business privilege in Virginia

2000Among the arguments raised by Lockheed was one based on the “new business rule.” The argument was rejected by this court and the Supreme Court: The trial court observed that if, as Lockheed suggests, the new business rule were applied as an absolute bar to damage recovery in this case, a cause of action for intentional interference with a contract expectancy would be meaningless, because “anybody anywhere in Virginia could lie, cheat, and steal to deprive any new business, or any existing business that has never operated in Virginia, of a contract expectancy with complete civil impunity.” The

2000Among the arguments raised by Lockheed was one based on the “new business rule.” The argument was rejected by this court and the Supreme Court: The trial court observed that if, as Lockheed suggests, the new business rule were applied as an absolute bar to damage recovery in this case, a cause of action for intentional interference with a contract expectancy would be meaningless, because “anybody anywhere in Virginia could lie, cheat, and steal to deprive any new business, or any existing business that has never operated in Virginia, of a contract expectancy with complete civil impunity.” The

1994The Court went on to note that under the Virginia statute, the directors become trustees of the trust res which are the remaining assets of the corporation, and, to the extent that they use this trust res “for operations of the business in violation of the statute instead of paying pre-existing obligations .... [T]hey are personally liable... for the damages caused by their breach of trust” Id. at 535 .

1994See, Short Brothers, Inc, v. Arlington County, 244 Va. 520 , 423 S.E.2d 172 (1992) (business license tax); Commonwealth v. Shell Oil Co., 210 Va. 163, 166-167 , 169 S.E.2d 461 (1969) (excise tax on fuel distinguished from business license tax); Dickerson G.M.C., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 339 , 143 S.E.2d 863 (1965) (merchant held to be retailer, not wholesaler); 51 Am.

1994See, Short Brothers, Inc, v. Arlington County, 244 Va. 520 , 423 S.E.2d 172 (1992) (business license tax); Commonwealth v. Shell Oil Co., 210 Va. 163, 166-167 , 169 S.E.2d 461 (1969) (excise tax on fuel distinguished from business license tax); Dickerson G.M.C., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 339 , 143 S.E.2d 863 (1965) (merchant held to be retailer, not wholesaler); 51 Am.

1948The imposition of a license tax upon the operator of an office budding, the amount of which was based upon the gross receipts received for the rental, was held valid in State v. Heymann, 178 La. 479 , 151 So. 901 .

1948The imposition of a license tax upon the operator of an office budding, the amount of which was based upon the gross receipts received for the rental, was held valid in State v. Heymann, 178 La. 479 , 151 So. 901 .

1917He claimed that his business was interstate commerce, and the Supreme Court of the United States sustained his contention, saying: “The Supreme Court of the State gave much weight to the dealer’s past conduct, and animating purpose, and relied upon the language quoted from Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343 , 45 L.

1917He claimed that his business was interstate commerce, and the Supreme Court of the United States sustained his contention, saying: “The Supreme Court of the State gave much weight to the dealer’s past conduct, and animating purpose, and relied upon the language quoted from Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343 , 45 L.