11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rielgreen1 sentence2003He could not do so, for he did not object to it at trial. {People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1185.) The cross-examination appears to have been appropriate impeachment. {People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1173 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ].) Moreover, it might have been permissible to rebut the implication in Barbara F.’s testimony that the chair incident was an isolated act of anger caused by her withdrawal from the case. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2003He could not do so, for he did not object to it at trial. {People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1185.) The cross-examination appears to have been appropriate impeachment. {People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1173 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ].) Moreover, it might have been permissible to rebut the implication in Barbara F.’s testimony that the chair incident was an isolated act of anger caused by her withdrawal from the case. 2003He could not do so, for he did not object to it at trial. {People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1185.) The cross-examination appears to have been appropriate impeachment. {People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1173 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ].) Moreover, it might have been permissible to rebut the implication in Barbara F.’s testimony that the chair incident was an isolated act of anger caused by her withdrawal from the case. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kellyred2 sentences1990Penalty Issues A. Cross-examination of Dr. Hoyle (19) Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling an objection to the prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense expert, Dr. Hoyle, concerning the possibility that defendant matched the sex offender psychological "profile." Defendant predicates error on the grounds that the cross-examination: (1) exceeded the scope of the direct examination; (2) introduced inadmissible character evidence; and (3) lacked an adequate foundation because Dr. Hoyle had not been qualified as an expert in the area of personality profiles, and such profiles h 1990Penalty Issues A. Cross-examination of Dr. Hoyle (19) Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling an objection to the prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense expert, Dr. Hoyle, concerning the possibility that defendant matched the sex offender psychological "profile." Defendant predicates error on the grounds that the cross-examination: (1) exceeded the scope of the direct examination; (2) introduced inadmissible character evidence; and (3) lacked an adequate foundation because Dr. Hoyle had not been qualified as an expert in the area of personality profiles, and such profiles h | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences1981Black in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ], “... before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The prosecutor’s allusion to Italians and his unsupported statement that “women are not given equal treatment” in his argument ignite the flames of ethnic prejudice. 1 Twice before during the cross-examination of the defense forensic expert, the prosecutor gave unsworn testimony of two studies he had of Italian-American life 1981Black in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ], “... before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The prosecutor’s allusion to Italians and his unsupported statement that “women are not given equal treatment” in his argument ignite the flames of ethnic prejudice. 1 Twice before during the cross-examination of the defense forensic expert, the prosecutor gave unsworn testimony of two studies he had of Italian-American life | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hoffmangreen2 sentences1940(People v. Hoffman, 199 Cal. 155, 162 [ 248 Pac. 504 ].) Nor do we find any error in the rulings of the trial court with respect to the cross-examination of the defense witness Sang relative to the possession and use of said sawed-off shotguns by the trio on the day of the homicide. 1940(People v. Hoffman, 199 Cal. 155, 162 [ 248 Pac. 504 ].) Nor do we find any error in the rulings of the trial court with respect to the cross-examination of the defense witness Sang relative to the possession and use of said sawed-off shotguns by the trio on the day of the homicide. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carskaddongreen2 sentences1938(People v. Niino, 183 Cal. 126, 130 [ 190 Pac. 626 ]; People v. Carskaddon, 123 Cal. App. 177, 181 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 38 ].) We do not find any error in the ruling which permitted the prosecution during the cross-examination of a defense expert witness to introduce testimony given by the defendant in a negligent homicide case pending against him, and which arose subsequent to the homicide here involved. 1938(People v. Niino, 183 Cal. 126, 130 [ 190 Pac. 626 ]; People v. Carskaddon, 123 Cal. App. 177, 181 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 38 ].) We do not find any error in the ruling which permitted the prosecution during the cross-examination of a defense expert witness to introduce testimony given by the defendant in a negligent homicide case pending against him, and which arose subsequent to the homicide here involved. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Niinogreen2 sentences1938(People v. Niino, 183 Cal. 126, 130 [ 190 Pac. 626 ]; People v. Carskaddon, 123 Cal. App. 177, 181 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 38 ].) We do not find any error in the ruling which permitted the prosecution during the cross-examination of a defense expert witness to introduce testimony given by the defendant in a negligent homicide case pending against him, and which arose subsequent to the homicide here involved. 1938(People v. Niino, 183 Cal. 126, 130 [ 190 Pac. 626 ]; People v. Carskaddon, 123 Cal. App. 177, 181 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 38 ].) We do not find any error in the ruling which permitted the prosecution during the cross-examination of a defense expert witness to introduce testimony given by the defendant in a negligent homicide case pending against him, and which arose subsequent to the homicide here involved. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Campos
green
2 sentences2022DISCUSSION A. Claim of Sanchez/Campos Error at the Competency Trial Defendant contends the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defense expert and the testimony of a prosecution witness at his competency trial introduced improper hearsay evidence in violation of Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665 , and Campos, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 304 . 2022DISCUSSION A. Claim of Sanchez/Campos Error at the Competency Trial Defendant contends the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defense expert and the testimony of a prosecution witness at his competency trial introduced improper hearsay evidence in violation of Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665 , and Campos, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 304 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Virgil
