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11 California opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc.green1 sentence2026First, the rights that a plaintiff asserts under state law must be “rights that are equivalent” to those protected by the Copyright Act. [Citations.] Second, the work involved must fall within the “subject matter” of the Copyright Act . . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 791 (Melchior).) In concluding the Copyright Act preempts Walker’s fraudulent concealment cause of action, the trial court remarked, “The fraudulent concealment claim arises out of the same underlying facts as the copyright infringement claim. | 1 | 1 |
Neville v. CHUDACOFFgreen1 sentence2016(Quoting Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 (Neville).) While noting that Van's complaint "contains rambling allegations that are difficult to understand," the court stated that all of Van's claims appeared to be based on respondents' litigation activity related to a copyright infringement claim that Van had previously brought against several of the respondents.5 The court concluded that Van's claims arose from respondents' conduct in furtherance of their constitutional right to petition under the anti-SLAPP statute. | 1 | 1 |
Meta-Film Associates, Inc. v. MCA, Inc.green1 sentence2013(Meta-Film Associates, Inc. v. MCA, Inc. (1984) 586 F.Supp. 1346, 1354 (Meta-Film).) Copying is usually proven circumstantially through evidence of access and substantial similarity. | 1 | 1 |
Rokos v. Peckgreen2 sentences2002Mar. 31, 1999, No. 97-CTV.7763) 1999 WL 179603 ; see also Rokos v. Peck, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 617 [implied-in-fact contract is effective only between the contracting parties, creates rights that are qualitatively different from copyright protection, and protects disclosure of ideas without creating a monopoly in the ideas involved]; but see Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., supra, 96 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1061-1062 [applying fact-specific analysis, but finding promise to pay for use of ideas was equivalent to exclusive rights protected by federal copyright law]; Metrano v. Fox Broadcasting Co. 2002Mar. 31, 1999, No. 97-CIV.7763) 1999 WL 179603 ; see also Rokos v. Peck, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 617 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 480 [implied-in-fact contract is effective only between the contracting parties, creates rights that are qualitatively different from copyright protection, and protects disclosure of ideas without creating a monopoly in the ideas involved]; but see Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., supra, 96 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1061-1062 [applying fact-specific analysis, but finding promise to pay for use of ideas was equivalent to exclusive rights protected by federal copyright law]; Metrano v. | 1 | 1 |
Gladstone v. Hillelgreen2 sentences1990But if other elements are required, in addition to or instead of, the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a state created cause of action, then the right does not lie ‘within the general scope of copyright,’ and there is no preemption.” (Id. at p. 1-13 [italics in original, fns. deleted].) Courts have denominated Nimmer’s analysis the “ ‘extra element’ test.” (See, e.g., Gladstone v. Hillel (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 977, 987 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 372 ].) “While generally accepting this test, the courts have demanded that the extra element ‘must be one that 1990But if other elements are required, in addition to or instead of, the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a state created cause of action, then the right does not lie ‘within the general scope of copyright,’ and there is no preemption.” (Id. at p. 1-13 [italics in original, fns. deleted].) Courts have denominated Nimmer’s analysis the “ ‘extra element’ test.” (See, e.g., Gladstone v. Hillel (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 977, 987 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 372 ].) “While generally accepting this test, the courts have demanded that the extra element ‘must be one that | 1 | 1 |
Apple Computer, Inc., a California Corporation v. Franklin Computer Corporation, a Pennsylvania Corporationgreen1 sentence1990(See, e.g., Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory (3d Cir. 1986) 797 F.2d 1222 , 1229-1242; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. (3d Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 [70 A.L.R.Fed. 153].) 16 Copyright law would thus have protected Balboa from unauthorized duplication or transfer of its programs by Maashoff, Atherton or CPIS. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goldberg v. Cameron
green
