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11 California opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dickerson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998That fact, alone, is sufficient to preclude application of that statutory provision in this case: “The courts of this state, however, are not free to create new privileges as a matter of judicial policy and must apply only those which have been created by statute. [Citations.] [Likewise, the judicial creation of an exception to an existing statutory privilege] is similarly precluded . . . because *111 the area of privilege ‘is one of the few instances where the Evidence Code precludes the courts from elaborating upon the statutory scheme.’ [Citation.]” (Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 C 1998That fact, alone, is sufficient to preclude application of that statutory provision in this case: “The courts of this state, however, are not free to create new privileges as a matter of judicial policy and must apply only those which have been created by statute. [Citations.] [Likewise, the judicial creation of an exception to an existing statutory privilege] is similarly precluded . . . because *111 the area of privilege ‘is one of the few instances where the Evidence Code precludes the courts from elaborating upon the statutory scheme.’ [Citation.]” (Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982) 135 C | 1 | 2 |
McClearen v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011(See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [ 291 P.2d 449 ] [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant’s rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 283 P.2d 704 ] [“Although [former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the litigation as to the party seeking to interven 2011(See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [ 291 P.2d 449 ] [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant’s rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 283 P.2d 704 ] [“Although [former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the litigation as to the party seeking to interven | 1 | 1 |
Bowles v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011(See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [ 291 P.2d 449 ] [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant’s rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 283 P.2d 704 ] [“Although [former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the litigation as to the party seeking to interven 2011(See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [ 291 P.2d 449 ] [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant’s rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 283 P.2d 704 ] [“Although [former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the litigation as to the party seeking to interven | 1 | 1 |
Rocca v. Steinmetzgreen2 sentences2011(See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [ 291 P.2d 449 ] [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant’s rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 283 P.2d 704 ] [“Although [former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the litigation as to the party seeking to interven 2011(See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [ 291 P.2d 449 ] [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant’s rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 283 P.2d 704 ] [“Although [former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the litigation as to the party seeking to interven | 1 | 1 |
Dollenmayer v. Pryorgreen2 sentences2011(See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [ 291 P.2d 449 ] [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant’s rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 283 P.2d 704 ] [“Although [former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the litigation as to the party seeking to interven 2011(See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [ 291 P.2d 449 ] [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant’s rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [ 283 P.2d 704 ] [“Although [former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the litigation as to the party seeking to interven | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jeffersongreen2 sentences2008(Cf. People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893 , 980 P.2d 441 ] [recognizing “ ‘ “the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part” ’ ” as a valid indicator of legislative intent].) These provisions (discussed below) demonstrate a legislative awareness that the Secretary might condition voting system use on procedural requirements (including tallying requirements) that were more exacting than those already imposed by statute, and evidence a legislative intent to authorize such enhanced requirements. 2008(Cf. People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893 , 980 P.2d 441 ] [recognizing “ ‘ “the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part” ’ ” as a valid indicator of legislative intent].) These provisions (discussed below) demonstrate a legislative awareness that the Secretary might condition voting system use on procedural requirements (including tallying requirements) that were more exacting than those already imposed by statute, and evidence a legislative intent to authorize such enhanced requirements. