defendant seeking challenge in California

1990However, the analysis was based upon People v. Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d 204 , which in turn was relied upon in People v. Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d 909 .

1975(People v. Coffey, 67 Cal.2d 204 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ].) In the instant case the defendant merely asserts that by admitting the prior misdemeanor he did not admit the *903 constitutional validity thereof.

2021However, “ ‘all exercises of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.’ (People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195 .) Where a court ‘bases its determination to deny probation in significant part upon an erroneous impression of the defendant’s legal status, fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be afforded a new hearing and “an informed, intelligent and just decision” on the basis of the facts.’ (People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 168 .)” ( Nuno, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 49-

2021However, “ ‘all exercises of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.’ (People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195 .) Where a court ‘bases its determination to deny probation in significant part upon an erroneous impression of the defendant’s legal status, fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be afforded a new hearing and “an informed, intelligent and just decision” on the basis of the facts.’ (People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 168 .)” ( Nuno, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 49-

2015(People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567 , 1573- 1574.) Defendant’s failure to provide any analysis of the photographs thus absolves us of any duty to respond beyond our observations that the photographs and the testimony summarized above are sufficient to demonstrate the fire consumed a portion of the structure.

2014The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.” 5 In People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1019 , footnote 11 [ 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 290 P.3d 364 ], the court noted: “We have ... clarified that a defendant seeking to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court after the case has been submitted to the jury should not move for a new trial under section 1181, subdivision 6, but should instead invite the court’s dismissal under section 1385.” 6 If we accepted the People’s argument that (a) the new trial order was a section 1181, sub

2014The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.” 5 In People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1019 , footnote 11 [ 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 290 P.3d 364 ], the court noted: “We have ... clarified that a defendant seeking to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court after the case has been submitted to the jury should not move for a new trial under section 1181, subdivision 6, but should instead invite the court’s dismissal under section 1385.” 6 If we accepted the People’s argument that (a) the new trial order was a section 1181, sub

2014The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.” 5 In People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1019 , footnote 11 [ 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 290 P.3d 364 ], the court noted: “We have ... clarified that a defendant seeking to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court after the case has been submitted to the jury should not move for a new trial under section 1181, subdivision 6, but should instead invite the court’s dismissal under section 1385.” 6 If we accepted the People’s argument that (a) the new trial order was a section 1181, sub

2014The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.” 5 In People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1019 , footnote 11 [ 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 290 P.3d 364 ], the court noted: “We have ... clarified that a defendant seeking to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court after the case has been submitted to the jury should not move for a new trial under section 1181, subdivision 6, but should instead invite the court’s dismissal under section 1385.” 6 If we accepted the People’s argument that (a) the new trial order was a section 1181, sub

2013(Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320 .)” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11 (Rodriguez).) Moreover, as observed in Rodriguez: “The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.

2000Thus, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (1984) 464 U.S. 238 [ 104 S.Ct. 615 , 78 L.Ed.2d 443 ], involving a common law tort action based on injuries from plutonium contamination, the United States Supreme Court rejected a claim that the action was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.) because the federal legislation occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns.

2000Thus, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (1984) 464 U.S. 238 [ 104 S.Ct. 615 , 78 L.Ed.2d 443 ], involving a common law tort action based on injuries from plutonium contamination, the United States Supreme Court rejected a claim that the action was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.) because the federal legislation occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns.

1990We question the proposition that a mere failure of recollection can meet the requirement “that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights.” (People v. Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 922 .) However, that issue is not directly before us. 5 People v. Zavala, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d 429 involved the interpretation of former Vehicle Code section 23102.2 (now § 41403).

1984(E.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [ 240 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ].) Our holding today may thus be seen as an extension of the concepts first developed in those cases.” (Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 133, fn. 7 .) We conclude that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights.

1984(E.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [ 240 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ].) Our holding today may thus be seen as an extension of the concepts first developed in those cases." ( Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 133, fn. 7 .) (9) We conclude that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights. (6d) *923 This is not inconsistent with the Tahl requirement that the record show express advisement and wa

1984(E.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [ 240 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ].) Our holding today may thus be seen as an extension of the concepts first developed in those cases." ( Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 133, fn. 7 .) (9) We conclude that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights. (6d) *923 This is not inconsistent with the Tahl requirement that the record show express advisement and wa

1984(E.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [ 240 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ].) Our holding today may thus be seen as an extension of the concepts first developed in those cases." ( Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 133, fn. 7 .) (9) We conclude that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights. (6d) *923 This is not inconsistent with the Tahl requirement that the record show express advisement and wa

1984(E.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [ 240 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ].) Our holding today may thus be seen as an extension of the concepts first developed in those cases." ( Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 133, fn. 7 .) (9) We conclude that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights. (6d) *923 This is not inconsistent with the Tahl requirement that the record show express advisement and wa

1984(E.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [ 240 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ].) Our holding today may thus be seen as an extension of the concepts first developed in those cases." ( Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 133, fn. 7 .) (9) We conclude that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights. (6d) *923 This is not inconsistent with the Tahl requirement that the record show express advisement and wa

1984(E.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [ 240 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ].) Our holding today may thus be seen as an extension of the concepts first developed in those cases." ( Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 133, fn. 7 .) (9) We conclude that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights. (6d) *923 This is not inconsistent with the Tahl requirement that the record show express advisement and wa

1984(E.g., In re Johnson (1965) 62 Cal.2d 325 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 , 398 P.2d 420 ]; In re James (1952) 38 Cal.2d 302 [ 240 P.2d 596 ]; People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815 [ 178 P.2d 761 , 170 A.L.R. 246 ].) Our holding today may thus be seen as an extension of the concepts first developed in those cases." ( Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 133, fn. 7 .) (9) We conclude that a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction on any ground must allege actual denial of his constitutional rights. (6d) *923 This is not inconsistent with the Tahl requirement that the record show express advisement and wa

1975(In re Yurko, 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 516 ].) A defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction may do so only through a clear allegation that he was neither represented by counsel nor waived the right to be so represented.

1975(In re Yurko, 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 516 ].) A defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction may do so only through a clear allegation that he was neither represented by counsel nor waived the right to be so represented.