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12 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pulizzanogreen2 sentences2025Id. at 653 . ¶29 DiFrances does not directly address the first part of the test, the five Pulizzano factors. 2024The Pulizzano exception has been applied when the complainant is a child and “the possibility of the child having a previous sexual experience may be relevant to the defendant’s case because it could provide an alternative source for the child’s detailed sexual knowledge.” Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶41 . [T]o establish a constitutional right to present otherwise excluded evidence of a child complainant’s prior sexual conduct for the limited purpose of proving an alternative source for sexual knowledge, prior to trial the defendant must make an offer of proof showing: (1) that the prior acts cle | 4 | 11 |
In Interest of Michael RBgreen2 sentences2025Indeed, in Michael R.B. v. State, 175 Wis. 2d 713, 736 , 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993), our supreme court labeled it an “insupportable leap of reasoning to conclude that two or three minutes of undefined sexual touching … so closely resembles sexual intercourse [so] as to satisfy the Pulizzano test.” ¶31 Further, Emily’s purported recantation was highly ambiguous, and the circuit court’s concerns about a mini-trial were well-founded based upon DiFrances’s bare-bones pretrial offer of proof. 2025Indeed, in Michael R.B. v. State, 175 Wis. 2d 713, 736 , 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993), our supreme court labeled it an “insupportable leap of reasoning to conclude that two or three minutes of undefined sexual touching … so closely resembles sexual intercourse [so] as to satisfy the Pulizzano test.” ¶31 Further, Emily’s purported recantation was highly ambiguous, and the circuit court’s concerns about a mini-trial were well-founded based upon DiFrances’s bare-bones pretrial offer of proof. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Dunlapgreen2 sentences2010Despite our acknowledgement that the rape shield law "takes on a slightly different role when the complainant is a child," Dunlap, 250 Wis. 2d 466, ¶ 19 , this court cautions that the Pulizzano exception to the rape shield law is intentionally narrow and must be applied accordingly. 2010Despite our acknowledgement that the rape shield law "takes on a slightly different role when the complainant is a child," Dunlap, 250 Wis. 2d 466, ¶ 19 , this court cautions that the Pulizzano exception to the rape shield law is intentionally narrow and must be applied accordingly. | 2 | 3 |
Washington v. Texasgreen2 sentences2016To assess Pulizzano's claim, the court described a "constitutional right to present evidence . . . grounded in the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 645 (first citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967); then citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965)). ¶173 Based on those constitutional protections, this court concluded that under certain circumstances "evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct may be so relevant and probative that the 2016To assess Pulizzano's claim, the court described a "constitutional right to present evidence . . . grounded in the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 645 (first citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967); then citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965)). ¶173 Based on those constitutional protections, this court concluded that under certain circumstances "evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct may be so relevant and probative that the | 2 | 2 |
Pointer v. Texasgreen2 sentences2016To assess Pulizzano's claim, the court described a "constitutional right to present evidence . . . grounded in the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 645 (first citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967); then citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965)). ¶173 Based on those constitutional protections, this court concluded that under certain circumstances "evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct may be so relevant and probative that the 2016To assess Pulizzano's claim, the court described a "constitutional right to present evidence . . . grounded in the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 645 (first citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967); then citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965)). ¶173 Based on those constitutional protections, this court concluded that under certain circumstances "evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct may be so relevant and probative that the | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dodsongreen2 sentences2010Id. at 78-79. ¶ 51. 2010Id. at 78-79. ¶ 51. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Thielgreen2 sentences2024See Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶51 . 10 The State asserts that its interests in enforcing the rape shield statute outweigh Dietzen presenting Pulizzano evidence because “[a]s the entire trial transcript shows, Dietzen was not denied his constitutional right to a defense without presenting this evidence.” We deem this argument to be undeveloped because the State does not support its argument with citation to any particular evidence from the trial. 2024See Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶51 . 10 The State asserts that its interests in enforcing the rape shield statute outweigh Dietzen presenting Pulizzano evidence because “[a]s the entire trial transcript shows, Dietzen was not denied his constitutional right to a defense without presenting this evidence.” We deem this argument to be undeveloped because the State does not support its argument with citation to any particular evidence from the trial. | 1 | 1 |
Napue v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2004The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the Brady] rule." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). 2004The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the Brady] rule." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Milenkovic v. State
green
2 sentences2010To demonstrate that the previous assault "clearly occurred," Carter's offer of proof " 'should state an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to warrant the conclusion or inference that the trier of fact is urged to adopt.'" Id at 652 (quoting Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 284 , 272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978)). 2010To demonstrate that the previous assault "clearly occurred," Carter's offer of proof " 'should state an evidentiary hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to warrant the conclusion or inference that the trier of fact is urged to adopt.'" Id at 652 (quoting Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 284 , 272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978)). | 2 | 1998–2010 |
State v. Carter
green
2 sentences2024We disagree. ¶17 “Wisconsin’s rape shield law … generally prohibits a defendant … from introducing evidence concerning [an] alleged victim’s prior sexual conduct.” State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶39 , 324 Wis. 2d 640 , 782 N.W.2d 695 (footnote omitted). ¶18 Under the Pulizzano exception, the rape shield statute may be overcome by a defendant’s constitutional right to present material evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct. 2024We disagree. ¶17 “Wisconsin’s rape shield law … generally prohibits a defendant … from introducing evidence concerning [an] alleged victim’s prior sexual conduct.” State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶39 , 324 Wis. 2d 640 , 782 N.W.2d 695 (footnote omitted). ¶18 Under the Pulizzano exception, the rape shield statute may be overcome by a defendant’s constitutional right to present material evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Giglio v. United States
green
2 sentences2004The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the Brady] rule." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). 2004The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the Brady] rule." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Agurs
green
2 sentences2004As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[b]ecause we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 . 2004As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[bjecause we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Hammer
green
2 sentences2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a 2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Scheffer
green
2 sentences2002Without a compelling state interest, the court's ruling may not interfere with the accused's opportunity to present crucial evidence to the jury. [35] Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315 . [36] Id. [37] This factor is similar to the first and second factors of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. 2002Without a compelling state interest, the court's ruling may not interfere with the accused's opportunity to present crucial evidence to the jury. [35] Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315 . [36] Id. [37] This factor is similar to the first and second factors of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Watson
green
2 sentences2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a 2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Eichman
green
2 sentences2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a 2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hartung v. Hartung
green
2 sentences2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a 2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Walker
green
2 sentences2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a 2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Wurtz
green
2 sentences2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a 2002Instead of asking whether the prior sexual act occurred and whether the acts closely resemble each other, the question in the present case is whether the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion to admit the testimony. [38] This factor is similar to the third factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [39] This factor is similar to the fourth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [40] This factor is similar to the fifth factor of the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 19 above. [41] This inquiry is similar to the inquiry in the Pulizzano test set forth in ¶ 20 a | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.