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10 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. López Bros.green1 sentence2019Applying Binger as an evidentiary rule (rather than as a guide to discretion) relegates the "powerful instrument"6 of cross-examination to an afterthought. 6See State v. Eddon, 36 P. 139, 142 (Wash. 1894) ("It is the experience of every court and every lawyer that cross-examination is the most powerful instrument known to the law in eliciting truth or in discovering error in statements made in chief, whether that error arise from mistaken judgment and careless observation and expression, or from a corrupt desire and intention to pervert the truth."). - 19 - Finally, I would note that treating | 1 | 1 |
Granados v. Zehrgreen1 sentence2019As the Florida Supreme Court has observed, "the crucible of cross-examination is well-suited for gleaning meritorious from non- meritorious claims." Eppler v. Tarmac Am., Inc., 752 So. 2d 592, 595-96 (Fla. 2000); see also Burns v. Freund, 49 So. 2d 592 , 595 (Fla. 1950) ("The purpose of the cross- examination is to test the truth of witness, to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, to develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner, or even to discredit the witness."); Granados v. Zehr, 979 So. 2d 1155, 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) ("[A]llegations of inconsistency, nondis | 1 | 1 |
Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc.green1 sentence2019As the Florida Supreme Court has observed, "the crucible of cross-examination is well-suited for gleaning meritorious from non- meritorious claims." Eppler v. Tarmac Am., Inc., 752 So. 2d 592, 595-96 (Fla. 2000); see also Burns v. Freund, 49 So. 2d 592 , 595 (Fla. 1950) ("The purpose of the cross- examination is to test the truth of witness, to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, to develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner, or even to discredit the witness."); Granados v. Zehr, 979 So. 2d 1155, 1158 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) ("[A]llegations of inconsistency, nondis | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Stategreen1 sentence2012With respect to the cross-examination of the defense’s penalty-phase expert, this Court has stated that “it is proper for a party to fully inquire into the history utilized by the expert to determine whether the expert’s opinion has a proper basis.” Parker v. State, 476 So.2d 134, 139 (Fla.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Rodgers v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Ault argues that in Rodgers v. State, 934 So.2d 1207, 1216 (Fla.2006), this Court found a due process right to be present during an in-chambers discussion between the two defense attorneys and the trial judge concerning counsels’ internal disagreement over the cross-examination of defense wit nesses. 2010Ault argues that in Rodgers v. State, 934 So.2d 1207, 1216 (Fla.2006), this Court found a due process right to be present during an in-chambers discussion between the two defense attorneys and the trial judge concerning counsels' internal disagreement over the cross-examination of defense witnesses. | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Once there is an attempt on cross-examination to show improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication, the witness' "`prior consistent statements are admissible on the redirect examination or through subsequent witnesses to show the consistency of the witness' [sic] trial testimony.'" Foburg v. State, 744 So.2d 1175, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 547 So.2d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). *1029 The requirement is not, as Mr. Ross contends, that the defense must have had the opportunity to cross-examine Lakeisha and Corbie Jones after the State introduced their taped stat | 1 | 1 |
Foburg v. Stategreen1 sentence2008Once there is an attempt on cross-examination to show improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication, the witness' "`prior consistent statements are admissible on the redirect examination or through subsequent witnesses to show the consistency of the witness' [sic] trial testimony.'" Foburg v. State, 744 So.2d 1175, 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 547 So.2d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). *1029 The requirement is not, as Mr. Ross contends, that the defense must have had the opportunity to cross-examine Lakeisha and Corbie Jones after the State introduced their taped stat | 1 | 1 |
Turtle v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See Turtle v. State, 600 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Castillogreen1 sentence1993Finally, Pottgen complains that the state’s cross-examination of a defense witness erroneously implied that he had committed an offense of which the prosecutor had no direct evidence. 3 See State v. Castillo, 486 So.2d 565, 565-66 (Fla.1986). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rafael Castro-Ayongreen1 sentence1983As stated in United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.1976), these changes represented a conscious choice "to include grand jury proceedings within the ambit of `other proceedings.'" This conclusion is supported by the Conference Committee Report which expressly states, "The rule as adopted covers statements before a grand jury." H.Rep. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Binger v. King Pest Control
green
1 sentence2019Applying Binger as an evidentiary rule (rather than as a guide to discretion) relegates the "powerful instrument"6 of cross-examination to an afterthought. 6See State v. Eddon, 36 P. 139, 142 (Wash. 1894) ("It is the experience of every court and every lawyer that cross-examination is the most powerful instrument known to the law in eliciting truth or in discovering error in statements made in chief, whether that error arise from mistaken judgment and careless observation and expression, or from a corrupt desire and intention to pervert the truth."). - 19 - Finally, I would note that treating | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2012The Supreme Court has stated the cross-examination requirement in very general terms: “Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . 2012The Supreme Court has stated the cross-examination requirement in very general terms: “Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Thompson v. State
green
1 sentence2012Crawford does not require similarity of motive in the previous judicial proceeding or mention a “meaningful” opportunity for cross-examination. 3 In Thompson v. State, 995 So.2d 532 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), the Second District dealt with a similar issue. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Secada v. Weinstein
green
1 sentence1996Cf. Secada v. Weinstein, 563 So.2d 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1986The record furnishes a sufficient basis for us to conclude that an attorney's cross-examination of defense counsel and of the state attorney may have shown that appellant was entitled to a new trial in accordance with the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981). 1986The record furnishes a sufficient basis for us to conclude that an attorney's cross-examination of defense counsel and of the state attorney may have shown that appellant was entitled to a new trial in accordance with the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Knight v. State
green
1 sentence1986The record furnishes a sufficient basis for us to conclude that an attorney's cross-examination of defense counsel and of the state attorney may have shown that appellant was entitled to a new trial in accordance with the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.