compensation exclusive remedy rule in California

2004(Gunnell v. Metrocolor Laboratories, Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 710, 718-719 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 195 ].) The trial court granted the JNOV solely on the ground that Mason’s negligence action was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule. (§ 3600, subd. (a).) In so ruling, the trial court reasoned that the relevant facts were undisputed, and that Mason was acting in the course of his employment when he was injured, as a matter of law.

2004(Gunnell v. Metrocolor Laboratories, Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 710, 718-719 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 195 ].) The trial court granted the JNOV solely on the ground that Mason’s negligence action was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy rule. (§ 3600, subd. (a).) In so ruling, the trial court reasoned that the relevant facts were undisputed, and that Mason was acting in the course of his employment when he was injured, as a matter of law.

2014Doing so, the court discussed some of the regulations in the Motor Carrier Act (AmeriGas Propane, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 996-997), and then discussed Perry, noting its observations about a “ ‘split in the circuits exists regarding whether motor carriers are liable under the Motor Carrier Act for injuries to drivers of leased trucks and not just to members of the public.’ ” ( 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 997 .) The court then said that while Perry did not resolve the split, Perry did confirm the two purposes of the act quoted above; “(1) ‘[T]o protect members of the public from motor carriers’

2014Doing so, the court discussed some of the regulations in the Motor Carrier Act (AmeriGas Propane, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 996-997), and then discussed Perry, noting its observations about a “ ‘split in the circuits exists regarding whether motor carriers are liable under the Motor Carrier Act for injuries to drivers of leased trucks and not just to members of the public.’ ” ( 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 997 .) The court then said that while Perry did not resolve the split, Perry did confirm the two purposes of the act quoted above; “(1) ‘[T]o protect members of the public from motor carriers’

2026Our Supreme Court has held that if an employee sustains an injury because the “employer knew and concealed from him that his health was endangered by asbestos in the work environment, failed to supply adequate protective devices to avoid disease, and violated governmental regulations relating to dust levels at the [workplace], [the employee’s] only remedy would be to prosecute his claim under the workers’ compensation law.” (Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465 , 474–475 (Johns- Manville).) Following Johns-Manville, courts have held employees’ injuries were with

2026An injured employee obtains “relatively swift and certain compensation in return for the surrender of the right to bring tort actions for his employer’s failure to provide a safe place of employment.” (Ibid.) “Workers’ compensation is the sole remedy for an employee injured by the employer’s failure to provide a safe workplace.” (Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1408, 1412 (Spratley).) “The exclusivity rule applies even where the employer’s misconduct is serious, 3 “The exception for conduct that ‘contravenes fundamental public policy’ is aimed at permitting a Tamen

2026Our Supreme Court has held that if an employee sustains an injury because the “employer knew and concealed from him that his health was endangered by asbestos in the work environment, failed to supply adequate protective devices to avoid disease, and violated governmental regulations relating to dust levels at the [workplace], [the employee’s] only remedy would be to prosecute his claim under the workers’ compensation law.” (Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465 , 474–475 (Johns- Manville).) Following Johns-Manville, courts have held employees’ injuries were with

2026An injured employee obtains “relatively swift and certain compensation in return for the surrender of the right to bring tort actions for his employer’s failure to provide a safe place of employment.” (Ibid.) “Workers’ compensation is the sole remedy for an employee injured by the employer’s failure to provide a safe workplace.” (Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1408, 1412 (Spratley).) “The exclusivity rule applies even where the employer’s misconduct is serious, 3 “The exception for conduct that ‘contravenes fundamental public policy’ is aimed at permitting a Tamen

2010Summary Judgment Standard of Review “On review of a summary judgment, we ‘examine the record de novo and independently determine whether [the] decision is correct. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In undertaking our independent review of the evidence submitted, we apply ‘ “the same three-step process required of the trial court: First, we identify the issues raised by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond; secondly, we determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claims and justify a judgment in movant’s favor; w

2010Summary Judgment Standard of Review “On review of a summary judgment, we ‘examine the record de novo and independently determine whether [the] decision is correct. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In undertaking our independent review of the evidence submitted, we apply ‘ “the same three-step process required of the trial court: First, we identify the issues raised by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond; secondly, we determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claims and justify a judgment in movant’s favor; w

2010(LAMTA, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 682 .) As the California Supreme Court noted in Vacanti, courts have exempted wrongful termination claims from exclusivity and thus have allowed “an employee to recover economic damages on a wrongful termination claim because the damages arose out of the act of termination—and not out of an injury to the employee’s person.” (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 814 ; see also Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 488, 500-501 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 677 ] (Pichon).) We also reject SunLine’s contention that the arbitration award creates the possibil

