth. 357 , 535 A.2d 702, 706 (1988) (apportionment of business privilege tax not 2003Martin Co. v. Sharpsburg Borough, 376 Pa. 242 , 102 A.2d 125, 126-27 (1954) (recognizing the important distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce when imposing a business privilege tax on gross receipts, and concluding that a Borough could impose a business privilege tax without apportionment because the ordinance taxed only those receipts derived from intrastate business, and therefore, there was no threat of the borough taxing outside its border); accord Wagman, Inc. v. Manchester Township, 112 Pa.Cmwlth. 357 , 535 A.2d 702, 706 (1988) (apportionment of business privilege tax not | 2 | 3 |
Mundy/CA-0295 v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2015See Shelly Funeral Home, Inc. v. Warrington Twp., 618 Pa. 469 , 57 A.3d 1136, 1141 (2012) (providing that the substance of a tax should dictate the validity of the tax). 2015See Shelly Funeral Home, Inc. v. Warrington Twp., 57 A.3d 1136, 1141 (Pa. 2012) (providing that the substance of a tax should dictate the validity of the tax). | 2 | 2 |
F. J. Busse Co. v. Pittsburghgreen2 sentences2015Busse Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 443 Pa. 349 , 279 A.2d 14 (1971) (holding that a business privilege tax levied on gross income, including income derived from the use of tangible property, did not duplicate a state tax on use of the same property, since the two taxes were levied upon different subjects); Blauner’s, Inc., 330 Pa. at 346 , 198 A. at 892 (indicating that a city sales tax did not duplicate a state mercantile license tax since the city taxed sales whereas the state taxed the privilege of conducting business, notwithstanding that both taxes were measured by gross sales). 2015Busse Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 443 Pa. 349 , 279 A.2d 14 (1971) (holding that a business privilege tax levied on gross income, including income derived from the use of tangible property, did not duplicate a state tax on use of the same property, since the two taxes were levied upon different subjects); Blauner’s, Inc., 330 Pa. at 346 , 198 A. at 892 (indicating that a city sales tax did not duplicate a state mercantile license tax since the city taxed sales whereas the state taxed the privilege of conducting business, notwithstanding that both taxes were measured by gross sales). | 1 | 8 |
Comach Construction, Inc. v. City of Allentowngreen2 sentences2021The Comach Court determined that “the subject matter of the business privilege tax is the privilege of conducting a business in the 8 City of Allentown[,]” while “[t]he subject matter of the [Transfer Tax] is the recording of a deed.” Id. 1999The court further held that the issue of whether the business privilege tax was duplicative of the realty transfer tax was decided against the taxpayer in Comach Construction, Inc., v. City of Allentown, 159 Pa.Cmwlth. 605 , 633 A.2d 1336 (1993), alloc. denied, 539 Pa. 682 , 652 A.2d 1327 (1994). | 1 | 3 |
Deeds ex rel. Renzulli v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Centergreen2 sentences2017See also Fish v. Township of Lower Merion, 633 Pa. 705 , 128 A.3d 764, 770-71 (2015) (holding that a township’s imposition of a business privilege tax on businesses whose sole income consisted of rent payments on leased real property was not barred by Section 301.1(f)(1) of the Local Tax Enabling Act (LTEA), Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. § 6924.301.1(f)(1), limiting its authority to "levy, assess, or collect ... any tax on ... leases or lease transactions[,];” School District of Scranton v. Dale & Dale Design & Development, Inc., 559 Pa. 398 , 741 A.2d 186, 189 (1999 2017The Court concluded “that the city sales tax ordinance and the Mercantile License Tax Act do not tax the same subject, nor the same person, and that the field covered by the ordinance had not been preempted by the mercantile license tax.” Id.21 Correspondingly, in this case, the PBT and the Sales Tax do not 21 See also Fish v. Township of Lower Merion, 128 A.3d 764, 770-71 (Pa. 2015) (holding that a township’s imposition of a business privilege tax on businesses whose sole income consisted of rent payments on leased real property was not barred by Section 301.1(f)(1) of the Local Tax Enabling | 1 | 2 |
Wightman Health Center v. Office of the Treasurergreen2 sentences1993This Court cited Smith, Kline, as authority in Wightman Health Center v. Office of Treasurer, 59 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 634 , 430 A.2d 717 (1981), when a nursing home argued that, because a license fee is paid to the Commonwealth, a municipality is precluded from levying a business privilege tax. 1993This Court cited Smith, Kline, as authority in Wightman Health Center v. Office of Treasurer, 59 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 634 , 430 A.2d 717 (1981), when a nursing home argued that, because a license fee is paid to the Commonwealth, a municipality is precluded from levying a business privilege tax. | 1 | 2 |
