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7 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1965–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testagreen2 sentences2018After considering the words "relating to" "according to [their] plain and ordinary meaning given in the context of political discussions and arguments, in order to carry out the intention and objectives of the people," id. at 1325, ¶ 30 (quotation omitted), the court concluded that the "text and history" of the provision showed it was intended to apply "broadly" to business privilege taxes "derived from the sales of motor-vehicle fuel" — not solely to transactional taxes imposed directly on fuel sales, id. at 1325-27, ¶¶ 30, 33-36 . ¶20 Although Beaver Excavating supports Saban's position that 2018After considering the words "relating to" "according to [their] plain and ordinary meaning given in the context of political discussions and arguments, in order to carry out the intention and objectives of the people," id. at 1325, ¶ 30 (quotation omitted), the court concluded that the "text and history" of the provision showed it was intended to apply "broadly" to business privilege taxes "derived from the sales of motor-vehicle fuel" — not solely to transactional taxes imposed directly on fuel sales, id. at 1325-27, ¶¶ 30, 33-36 . ¶20 Although Beaver Excavating supports Saban's position that | 1 | 1 |
Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue of Wash.green2 sentences1985The crucial test is “whether the state [or city] has given anything for which it can ask return.” Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Wash. Dept. of Rev., 419 U.S. 560, 561 , 95 S.Ct. 706, 708 , 42 L.Ed.2d 719, 722 (1975); citing Wisconsin v. J.C. 1985The crucial test is “whether the state [or city] has given anything for which it can ask return.” Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Wash. Dept. of Rev., 419 U.S. 560, 561 , 95 S.Ct. 706, 708 , 42 L.Ed.2d 719, 722 (1975); citing Wisconsin v. J.C. | 1 | 1 |
Industrial Uranium Co. v. State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences1982See Industrial Uranium Co. v. State Tax Commission, 95 Ariz. 130 , 387 P.2d 1013 (1963). 1982See Industrial Uranium Co. v. State Tax Commission, 95 Ariz. 130 , 387 P.2d 1013 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hoskins
green
1 sentence2023State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127 , 142–43 (2000) (“We will not reverse a conviction based on the erroneous admission of evidence without a ‘reasonable probability’ that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been admitted.” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Boyes v. State
neutral
2 sentences1979Although our Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, 105 Ariz. 34 , 459 P.2d 86 (1969), vacating, 8 Ariz.App. 304 , 445 P.2d 861 (1968), it continued to apply the same principal business test (and the legislature shortly thereafter amended A.R.S. § 40-601 to specifically include within the definition of private motor carriers the activities at issue in Boyes.) In Purolator Security, Inc. v. Thorneycroft, 116 Ariz. 394 , 569 P.2d 824 (1977) the court held that Purolator was a common motor carrier of property despite Purolator’s contention that the principal business was security service 1979Although our Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, 105 Ariz. 34 , 459 P.2d 86 (1969), vacating, 8 Ariz.App. 304 , 445 P.2d 861 (1968), it continued to apply the same principal business test (and the legislature shortly thereafter amended A.R.S. § 40-601 to specifically include within the definition of private motor carriers the activities at issue in Boyes.) In Purolator Security, Inc. v. Thorneycroft, 116 Ariz. 394 , 569 P.2d 824 (1977) the court held that Purolator was a common motor carrier of property despite Purolator’s contention that the principal business was security service | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Boyes v. State
green
2 sentences1979Although our Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, 105 Ariz. 34 , 459 P.2d 86 (1969), vacating, 8 Ariz.App. 304 , 445 P.2d 861 (1968), it continued to apply the same principal business test (and the legislature shortly thereafter amended A.R.S. § 40-601 to specifically include within the definition of private motor carriers the activities at issue in Boyes.) In Purolator Security, Inc. v. Thorneycroft, 116 Ariz. 394 , 569 P.2d 824 (1977) the court held that Purolator was a common motor carrier of property despite Purolator’s contention that the principal business was security service 1979Although our Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, 105 Ariz. 34 , 459 P.2d 86 (1969), vacating, 8 Ariz.App. 304 , 445 P.2d 861 (1968), it continued to apply the same principal business test (and the legislature shortly thereafter amended A.R.S. § 40-601 to specifically include within the definition of private motor carriers the activities at issue in Boyes.) In Purolator Security, Inc. v. Thorneycroft, 116 Ariz. 394 , 569 P.2d 824 (1977) the court held that Purolator was a common motor carrier of property despite Purolator’s contention that the principal business was security service | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Purolator Security, Inc. v. Thorneycroft
green
2 sentences1979Although our Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, 105 Ariz. 34 , 459 P.2d 86 (1969), vacating, 8 Ariz.App. 304 , 445 P.2d 861 (1968), it continued to apply the same principal business test (and the legislature shortly thereafter amended A.R.S. § 40-601 to specifically include within the definition of private motor carriers the activities at issue in Boyes.) In Purolator Security, Inc. v. Thorneycroft, 116 Ariz. 394 , 569 P.2d 824 (1977) the court held that Purolator was a common motor carrier of property despite Purolator’s contention that the principal business was security service 1979Although our Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, 105 Ariz. 34 , 459 P.2d 86 (1969), vacating, 8 Ariz.App. 304 , 445 P.2d 861 (1968), it continued to apply the same principal business test (and the legislature shortly thereafter amended A.R.S. § 40-601 to specifically include within the definition of private motor carriers the activities at issue in Boyes.) In Purolator Security, Inc. v. Thorneycroft, 116 Ariz. 394 , 569 P.2d 824 (1977) the court held that Purolator was a common motor carrier of property despite Purolator’s contention that the principal business was security service | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Arizona Corp. Commission v. Continental Security Guards
green
2 sentences1979The Puralator court distinguished its factual situation from the one present in Arizona Corporation Commission v. Continental Security Guards, 103 Ariz. 410 , 443 P.2d 406 (1968), where the court had concluded that Continental was not a contract or common motor carrier since its principal business was protection and security and the armored car was merely a part of the security provided. 1979The Puralator court distinguished its factual situation from the one present in Arizona Corporation Commission v. Continental Security Guards, 103 Ariz. 410 , 443 P.2d 406 (1968), where the court had concluded that Continental was not a contract or common motor carrier since its principal business was protection and security and the armored car was merely a part of the security provided. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Arizona State Tax Com'n v. Garrett Corporation
green
2 sentences1968Arizona State Tax Commission v. Garrett Corporation, 79 Ariz. 389 , 291 P.2d 208 (1955). 1968Arizona State Tax Commission v. Garrett Corporation, 79 Ariz. 389 , 291 P.2d 208 (1955). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
United States v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1965In rejecting the contention of .unconstitutionality, which had been upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals (4 Cir., 15 F.2d 809 ), the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, said: “If the form of the return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all.” ( 274 U.S. 259, 263 , 47 S.Ct. 607 ) The legal requirement that one disclose that one has been convicted of a felony has never been held to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment or similar consti 1965In rejecting the contention of .unconstitutionality, which had been upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals (4 Cir., 15 F.2d 809 ), the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, said: “If the form of the return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all.” ( 274 U.S. 259, 263 , 47 S.Ct. 607 ) The legal requirement that one disclose that one has been convicted of a felony has never been held to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment or similar consti | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Sullivan v. United States
neutral
1 sentence1965In rejecting the contention of .unconstitutionality, which had been upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals (4 Cir., 15 F.2d 809 ), the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, said: “If the form of the return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all.” ( 274 U.S. 259, 263 , 47 S.Ct. 607 ) The legal requirement that one disclose that one has been convicted of a felony has never been held to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment or similar consti | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.