2010(LAMTA, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 682 .) As the California Supreme Court noted in Vacanti, courts have exempted wrongful termination claims from exclusivity and thus have allowed “an employee to recover economic damages on a wrongful termination claim because the damages arose out of the act of termination—and not out of an injury to the employee’s person.” (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 814 ; see also Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 488, 500-501 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 677 ] (Pichon).) We also reject SunLine’s contention that the arbitration award creates the possibil

2004“Whether an employee’s injury arose out of and in the course of [his or] her employment is generally a question of fact to be determined in light of the circumstances of the particular case. [Citations.] However, where the facts are undisputed, resolution of the question becomes a matter of law. [Citations.]” (Wright v. Beverly Fabrics, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 346, 353 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 ].) Mason contends that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that he was not acting in the course of his employment when he was injured. 3 LDG *831 contends that the trial court’s ruling was

2004“Whether an employee’s injury arose out of and in the course of [his or] her employment is generally a question of fact to be determined in light of the circumstances of the particular case. [Citations.] However, where the facts are undisputed, resolution of the question becomes a matter of law. [Citations.]” (Wright v. Beverly Fabrics, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 346, 353 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 ].) Mason contends that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that he was not acting in the course of his employment when he was injured. 3 LDG *831 contends that the trial court’s ruling was

1997Co. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 456, 468 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 726 ].) The workers’ compensation exclusive remedy doctrine would operate to prevent the joint venture from seeking this otherwise-available indemnity from its member, just as that doctrine operated to shield the independent contractor from indemnity in Privette .

1997Co. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 456, 468 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 726 ].) The workers’ compensation exclusive remedy doctrine would operate to prevent the joint venture from seeking this otherwise-available indemnity from its member, just as that doctrine operated to shield the independent contractor from indemnity in Privette .

1987Before 1982, [5] when an employer engaged in a relationship with an employee that was distinct from the ordinary employer-employee relationship, *957 invoking a different set of obligations from the employer's typical duties to its employees, the employee could recover damages for breach of the employer's special obligations under the dual capacity doctrine, even though the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule (former § 3601) [6] barred recovery for work-related injuries. ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 161 ; D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles (1980) 27 Ca

1987Before 1982, [5] when an employer engaged in a relationship with an employee that was distinct from the ordinary employer-employee relationship, *957 invoking a different set of obligations from the employer's typical duties to its employees, the employee could recover damages for breach of the employer's special obligations under the dual capacity doctrine, even though the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule (former § 3601) [6] barred recovery for work-related injuries. ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 161 ; D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles (1980) 27 Ca

1987Before 1982, [5] when an employer engaged in a relationship with an employee that was distinct from the ordinary employer-employee relationship, *957 invoking a different set of obligations from the employer's typical duties to its employees, the employee could recover damages for breach of the employer's special obligations under the dual capacity doctrine, even though the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule (former § 3601) [6] barred recovery for work-related injuries. ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 161 ; D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles (1980) 27 Ca

1987Before 1982, [5] when an employer engaged in a relationship with an employee that was distinct from the ordinary employer-employee relationship, *957 invoking a different set of obligations from the employer's typical duties to its employees, the employee could recover damages for breach of the employer's special obligations under the dual capacity doctrine, even though the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule (former § 3601) [6] barred recovery for work-related injuries. ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 161 ; D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles (1980) 27 Ca

1987(See Deauville v. Hall (1961) 188 Cal. App.2d 535, 540 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 ], cert. den. 368 U.S. 824 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 28 , 82 S.Ct. 43 ].) (5b) Hughes did not allege an employment relationship in her complaint.

1987(See Deauville v. Hall (1961) 188 Cal. App.2d 535, 540 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 ], cert. den. 368 U.S. 824 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 28 , 82 S.Ct. 43 ].) (5b) Hughes did not allege an employment relationship in her complaint.

1987Before 1982, [5] when an employer engaged in a relationship with an employee that was distinct from the ordinary employer-employee relationship, *957 invoking a different set of obligations from the employer's typical duties to its employees, the employee could recover damages for breach of the employer's special obligations under the dual capacity doctrine, even though the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule (former § 3601) [6] barred recovery for work-related injuries. ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 161 ; D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles (1980) 27 Ca

1987Before 1982, [5] when an employer engaged in a relationship with an employee that was distinct from the ordinary employer-employee relationship, *957 invoking a different set of obligations from the employer's typical duties to its employees, the employee could recover damages for breach of the employer's special obligations under the dual capacity doctrine, even though the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule (former § 3601) [6] barred recovery for work-related injuries. ( Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 161 ; D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles (1980) 27 Ca