2 sentences2014Cal. 2007) 482 F.Supp.2d 1136 (Goldberg), where “because there were continuing instances of infringement, it could not be concluded that the claim was time barred in its entirety.” However, Goldberg was a copyright infringement case, and RPIs do not have a copyright infringement claim. 2014At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, RPIs’ counsel discussed a case, Goldberg v. Cameron (N.D.Cal. 2007) 482 F.Supp.2d 1136 (Goldberg), where “because there were continuing instances of infringement, it could not be concluded that the claim was time barred in its entirety.” However, Goldberg was a copyright infringement case, and RPIs do not have a copyright infringement claim. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Douglas Jordan-Benel v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that Jordan-Benel had significantly limited his claims, and therefore “we only address whether anti-SLAPP applies to Jordan-Benel’s implied-in-fact contract claim in which Defendants’ failure to pay is the alleged breach.” (Jordan-Benel, supra, 859 F.3d at p. 1189 .) In considering the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court stated, “Whereas the creation of a film might be the basis for a copyright infringement claim, that act alone will not support an ‘idea theft’ breach of contract claim because the breach is not the defendant’s use of the idea. [C | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Firoozye v. Earthlink Network
green
2 sentences2002This extra element does change the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim.”]; Firoozye v. Earthlink Network (N.D.Cal. 2001) 153 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1127 ; Katz Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office (S.D.N.Y. 2002This extra element does change the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim."]; Firoozye v. Earthlink Network (N.D.Cal.2001) 153 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1127 ; Katz Dochrermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office (S.D.N.Y. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Balboa Insurance v. Trans Global Equities
green
2 sentences2002Co. v. Trans Global Equities, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1340 .) To avoid preemption, the extra element must be one that changes the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim. 2002Co. v. Trans Global Equities, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1340 , 267 Cal.Rptr. 787 .) To avoid preemption, the extra element must be one that changes the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim. ( Ibid. ) "In a proper case, the same conduct may support relief under multiple theories. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2000Exchange, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007-1009, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 .) Midiman proposes another basis for conflict: "The trademark claims could [have been] defended by arguing the use of Roland's trademarks in advertisements was not trademark infringement, because the statements were true. [Citing New Kids On The Block v. News America Publishing, Inc. (9th Cir.1992) 971 F.2d 302 .] In essence, Midiman's defense to the trademark claim would [have been] that its advertisements proclaimed the Midi GMan *98 included `Roland-compatible sounds' because that was simply a fact, [¶] This trademark def | 1 | 2000–2000 |
cluster 587692
green
1 sentence2000Exchange, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1007-1009, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 .) Midiman proposes another basis for conflict: "The trademark claims could [have been] defended by arguing the use of Roland's trademarks in advertisements was not trademark infringement, because the statements were true. [Citing New Kids On The Block v. News America Publishing, Inc. (9th Cir.1992) 971 F.2d 302 .] In essence, Midiman's defense to the trademark claim would [have been] that its advertisements proclaimed the Midi GMan *98 included `Roland-compatible sounds' because that was simply a fact, [¶] This trademark def | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
green
1 sentence2000We will briefly discuss some of the most relevant cases to assist our analysis. *370 In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 1999) 33 F.Supp.2d 867 , actor Dustin Hoffman sued the publisher of Los Angeles Magazine for publishing his digitally altered still photograph copied without permission from the motion picture film Tootsie (Columbia Pictures 1982). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990(See, e.g., Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory (3d Cir. 1986) 797 F.2d 1222 , 1229-1242; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. (3d Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 [70 A.L.R.Fed. 153].) 16 Copyright law would thus have protected Balboa from unauthorized duplication or transfer of its programs by Maashoff, Atherton or CPIS. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Scheinman, Inc.
green
1 sentence1988(S.D.N.Y. 1985) 601 F.Supp. 1523, 1535 ; Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Sheinman, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 645 F.Supp. 1201 .) Under the extra element test, it is clear that federal copyright law does not preempt state causes of action alleging fraud or conversion—the two theories pleaded in the complaint. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1988(S.D.N.Y. 1985) 601 F.Supp. 1523, 1535 ; Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Sheinman, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 645 F.Supp. 1201 .) Under the extra element test, it is clear that federal copyright law does not preempt state causes of action alleging fraud or conversion—the two theories pleaded in the complaint. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.