City of Pittsburgh v. Tuckergreen2 sentences2013In City of Pittsburgh v. Tucker, 74 Pa. Cmwlth. 290, 459 A.2d 1333 (1983), this court addressed whether a commercial illustrator’s gross receipts were exempt from a local tax, which precluded the local tax authority from levying a business privilege tax on "manufacturing or acts or transactions related to the business [of manufacturing].” Id. at 1335 (internal quotations omitted). 2013In City of Pittsburgh v. Tucker, 74 Pa. Cmwlth. 290, 459 A.2d 1333 (1983), this court addressed whether a commercial illustrator’s gross receipts were exempt from a local tax, which precluded the local tax authority from levying a business privilege tax on "manufacturing or acts or transactions related to the business [of manufacturing].” Id. at 1335 (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Duquesne Club v. Pittsburghgreen1 sentence2026See Duquesne Club v. Pittsburgh, 87 A.2d 81 (Pa. Super. 1952) (holding that because the club supplied food service to its members not for profit but for convenience of its members, it was not conducting business subject to a mercantile tax); Philadelphia School District v. Frankford Grocery Co., 103 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1954) (holding that “business” as contemplated by the Philadelphia School District Tax Act means business for gain or profit, with a profit motive and disagreeing with the school district’s view that “business” should include any commercial activity and not limited to a business carri | 1 | 1 |
S & H Transport, Aplt. v. City of Yorkgreen1 sentence2026As our Supreme Court has explained, the LTEA allowed such local taxation “as a quid pro quo for businesses advantaging themselves of local governmental benefits, including the availability of police, fire, and other services.” S & H Transport v. City of York, 210 A.3d 1028, 1031 (Pa. 2019) (quoting V.L. | 1 | 1 |
Board of Christian Education v. Philadelphia School Districtgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Board of Christian Education of Presbyterian Church in United States v. School District of Philadelphia, 91 A.2d 372 (Pa. Super. 1952) (holding that a church’s rental activities conducted for a gain or profit were subject to a business privilege tax). 10 conceive how the contributions returned to them should be regarded as a gain or profit to the entity acting as their mutual agent. 2021See, e.g., Board of Christian Education of Presbyterian Church in United States v. School District of Philadelphia, 91 A.2d 372 (Pa. Super. 1952) (holding that a church’s rental activities conducted for a gain or profit were subject to a business privilege tax). 10 conceive how the contributions returned to them should be regarded as a gain or profit to the entity acting as their mutual agent. | 1 | 1 |
| Township of Little Britain v. Lancaster County Turf Products, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Township of Middle Smithfield v. Kesslergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Deeds ex rel. Renzulli v. University of Pennsylvania Medical Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holland v. Marcygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ostroskygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shelly Funeral Home, Inc. v. Warrington Townshipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fish v. Township of Lower Meriongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blauner's, Inc. v. Philadelphiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lynnebrook and Woodbrook Associates, Lp Ex Rel. Lynnebrook Manor, Inc. v. Millersvillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| School District v. R.V. Valvano Construction Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| V.L. Rendina, Inc. v. City of Harrisburggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tech One Associates v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Reviewgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Philadelphia v. New Sun Ray Drug, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Morris v. Kansas Drywall Supply Co. (In Re Classic Drywall, Inc.)green | 1 | 1 |
| V.L. Rendina, Inc. v. City of Harrisburggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Hennefordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bankers Securities Corp. v. Philadelphia School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pittsburgh v. Houstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Philadelphia v. Tax Review Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Township of Lower Merion v. Qed, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Valvano Const. Co., Inc., 863 A.2d 48, 54-55 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (citing Township of Lower Merion v. QED, Inc., 738 A.2d 1066 (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 680 , 775 A.2d 811 (2001)). 2002Finally, Northwood argues that, according to Township of Lower Merion v. QED, Inc., 738 A.2d 1066 , 1071 n. 6 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 680 , 775 A.2d 811 (2001), section 8 of The Local Tax Enabling Act 4 (LTEA) allows for a business privilege tax exemption where a company has more than one base of operations. | 3 | 2002–2014 |
Airpark International I v. Interboro School District
green
2 sentences2007The Authority next claims that the resolution violates Section 533 of the Reform Act by imposing a business privilege or gross receipts tax on airport parking. 7 In support of its argument, the Authority relies upon Justice Nigro’s Opinion in Support of Reversal 8 in Airpark International I v. Interboro School District, 558 Pa. 1 , 735 A.2d 646 (1999). 2007The Authority next claims that the resolution violates Section 533 of the Reform Act by imposing a business privilege or gross receipts tax on airport parking. 7 In support of its argument, the Authority relies upon Justice Nigro’s Opinion in Support of Reversal 8 in Airpark International I v. Interboro School District, 558 Pa. 1 , 735 A.2d 646 (1999). | 3 | 1999–2007 |
