animating principle in California

2025Any object has the potential to be art, but “[t]o say that the First Amendment protects the sale or dissemination of all objects ranging from ‘totem poles,’ [citation], to television sets does not take us far in trying to articulate or understand a jurisprudence of ordered liberty; indeed it would entirely drain the First Amendment of meaning.” (Mastrovincenzo, supra, 435 F.3d at p. 92, fn. omitted; see Cressman, supra, 798 F.3d at pp. 952–953 [“Given the animating principle behind pure-speech protection—viz., safeguarding self expression—it is evident that all images are not categorically pur

2025Any object has the potential to be art, but “[t]o say that the First Amendment protects the sale or dissemination of all objects ranging from ‘totem poles,’ [citation], to television sets does not take us far in trying to articulate or understand a jurisprudence of ordered liberty; indeed it would entirely drain the First Amendment of meaning.” (Mastrovincenzo, supra, 435 F.3d at p. 92, fn. omitted; see Cressman, supra, 798 F.3d at pp. 952–953 [“Given the animating principle behind pure-speech protection—viz., safeguarding self expression—it is evident that all images are not categorically pur

2025(Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence (1984) 468 U.S. 288, 304 (Clark), citing Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503 (Tinker) [black armband worn by students in public school as protest of hostilities in Vietnam]; Brown v. Louisiana (1966) 383 U.S. 131 [sit-in by Black students in Whites only library to protest segregation]; Stromberg v. California (1931) 283 U.S. 359 [flying red flag as gesture of support for communism]; Spence v. 38.

2025(Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence (1984) 468 U.S. 288, 304 (Clark), citing Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503 (Tinker) [black armband worn by students in public school as protest of hostilities in Vietnam]; Brown v. Louisiana (1966) 383 U.S. 131 [sit-in by Black students in Whites only library to protest segregation]; Stromberg v. California (1931) 283 U.S. 359 [flying red flag as gesture of support for communism]; Spence v. 38.

2015Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477 .” ( Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 167-168 The court then explained that “the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain” (Ice, at p. 168, citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 497); that the, appropriate consideration in Apprendi was therefore “whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights . . .’ [(Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 557 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ])]” (Ice, at p. 168); and that “[i]n undertaking

2009The court observed that “[o]ur application of Apprendi’s rule must honor the ‘longstand *531 ing common-law practice’ in which the rule is rooted. [Citation.] The rule’s animating principle is the preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at the trial for an alleged offense. [Citation.] Guided by that principle, our opinions make clear that the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain. [Citation.] We accordingly considered whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the do

2024Pursuant to his duty of loyalty, Dirks was “obligated to act with the utmost loyalty and in the highest good faith when dealing with any member of the LLC, . . . [and could] not obtain any advantage over [any member of the LLC] by even the slightest misrepresentation or concealment.” (Feresi v. The Livery, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 419, 425 (Feresi).) “The animating principle of a fiduciary’s duties to his charges is unfaltering loyalty and honesty. ‘Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.

2016First, “[f]ailing the objective test, [a] hallucination cannot as a matter of law negate malice so as to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter—whether on a ‘sudden quarrel or heat of passion’ theory of statutory voluntary manslaughter [citations] or on a ‘diminished actuality’ theory of nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter [citations].” ( Padilla, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 679.) Second, a hallucination—as a subjective phenomenon playing out in the defendant’s mind—can “negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder.” (Id. at p. 677.) Thi

2015Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477 .” ( Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 167-168 The court then explained that “the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain” (Ice, at p. 168, citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 497); that the, appropriate consideration in Apprendi was therefore “whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights . . .’ [(Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 557 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ])]” (Ice, at p. 168); and that “[i]n undertaking

2015Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477 .” ( Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 167-168 The court then explained that “the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain” (Ice, at p. 168, citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 497); that the, appropriate consideration in Apprendi was therefore “whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights . . .’ [(Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 557 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ])]” (Ice, at p. 168); and that “[i]n undertaking

2015Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477 .” ( Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 167-168 The court then explained that “the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain” (Ice, at p. 168, citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 497); that the, appropriate consideration in Apprendi was therefore “whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights . . .’ [(Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 557 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ])]” (Ice, at p. 168); and that “[i]n undertaking

2015Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477 .” ( Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 167-168 The court then explained that “the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain” (Ice, at p. 168, citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 497); that the, appropriate consideration in Apprendi was therefore “whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights . . .’ [(Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 557 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ])]” (Ice, at p. 168); and that “[i]n undertaking

2015Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477 .” ( Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 167-168 The court then explained that “the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain” (Ice, at p. 168, citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 497); that the, appropriate consideration in Apprendi was therefore “whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights . . .’ [(Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 557 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ])]” (Ice, at p. 168); and that “[i]n undertaking

2015Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 477 .” ( Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 167-168 The court then explained that “the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain” (Ice, at p. 168, citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 497); that the, appropriate consideration in Apprendi was therefore “whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the domain of the jury ... by those who framed the Bill of Rights . . .’ [(Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 557 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 524 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 ])]” (Ice, at p. 168); and that “[i]n undertaking

2014(Enea v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1564 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 ]; Yeomans v. Lysfjord (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 361-362 [ 327 P.2d 957 ].) The animating principle of a fiduciary’s duties to his charges is unfaltering loyalty and honesty.

2014(Enea v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1564 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 ]; Yeomans v. Lysfjord (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 361-362 [ 327 P.2d 957 ].) The animating principle of a fiduciary’s duties to his charges is unfaltering loyalty and honesty.

2014(Enea v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1564 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 ]; Yeomans v. Lysfjord (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 361-362 [ 327 P.2d 957 ].) The animating principle of a fiduciary’s duties to his charges is unfaltering loyalty and honesty.

2014(Enea v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1564 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 ]; Yeomans v. Lysfjord (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 361-362 [ 327 P.2d 957 ].) The animating principle of a fiduciary’s duties to his charges is unfaltering loyalty and honesty.