business test in Iowa

2026If factual data are presented which furnish a basis for compilation of probable loss of profits, evidence of future profits should be admitted and its weight, if any, should be left to the jury.” Harsha, 346 N.W.2d at 798.

2026If factual data are presented which furnish a basis for compilation of probable loss of profits, evidence of future profits should be admitted and its weight, if any, should be left to the jury.” Harsha, 346 N.W.2d at 798 .

2017Iowa has long recognized the new business rule that considers “[e]xpected profits from a new commercial enterprise . . . too remote and speculative to warrant judgment for their loss because there are no available data of past business from which the fact of anticipated profits could have been established.” City of Corning v. Iowa–Nebraska Light & Power Co., 282 N.W. 791, 796 (Iowa 1938).

1984The rationale underlying the new business rule is that “[ejxpected profits from a new commercial enterprise [are] too remote and speculative to warrant judgment for their loss because there are no available data of past business from which the fact of anticipated profits could have been established.” City of Corning, 225 Iowa at 1389 , 282 N.W. at 796 .

2016Thus, in Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co. v. Martinez, the court relied on .the primary business test to determine that a sand and gravel excavator that made its own deliveries and charged for them, but did not transport materials for other suppliers, was not a carrier for hire. 125 N.M. 46 , 956 P.2d 845, 846-47 (Ct.App.1998), In Gambino v. Jackson, the court found an individual who sold and delivered agricultural lime was a private carrier and not a common or contract carrier.

2016Thus, in Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co. v. Martinez, the court relied on .the primary business test to determine that a sand and gravel excavator that made its own deliveries and charged for them, but did not transport materials for other suppliers, was not a carrier for hire. 125 N.M. 46 , 956 P.2d 845, 846-47 (Ct.App.1998), In Gambino v. Jackson, the court found an individual who sold and delivered agricultural lime was a private carrier and not a common or contract carrier.

2016Regulation, 284 Mont. 65 , 943 P.2d 971, 975-77 (1997) (finding that a resort’s provision of transportation to its guests was exempt from regulation under the primary business test).

2016Regulation, 284 Mont. 65 , 943 P.2d 971, 975-77 (1997) (finding that a resort’s provision of transportation to its guests was exempt from regulation under the primary business test).

2016See Iowa Code § 4.4 (2) (setting forth a presumption that "[t]he entire statute is intended to be effective”); Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa 2013) ("Normally we do not interpret statutes so they contain sur-plusage.”). 7 , As the Supreme Court pointed out, the primary business test was developed to avoid "subterfuges which might be employed to engage in unauthorized for-hire transportation,” such as having the carrier temporarily take title while the goods were being transported and other varieties of “pseudo-private carriage.” Red Ball, 377 U.S. at 313-16 , 84 S.Ct. at 1262-63 ,

2016See Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Shannon, 377 U.S. 311, 313-19 , 84 S.Ct. 1260, 1262-65 , 12 L.Ed.2d 341, 343-47 (1964). 7 In the present case, the district court relied on this test when it initially ruled that United Suppliers was not a trucker under the Nationwide policy because it was not “engaged in the business of transporting property by ‘auto’ for hire.” As the district court noted in that ruling, “States have appropriated the primary business test to determine a carrier’s ‘for hire’ or ‘private carrier’ status in a variety of circumstances_” See, e.g., A.G.G.

2016See Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Shannon, 377 U.S. 311, 313-19 , 84 S.Ct. 1260, 1262-65 , 12 L.Ed.2d 341, 343-47 (1964). 7 In the present case, the district court relied on this test when it initially ruled that United Suppliers was not a trucker under the Nationwide policy because it was not “engaged in the business of transporting property by ‘auto’ for hire.” As the district court noted in that ruling, “States have appropriated the primary business test to determine a carrier’s ‘for hire’ or ‘private carrier’ status in a variety of circumstances_” See, e.g., A.G.G.

2016Enters., Inc. v. Washington County, 145 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1222 (D.Or.2001) (“The primary business test ... determines if the transportation is within the scope and in the furtherance of a primary business enterprise other than transportation.”); Frohardt v. Bassett, 788 N.E.2d 462, 468 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (“Red Ball dis *776 tinguishes a ‘for-hire’ carrier from a ‘private’ carrier by explaining that, in order to be considered ‘for hire,’ a carrier’s primary business must be supplying transportation for compensation.”); Grouse Mountain Assocs., Ltd. v. Mont.

2016Enters., Inc. v. Washington County, 145 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1222 (D.Or.2001) (“The primary business test ... determines if the transportation is within the scope and in the furtherance of a primary business enterprise other than transportation.”); Frohardt v. Bassett, 788 N.E.2d 462, 468 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (“Red Ball dis *776 tinguishes a ‘for-hire’ carrier from a ‘private’ carrier by explaining that, in order to be considered ‘for hire,’ a carrier’s primary business must be supplying transportation for compensation.”); Grouse Mountain Assocs., Ltd. v. Mont.

2016In Admiral Disposal Co. v. Department of Revenue, an Illinois appellate court applied these factors in determining that,a garbage collection company was a private carrier rather than a carrier for hire. 302 Ill.App.3d 256 , 235 Ill.Dec. 858 , 706 N.E.2d 118, 121-23 (1999). 8 The court thus cited twelve criteria “for evaluating the primary business test’s application to a specific case”: ' ■ 1.

2016In Admiral Disposal Co. v. Department of Revenue, an Illinois appellate court applied these factors in determining that,a garbage collection company was a private carrier rather than a carrier for hire. 302 Ill.App.3d 256 , 235 Ill.Dec. 858 , 706 N.E.2d 118, 121-23 (1999). 8 The court thus cited twelve criteria “for evaluating the primary business test’s application to a specific case”: ' ■ 1.

2016Enters., Inc. v. Washington County, 145 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1222 (D.Or.2001) (“The primary business test ... determines if the transportation is within the scope and in the furtherance of a primary business enterprise other than transportation.”); Frohardt v. Bassett, 788 N.E.2d 462, 468 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (“Red Ball dis *776 tinguishes a ‘for-hire’ carrier from a ‘private’ carrier by explaining that, in order to be considered ‘for hire,’ a carrier’s primary business must be supplying transportation for compensation.”); Grouse Mountain Assocs., Ltd. v. Mont.

2016Enters., Inc. v. Washington County, 145 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1222 (D.Or.2001) (“The primary business test ... determines if the transportation is within the scope and in the furtherance of a primary business enterprise other than transportation.”); Frohardt v. Bassett, 788 N.E.2d 462, 468 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (“Red Ball dis *776 tinguishes a ‘for-hire’ carrier from a ‘private’ carrier by explaining that, in order to be considered ‘for hire,’ a carrier’s primary business must be supplying transportation for compensation.”); Grouse Mountain Assocs., Ltd. v. Mont.

1984We discussed the general principles governing opinion evidence in Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Iowa 1977): Iowa is committed to a liberal rule which allows opinion testimony if it is of a nature which will aid the jury and is based on special training, experience, or knowledge with respect to the issue in question.

1984We discussed the general principles governing opinion evidence in Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Iowa 1977): Iowa is committed to a liberal rule which allows opinion testimony if it is of a nature which will aid the jury and is based on special training, experience, or knowledge with respect to the issue in question.