Commonwealth v. Wilsbach Distributors, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997We affirm. [4] The preemption analysis by the Commonwealth Court in Middletown Township focused on "whether the legislature intended to deprive the municipality of its statutory power to levy a business privilege tax . . . whether the `general tenor' of the state statute was intended to preempt the field as to local taxation." Middletown Township, 105 Pa. Commw. at 314 , 524 A.2d at 1040 (citing Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Ass'n v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374 , 77 A.2d 616 (1951)). [5] Pittsburgh v. Allegheny Valley Bank, 488 Pa. 544 , 412 A.2d 1366 (1980) (holding that Banking Code of 1965, A 1997We affirm. [4] The preemption analysis by the Commonwealth Court in Middletown Township focused on "whether the legislature intended to deprive the municipality of its statutory power to levy a business privilege tax . . . whether the `general tenor' of the state statute was intended to preempt the field as to local taxation." Middletown Township, 105 Pa. Commw. at 314 , 524 A.2d at 1040 (citing Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Ass'n v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374 , 77 A.2d 616 (1951)). [5] Pittsburgh v. Allegheny Valley Bank, 488 Pa. 544 , 412 A.2d 1366 (1980) (holding that Banking Code of 1965, A | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp.
green
2 sentences1995Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Electric, 336 Pa. 209 , 8 A.2d 404 (1939). 1995Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Electric, 336 Pa. 209 , 8 A.2d 404 (1939). | 2 | 1980–1995 |
Harsco Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh
green
2 sentences1993Johnson, 495 Pa. 256 , 433 A2d 465 (1981) and of the business privilege tax in Harsco Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 516 Pa. 562 , 533 A.2d 1012 (1987). 1993Johnson, 495 Pa. 256 , 433 A2d 465 (1981) and of the business privilege tax in Harsco Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 516 Pa. 562 , 533 A.2d 1012 (1987). | 2 | 1993–1994 |
Commonwealth v. National Biscuit Co.
green
2 sentences1993In Commonwealth v. National Biscuit Co., 390 Pa. 642 , 136 A.2d 821 (1957), the Supreme Court set forth the test for determining whether a local tax taxes the same “privilege, transaction, subject, occupation or personal property which is now or does hereafter become subject to a State tax or license fee,” which is precluded by § 2(1) of LTEA, 53 P.S. § 6902(1). 1993In Commonwealth v. National Biscuit Co., 390 Pa. 642 , 136 A.2d 821 (1957), the Supreme Court set forth the test for determining whether a local tax taxes the same “privilege, transaction, subject, occupation or personal property which is now or does hereafter become subject to a State tax or license fee,” which is precluded by § 2(1) of LTEA, 53 P.S. § 6902(1). | 2 | 1977–1993 |
Aronson v. City of Pittsburgh
green
2 sentences1990We affirmed on the basis that the “receipt of compensation for services as a corporate director does not constitute a business as defined in the business privilege tax ordinance.” Id., 86 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 600, 485 A.2d at 895 . 1990We affirmed on the basis that the “receipt of compensation for services as a corporate director does not constitute a business as defined in the business privilege tax ordinance.” Id., 86 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 600, 485 A.2d at 895 . | 2 | 1986–1990 |
Board of Revision of Taxes v. United Fund of the Philadelphia Area
green
2 sentences1986This result plainly contravenes the rule that a statutory provision purporting to exempt persons and property from taxation must be strictly construed. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(5); Bd. of Revision of Taxes of Philadelphia v. United Fund of Philadelphia Area, 11 Pa. Cmwlth. 201, 314 A.2d 530 (1973). 1986This result plainly contravenes the rule that a statutory provision purporting to exempt persons and property from taxation must be strictly construed. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(5); Bd. of Revision of Taxes of Philadelphia v. United Fund of Philadelphia Area, 11 Pa. Cmwlth. 201, 314 A.2d 530 (1973). | 2 | 1980–1986 |
National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia
green
2 sentences1983The appellant contends that since it pays a fee to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for each attorney it employs, it is not subject to levy, assessment or collection of the business privilege tax because Section 2(1) of the Local Tax Enabling Act, 53 P.S. §6902(1) prohibits such levy, assessment or collection with respect to an “occupation . . . which is now or does hereafter become subject to a state tax or license fee.” The appellant says that the Pa. B.D.E. 219 fee is a license fee within the meaning of the Act, and that we should apply to the facts the test of National Biscuit Co. v. Philade 1983The appellant contends that since it pays a fee to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for each attorney it employs, it is not subject to levy, assessment or collection of the business privilege tax because Section 2(1) of the Local Tax Enabling Act, 53 P.S. §6902(1) prohibits such levy, assessment or collection with respect to an “occupation . . . which is now or does hereafter become subject to a state tax or license fee.” The appellant says that the Pa. B.D.E. 219 fee is a license fee within the meaning of the Act, and that we should apply to the facts the test of National Biscuit Co. v. Philade | 2 | 1977–1983 |
Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1945In Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801 , it is stated: ‘The common usage of the business is a test of negligence, but not a conclusive or controlling test.’ In the case of Zartner v. George, 156 Wis. 131 , 145 N. W. 971 , the Supreme Court of Wisconsin aptly said: ‘If the act in question is obviously dangerous, then evidence of custom is inadmissible, because custom cannot change the quality of an act. . . . 1933“The common usage of the business is a test of negligence, but not a conclusive or controlling test”: Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801 . | 2 | 1933–1945 |
Zartner v. George
neutral
2 sentences1945In Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801 , it is stated: ‘The common usage of the business is a test of negligence, but not a conclusive or controlling test.’ In the case of Zartner v. George, 156 Wis. 131 , 145 N. W. 971 , the Supreme Court of Wisconsin aptly said: ‘If the act in question is obviously dangerous, then evidence of custom is inadmissible, because custom cannot change the quality of an act. . . . 1945In Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801 , it is stated: ‘The common usage of the business is a test of negligence, but not a conclusive or controlling test.’ In the case of Zartner v. George, 156 Wis. 131 , 145 N. W. 971 , the Supreme Court of Wisconsin aptly said: ‘If the act in question is obviously dangerous, then evidence of custom is inadmissible, because custom cannot change the quality of an act. . . . | 2 | 1933–1945 |
Coleman v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2026Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Philadelphia School District v. Frankford Grocery Co.
green
1 sentence2026See Duquesne Club v. Pittsburgh, 87 A.2d 81 (Pa. Super. 1952) (holding that because the club supplied food service to its members not for profit but for convenience of its members, it was not conducting business subject to a mercantile tax); Philadelphia School District v. Frankford Grocery Co., 103 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1954) (holding that “business” as contemplated by the Philadelphia School District Tax Act means business for gain or profit, with a profit motive and disagreeing with the school district’s view that “business” should include any commercial activity and not limited to a business carri | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| DeGore v. CIV. SERV. COM., ALLEG. CTY. neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bundy v. Belin
green
1 sentence2021See 1 Pa. C.S. §1928(b)(3), (5); Greenwood Gaming, 90 A.3d at 707 ; Bundy, 461 A.2d at 200 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance v. Wolfe
green
1 sentence2021See 1 Pa. C.S. §1928(b)(3), (5); Greenwood Gaming, 90 A.3d at 707 ; Bundy, 461 A.2d at 200 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Cuker v. Mikalauskas green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Provident Mutual Life Insurance v. Tax Review Board green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Blauner's, Inc. v. Philadelphia green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Smith v. Hartford Ins. Co. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| J & K Trash Removal, Inc. v. City of Chester neutral | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In Re Estate of Leitham green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Krug v. City of Philadelphia green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| City of Philadelphia v. 2600 Lewis, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Sterling v. Philadelphia green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Hanover Borough Professional Ass'n v. Borough of Hanover neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Joines v. United States green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Airway Arms, Inc. v. Moon Area School District green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Mellon Square Garage, Inc. v. Public Parking Authority green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Ass'n v. Pittsburgh green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Darr v. Burford red | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Middletown Township v. Alverno Valley Farms green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| City of Pittsburgh v. Allegheny Valley Bank green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Cheltenham Township v. Cheltenham Cinema, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Tax Review Board v. Brine Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Sun Oil Co. v. Tax Review Board green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.