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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jacobsgreen2 sentences2020(See 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appellate Review § 695.) . . .’ (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 358, pp. 406–407.)” (People v. Jacobs, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 737–738.) We conclude that the costs of proof award here is not “in conformity with the spirit of the law”—it does not “subserve . . . substantial justice.” Frankly, we are troubled that a defendant can at the very inception of litigation, at a time when, as best we can tell, no discovery had taken place, and certainly no deposition, serve RFAs essentially seeking responses admitting that plaintiff had no case, and then, if pl 2017(People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1614 ; People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 282 ; see People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [‘ “capricious disposition or whimsical thinking” ’].)” We went on to describe other possible descriptions, but noting that “The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles 12 that govern the subject of [the] discretionary action . . . .’ ” (Jacobs, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 .) And we concluded with this: “All this is well described in Witkin where, likewise citing the still vi | 1 | 7 |
People v. Giminezgreen1 sentence2017(People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1614 ; People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 282 ; see People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [‘ “capricious disposition or whimsical thinking” ’].)” We went on to describe other possible descriptions, but noting that “The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles 12 that govern the subject of [the] discretionary action . . . .’ ” (Jacobs, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 .) And we concluded with this: “All this is well described in Witkin where, likewise citing the still vi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bailey v. Taaffe
green
2 sentences2021It is not a mental discretion, to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a 21 manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . .” ’ “All this is well described in Witkin where, likewise citing the still vital Bailey v. Taaffe, supra, 29 Cal. 422, 424 , the author distills the principle as follows: ‘Limits of Legal Discretion. [¶] The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governin 2021It is not a mental discretion, to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a 21 manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. . . .” ’ “All this is well described in Witkin where, likewise citing the still vital Bailey v. Taaffe, supra, 29 Cal. 422, 424 , the author distills the principle as follows: ‘Limits of Legal Discretion. [¶] The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governin | 11 | 2007–2021 |
People v. Branch
green
1 sentence2017(People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1614 ; People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 282 ; see People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [‘ “capricious disposition or whimsical thinking” ’].)” We went on to describe other possible descriptions, but noting that “The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles 12 that govern the subject of [the] discretionary action . . . .’ ” (Jacobs, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 .) And we concluded with this: “All this is well described in Witkin where, likewise citing the still vi | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Linkenauger
green
1 sentence2017(People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1614 ; People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 282 ; see People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72 [‘ “capricious disposition or whimsical thinking” ’].)” We went on to describe other possible descriptions, but noting that “The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles 12 that govern the subject of [the] discretionary action . . . .’ ” (Jacobs, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 737 .) And we concluded with this: “All this is well described in Witkin where, likewise citing the still vi | 1 | 2017–2017 |