green
1 sentence2022The court may require that an objection be made at a sidebar to “efficiently dispose of matters outside the hearing of jurors or testifying witnesses.” (Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1237 .) Here, during the cross-examination of defense witness Dr. Gomez, defense counsel lodged an objection to one of the prosecutor’s questions on the grounds of “prosecutorial misconduct.” Later, out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s characterization of his conduct in front of the jury. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Sanchez
green
1 sentence2022DISCUSSION A. Claim of Sanchez/Campos Error at the Competency Trial Defendant contends the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defense expert and the testimony of a prosecution witness at his competency trial introduced improper hearsay evidence in violation of Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665 , and Campos, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 304 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Fost v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2005(Id. at p. 732.) “It follows that, where the shield law is invoked to resist proper cross-examination regarding material matters, a trial court may bar the receipt in evidence of the direct testimony to which it relates or strike such testimony if it has already been given, either entirely or in part. . . .” (Id. at pp. 736-737, fn. omitted, italics added.) Post explained there was one exception to the general remedy of striking the direct testimony of a witness invoking the shield law: “[Wjhere a *158 defendant can show that nondisclosure of unpublished information sought by the People on the | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2003In any case, as noted, defendant did not raise this objection at trial and therefore forfeited the issue. ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 208-209, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 , 940 P.2d 710 .) Finally, defendant reasserts misconduct based on Sergeant Rosales's testimony that Hickman had stab wounds "to the legs[,] to the rectum area." For the reasons already discussed, we find no misconduct in connection with this testimony. *128 e) Cross-examination of Ernest Ramos Defendant next asserts prosecutorial misconduct based on the cross-examination of defense witness Ernest Ramos. 2003In any case, as noted, defendant did not raise this objection at trial and therefore forfeited the issue. ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 208-209, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 , 940 P.2d 710 .) Finally, defendant reasserts misconduct based on Sergeant Rosales's testimony that Hickman had stab wounds "to the legs[,] to the rectum area." For the reasons already discussed, we find no misconduct in connection with this testimony. *128 e) Cross-examination of Ernest Ramos Defendant next asserts prosecutorial misconduct based on the cross-examination of defense witness Ernest Ramos. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Earp
green
1 sentence2002(People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 858 .) Defendant first urges us to find misconduct in the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defense witness Kay Zenk. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Frye v. United States
red
2 sentences1990Cir.1923) 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 ). [5] Assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that any of the foregoing claims has merit, it is clear nevertheless that defendant could not have been prejudiced by the disputed testimony. 1990Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 ). 5 Assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that any of the foregoing claims has merit, it is clear nevertheless that defendant could not have been prejudiced by the disputed testimony. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
In Re Spencer
green
2 sentences1988Sua Sponte Limiting Instruction. (19) Defendant contends that in violation of In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400 [ 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 , 406 P.2d 33 ], and People v. Quicke (1969) 71 Cal.2d 502 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. 683 , 455 P.2d 787 ], the court (1) failed to limit, sua sponte, the admissibility of a certain statement he had made to Dr. Sharma solely for the purpose of showing the information on which the psychiatrist based his opinion, and (2) failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it could consider the statement only for that purpose. *333 The statement at issue appears in the prosecutor's 1988Sua Sponte Limiting Instruction. (19) Defendant contends that in violation of In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400 [ 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 , 406 P.2d 33 ], and People v. Quicke (1969) 71 Cal.2d 502 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. 683 , 455 P.2d 787 ], the court (1) failed to limit, sua sponte, the admissibility of a certain statement he had made to Dr. Sharma solely for the purpose of showing the information on which the psychiatrist based his opinion, and (2) failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it could consider the statement only for that purpose. *333 The statement at issue appears in the prosecutor's | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Quicke
green
2 sentences1988Sua Sponte Limiting Instruction. (19) Defendant contends that in violation of In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400 [ 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 , 406 P.2d 33 ], and People v. Quicke (1969) 71 Cal.2d 502 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. 683 , 455 P.2d 787 ], the court (1) failed to limit, sua sponte, the admissibility of a certain statement he had made to Dr. Sharma solely for the purpose of showing the information on which the psychiatrist based his opinion, and (2) failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it could consider the statement only for that purpose. *333 The statement at issue appears in the prosecutor's 1988Sua Sponte Limiting Instruction. (19) Defendant contends that in violation of In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400 [ 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 , 406 P.2d 33 ], and People v. Quicke (1969) 71 Cal.2d 502 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. 683 , 455 P.2d 787 ], the court (1) failed to limit, sua sponte, the admissibility of a certain statement he had made to Dr. Sharma solely for the purpose of showing the information on which the psychiatrist based his opinion, and (2) failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it could consider the statement only for that purpose. *333 The statement at issue appears in the prosecutor's | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.