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martingreen2 sentences1994The "dignitary interest" in informing a criminal defendant of the reasons for his sentence should be obvious. "`The very essence of arbitrariness is to have one's status redefined by the state without an adequate explanation of its reasons for doing so.... [T]he respect for individual autonomy that is at the foundation of procedural due process imposes a distinct obligation upon the government to explain fully its adverse status decision.' [Citation]." ( People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 276 .) Finally, no governmental interest is served by permitting a trial judge to dispense with the 1994The "dignitary interest" in informing a criminal defendant of the reasons for his sentence should be obvious. "`The very essence of arbitrariness is to have one's status redefined by the state without an adequate explanation of its reasons for doing so.... [T]he respect for individual autonomy that is at the foundation of procedural due process imposes a distinct obligation upon the government to explain fully its adverse status decision.' [Citation]." ( People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 276 .) Finally, no governmental interest is served by permitting a trial judge to dispense with the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ditsongreen2 sentences1987(People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 439 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 369 P.2d 714 ].) “[T]hat sense of fair play and decency [requiring exclusion of involuntary confessions] is no less offended when a defendant is convicted by real evidence which the police have discovered essentially by virtue of having extorted such a confession. 1987(People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 439 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 369 P.2d 714 ].) “[T]hat sense of fair play and decency [requiring exclusion of involuntary confessions] is no less offended when a defendant is convicted by real evidence which the police have discovered essentially by virtue of having extorted such a confession. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Atchleygreen2 sentences1987As an existing statutory rule of evidence, the exclusionary right survives the passage of section 28(d). 2 *718 In People v. Berve (1958) 51 Cal.2d 286 [ 332 P.2d 97 ], the court stated, “The use of confessions in a criminal prosecution obtained by force, fear, promise of immunity or reward constitutes a denial of due process of law both under the federal and state Constitutions requiring a reversal of the conviction although other evidence may be consistent with guilt. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 290.) This is so because “it oifends ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency’ to convict a 1987As an existing statutory rule of evidence, the exclusionary right survives the passage of section 28(d). 2 *718 In People v. Berve (1958) 51 Cal.2d 286 [ 332 P.2d 97 ], the court stated, “The use of confessions in a criminal prosecution obtained by force, fear, promise of immunity or reward constitutes a denial of due process of law both under the federal and state Constitutions requiring a reversal of the conviction although other evidence may be consistent with guilt. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 290.) This is so because “it oifends ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency’ to convict a | 1 | 1 |
Ramirez v. Browngreen1 sentence1986(Ramirez v. Brown, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 204.) Precisely the opposite is true in the present case: section 28(b) appears to establish for crime victims an unqualified right to direct restitution from convicted persons, at a time when the existing statutory framework provided for restitution from a fund, based on victims’ need, 15 with dollar limitations and dependent on defendants’ ability to pay. | 1 | 1 |
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1982Code, § 911; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 542 P.2d 977 ].) Of course, real parties are not urging the adoption of a new privilege; they urge instead that an existing statutory privilege be limited by the creation of an exception to it. 1982Code, § 911; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 553 , 542 P.2d 977 ].) Of course, real parties are not urging the adoption of a new privilege; they urge instead that an existing statutory privilege be limited by the creation of an exception to it. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Verdugo v. Target Corp.
green
2 sentences2018The Verdugo court made clear that in determining whether a defendant has a common law duty to take some particular action with respect to AEDs, a court should carefully analyze the existing statutory framework to assess the relevant policy considerations that impact such a determination. ( Verdugo , supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 334-335, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 662 , 327 P.3d 774 ["Although ... we conclude that the current California statutes do not preclude courts from determining whether a common law duty to acquire and make available an AED (either in general or in particular circumstances) should be r 2018The Verdugo court made clear that in determining whether a defendant has a common law duty to take some particular action with respect to AEDs, a court should carefully analyze the existing statutory framework to assess the relevant policy considerations that impact such a determination. ( Verdugo , supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 334-335, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 662 , 327 P.3d 774 ["Although ... we conclude that the current California statutes do not preclude courts from determining whether a common law duty to acquire and make available an AED (either in general or in particular circumstances) should be r | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co.
