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11 California opinions name it 3 courts 1921–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bank of Italy v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2018(Cf., e.g., Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1 , 15, 251 P. 784 [a public official "may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under [a] statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case" ].) True, the Board did not have to grant a rehearing, as we have explained. 2018(Cf., e.g., Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1 , 15, 251 P. 784 [a public official "may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under [a] statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case" ].) True, the Board did not have to grant a rehearing, as we have explained. | 8 | 10 |
Feduniak v. California Coastal Commissiongreen2 sentences2015(See Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 15 [ 251 P. 784 ] [agency head “may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under the statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case, for an attempt to do so would be for him to arrogate to himself a legislative function”].) “Mere failure to act. . . does not constitute an administrative construction.” (Estate of Madison (1945) 26 Cal.2d 453, 463 [ 159 P.2d 630 ]; see Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1369 [ 56 C 2015(See Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 15 [ 251 P. 784 ] [agency head “may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under the statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case, for an attempt to do so would be for him to arrogate to himself a legislative function”].) “Mere failure to act. . . does not constitute an administrative construction.” (Estate of Madison (1945) 26 Cal.2d 453, 463 [ 159 P.2d 630 ]; see Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1369 [ 56 C | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Madisongreen2 sentences2015(See Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 15 [ 251 P. 784 ] [agency head “may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under the statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case, for an attempt to do so would be for him to arrogate to himself a legislative function”].) “Mere failure to act. . . does not constitute an administrative construction.” (Estate of Madison (1945) 26 Cal.2d 453, 463 [ 159 P.2d 630 ]; see Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1369 [ 56 C 2015(See Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 15 [ 251 P. 784 ] [agency head “may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under the statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case, for an attempt to do so would be for him to arrogate to himself a legislative function”].) “Mere failure to act. . . does not constitute an administrative construction.” (Estate of Madison (1945) 26 Cal.2d 453, 463 [ 159 P.2d 630 ]; see Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1369 [ 56 C | 1 | 2 |
California School Employees Ass'n v. Personnel Commission of the Pajaro Valley Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2005Employees Assn. v. Personnel Commission (1970) 3 Cal.3d 139, 144 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 474 P.2d 436 ].) Similarly, as said in Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 15 [ 251 P. 784 ], the head of an agency “may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under the statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case, for an attempt to do so would be for him to arrogate to himself a legislative function.” 2005Employees Assn. v. Personnel Commission (1970) 3 Cal.3d 139, 144 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 620 , 474 P.2d 436 ].) Similarly, as said in Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 15 [ 251 P. 784 ], the head of an agency “may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under the statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case, for an attempt to do so would be for him to arrogate to himself a legislative function.” | 1 | 1 |
Halpin v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1996See People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 883 P.2d 974 ] [rule cannot impair court’s statutory powers]; Halpin v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 701, 706 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 857 ] [Shasta County court order setting fees conflicts with statutory duty to determine reasonable fees, hence, invalid].) In this case the Board has a duty to determine, factually, if an “occurrence” took place and upon such determination the Board is authorized to reimburse tank operators for cleanup costs incurred, to a ceiling of $990,000 per “occurrence.” It is undisputed that in making its 1996See People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 883 P.2d 974 ] [rule cannot impair court’s statutory powers]; Halpin v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 701, 706 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 857 ] [Shasta County court order setting fees conflicts with statutory duty to determine reasonable fees, hence, invalid].) In this case the Board has a duty to determine, factually, if an “occurrence” took place and upon such determination the Board is authorized to reimburse tank operators for cleanup costs incurred, to a ceiling of $990,000 per “occurrence.” It is undisputed that in making its | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences1996See People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 883 P.2d 974 ] [rule cannot impair court’s statutory powers]; Halpin v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 701, 706 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 857 ] [Shasta County court order setting fees conflicts with statutory duty to determine reasonable fees, hence, invalid].) In this case the Board has a duty to determine, factually, if an “occurrence” took place and upon such determination the Board is authorized to reimburse tank operators for cleanup costs incurred, to a ceiling of $990,000 per “occurrence.” It is undisputed that in making its 1996See People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 960 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 883 P.2d 974 ] [rule cannot impair court’s statutory powers]; Halpin v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 701, 706 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 857 ] [Shasta County court order setting fees conflicts with statutory duty to determine reasonable fees, hence, invalid].) In this case the Board has a duty to determine, factually, if an “occurrence” took place and upon such determination the Board is authorized to reimburse tank operators for cleanup costs incurred, to a ceiling of $990,000 per “occurrence.” It is undisputed that in making its | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rojo v. Kliger
green
2 sentences2007As stated in Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 15 [ 251 P. 784 ], the head of an agency “may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under the statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case, for an attempt to do so would be for him to arrogate to himself a legislative function.” Furthermore, administrative remedies, and the concomitant exhaustion requirement, serve the “salutory [sic] goals of easing the burden on the court system, maximizing the use of administrative agency expert 2007As stated in Bank of Italy v. Johnson (1926) 200 Cal. 1, 15 [ 251 P. 784 ], the head of an agency “may not by the adoption of any rule of policy or procedure so circumscribe or curtail the exercise of his discretion under the statute as to prevent the free and untrammeled exercise thereof in every case, for an attempt to do so would be for him to arrogate to himself a legislative function.” Furthermore, administrative remedies, and the concomitant exhaustion requirement, serve the “salutory [sic] goals of easing the burden on the court system, maximizing the use of administrative agency expert | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Montalvo v. Ferrero Acosta
neutral
1 sentence1921A. 78, 56 Pac. 829 ], it was held that the taxing authorities had power to assess property in the absence of the adoption of any rule of valuation by the legislature, although the constitution required that property “shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as provided by law.” Bearing in mind that these holdings were under state constitutions which required that the legislature “shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation” or that the “value” is “to be ascertained as provided by law,” there can be no doubt that under the less specific provision of our | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.