green
2 sentences2011Co. (1974) 39 Ohio St.2d 119 [ 314 N.E.2d 386, 388-389 ]; Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. (1975) 465 Pa. 225 [ 348 A.2d 734, 736 ].) *759 Thus understood as requiring an order that (1) amounts to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered, the death knell doctrine fits comfortably within the existing statutory framework. 5 In Daar itself, we described the class certification denial order as “in legal effect a fina 2011Co. (1974) 39 Ohio St.2d 119 [ 314 N.E.2d 386, 388-389 ]; Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. (1975) 465 Pa. 225 [ 348 A.2d 734, 736 ].) *759 Thus understood as requiring an order that (1) amounts to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered, the death knell doctrine fits comfortably within the existing statutory framework. 5 In Daar itself, we described the class certification denial order as “in legal effect a fina | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
1 sentence2011Co. (1974) 39 Ohio St.2d 119 [ 314 N.E.2d 386, 388-389 ]; Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. (1975) 465 Pa. 225 [ 348 A.2d 734, 736 ].) *759 Thus understood as requiring an order that (1) amounts to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered, the death knell doctrine fits comfortably within the existing statutory framework. 5 In Daar itself, we described the class certification denial order as “in legal effect a fina | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
green
2 sentences2011Co. (1974) 39 Ohio St.2d 119 [ 314 N.E.2d 386, 388-389 ]; Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. (1975) 465 Pa. 225 [ 348 A.2d 734, 736 ].) *759 Thus understood as requiring an order that (1) amounts to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered, the death knell doctrine fits comfortably within the existing statutory framework. 5 In Daar itself, we described the class certification denial order as “in legal effect a fina 2011Co. (1974) 39 Ohio St.2d 119 [ 314 N.E.2d 386, 388-389 ]; Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. (1975) 465 Pa. 225 [ 348 A.2d 734, 736 ].) *759 Thus understood as requiring an order that (1) amounts to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered, the death knell doctrine fits comfortably within the existing statutory framework. 5 In Daar itself, we described the class certification denial order as “in legal effect a fina | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences1998(Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 823 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 .) After due consideration, it ultimately determined that none of the possible difficulties and uncertainties counseled against adopting comparative negligence. ( Id. at pp. 823-829, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 .) In sum, although the court acted in its common law capacity to modify substantially a legal doctrine, it did so consistent with the existing statutory framework and harmonized the change to ensure judicious development of relevant principles. 1998(Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 823 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 .) After due consideration, it ultimately determined that none of the possible difficulties and uncertainties counseled against adopting comparative negligence. ( Id. at pp. 823-829, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 .) In sum, although the court acted in its common law capacity to modify substantially a legal doctrine, it did so consistent with the existing statutory framework and harmonized the change to ensure judicious development of relevant principles. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences1994The “dignitary interest” in informing a criminal defendant of the reasons for his sentence should be obvious. “ ‘The very essence of arbitrariness is to have one’s status redefined by the state without an adequate explanation of its reasons for doing so. . . . [T]he respect for individual autonomy that is at the foundation of procedural due process imposes a distinct obligation upon the government to explain fully its adverse status decision.’ [Citation].” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 276 .) Finally, no governmental interest is served by permitting a trial judge to dispense with 1994The "dignitary interest" in informing a criminal defendant of the reasons for his sentence should be obvious. "`The very essence of arbitrariness is to have one's status redefined by the state without an adequate explanation of its reasons for doing so.... [T]he respect for individual autonomy that is at the foundation of procedural due process imposes a distinct obligation upon the government to explain fully its adverse status decision.' [Citation]." ( People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 276 .) Finally, no governmental interest is served by permitting a trial judge to dispense with the | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Berve
green
1 sentence1987As an existing statutory rule of evidence, the exclusionary right survives the passage of section 28(d). 2 *718 In People v. Berve (1958) 51 Cal.2d 286 [ 332 P.2d 97 ], the court stated, “The use of confessions in a criminal prosecution obtained by force, fear, promise of immunity or reward constitutes a denial of due process of law both under the federal and state Constitutions requiring a reversal of the conviction although other evidence may be consistent with guilt. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 290.) This is so because “it oifends ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency’ to convict a | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Berve
green
1 sentence1987As an existing statutory rule of evidence, the exclusionary right survives the passage of section 28(d). 2 *718 In People v. Berve (1958) 51 Cal.2d 286 [ 332 P.2d 97 ], the court stated, “The use of confessions in a criminal prosecution obtained by force, fear, promise of immunity or reward constitutes a denial of due process of law both under the federal and state Constitutions requiring a reversal of the conviction although other evidence may be consistent with guilt. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 290.) This is so because “it oifends ‘the community’s sense of fair play and decency’ to convict a | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.