Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Horvathgreen2 sentences2016(Harding v. Galceran (9th Cir. 1989) 889 F.2d 906, 908 ; cf. Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842 [the federal supremacy clause precludes the application of California claim presentation requirements to bar federal actions (i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions)].) Likewise, the substantiality doctrine does not apply to bar the application of the doctrine of res judicata in the circumstances of this case. 2016(Harding v. Galceran (9th Cir. 1989) 889 F.2d 906, 908 ; cf. Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842 [the federal supremacy clause precludes the application of California claim presentation requirements to bar federal actions (i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions)].) Likewise, the substantiality doctrine does not apply to bar the application of the doctrine of res judicata in the circumstances of this case. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Williamsgreen2 sentences2015(See In re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 611 ] [unlike alimony, property settlement payments are dischargeable in bankruptcy]; In re Marriage of Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 1220-1224 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 909 ] [same; ex-husband cannot offset ex-wife’s discharged obligation against his own payment obligation]; In re Marriage of Cohen (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 836, 838-839 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 672 ]; Cohen, at p. 843 [requiring ex-husband to pay discharged community debts “would be contrary to the federal supremacy clause”].) 8 “Despite the *995 obvious inequi 2015(See In re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 611 ] [unlike alimony, property settlement payments are dischargeable in bankruptcy]; In re Marriage of Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 1220-1224 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 909 ] [same; ex-husband cannot offset ex-wife’s discharged obligation against his own payment obligation]; In re Marriage of Cohen (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 836, 838-839 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 672 ]; Cohen, at p. 843 [requiring ex-husband to pay discharged community debts “would be contrary to the federal supremacy clause”].) 8 “Despite the *995 obvious inequi | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Lynngreen2 sentences2015(See In re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 611 ] [unlike alimony, property settlement payments are dischargeable in bankruptcy]; In re Marriage of Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 1220-1224 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 909 ] [same; ex-husband cannot offset ex-wife’s discharged obligation against his own payment obligation]; In re Marriage of Cohen (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 836, 838-839 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 672 ]; Cohen, at p. 843 [requiring ex-husband to pay discharged community debts “would be contrary to the federal supremacy clause”].) 8 “Despite the *995 obvious inequi 2015(See In re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 611 ] [unlike alimony, property settlement payments are dischargeable in bankruptcy]; In re Marriage of Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 1220-1224 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 909 ] [same; ex-husband cannot offset ex-wife’s discharged obligation against his own payment obligation]; In re Marriage of Cohen (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 836, 838-839 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 672 ]; Cohen, at p. 843 [requiring ex-husband to pay discharged community debts “would be contrary to the federal supremacy clause”].) 8 “Despite the *995 obvious inequi | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Cohengreen2 sentences2015(See In re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 611 ] [unlike alimony, property settlement payments are dischargeable in bankruptcy]; In re Marriage of Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 1220-1224 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 909 ] [same; ex-husband cannot offset ex-wife’s discharged obligation against his own payment obligation]; In re Marriage of Cohen (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 836, 838-839 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 672 ]; Cohen, at p. 843 [requiring ex-husband to pay discharged community debts “would be contrary to the federal supremacy clause”].) 8 “Despite the *995 obvious inequi 2015(See In re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120, 125-126 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 611 ] [unlike alimony, property settlement payments are dischargeable in bankruptcy]; In re Marriage of Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 1220-1224 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 909 ] [same; ex-husband cannot offset ex-wife’s discharged obligation against his own payment obligation]; In re Marriage of Cohen (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 836, 838-839 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 672 ]; Cohen, at p. 843 [requiring ex-husband to pay discharged community debts “would be contrary to the federal supremacy clause”].) 8 “Despite the *995 obvious inequi | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Department of Mental Healthgreen2 sentences2002(In re Anthony P. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1116 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 ]; Black v. Department of Mental Health (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 739, 749 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ].) Under the former federal-state AFDC regime, states could not impose eligibility requirements beyond those specified in the federal AFDC statutes because to do so would violate the federal supremacy clause. 2002(In re Anthony P. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1116 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 ]; Black v. Department of Mental Health (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 739, 749 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ].) Under the former federal-state AFDC regime, states could not impose eligibility requirements beyond those specified in the federal AFDC statutes because to do so would violate the federal supremacy clause. | 1 | 1 |
Catherine P. v. Ngoc P.green2 sentences2002(In re Anthony P. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1116 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 ]; Black v. Department of Mental Health (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 739, 749 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ].) Under the former federal-state AFDC regime, states could not impose eligibility requirements beyond those specified in the federal AFDC statutes because to do so would violate the federal supremacy clause. 2002(In re Anthony P. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1116 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 ]; Black v. Department of Mental Health (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 739, 749 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ].) Under the former federal-state AFDC regime, states could not impose eligibility requirements beyond those specified in the federal AFDC statutes because to do so would violate the federal supremacy clause. | 1 | 1 |
Frink v. Prodgreen2 sentences1985Although as a general rule this is correct, where, as in the case at bar, “a question of law only is presented on the facts appearing in the record the change in theory may be permitted.” (Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]; accord Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 170 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 893 , 643 P.2d 476 ].) 5 The respondents contend that the court reached the merits of their claims when it issued its stay order. 1985Although as a general rule this is correct, where, as in the case at bar, “a question of law only is presented on the facts appearing in the record the change in theory may be permitted.” (Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]; accord Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 170 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 893 , 643 P.2d 476 ].) 5 The respondents contend that the court reached the merits of their claims when it issued its stay order. | 1 | 1 |
Panopulos v. Maderisgreen2 sentences1985Although as a general rule this is correct, where, as in the case at bar, “a question of law only is presented on the facts appearing in the record the change in theory may be permitted.” (Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]; accord Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 170 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 893 , 643 P.2d 476 ].) 5 The respondents contend that the court reached the merits of their claims when it issued its stay order. 1985Although as a general rule this is correct, where, as in the case at bar, “a question of law only is presented on the facts appearing in the record the change in theory may be permitted.” (Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [ 303 P.2d 738 ]; accord Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 170 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 893 , 643 P.2d 476 ].) 5 The respondents contend that the court reached the merits of their claims when it issued its stay order. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Metzgergreen2 sentences1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate 1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate | 1 | 1 |
Masaoka v. Peoplegreen1 sentence1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate | 1 | 1 |
People v. O'ROYgreen2 sentences1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate 1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brisendinegreen2 sentences1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate 1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo
green
2 sentences1980The husband also cited Cose v. Cose (Alaska 1979) 592 P.2d 1230 , in which the Alaska Supreme Court held that the federal supremacy clause prohibits application of state property settlement concepts on divorce to military retirement pay on grounds of congressional intent, and Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (1971) 439 U.S. 572 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 1 , 99 S.Ct. 802 ]. 1980The husband also cited Cose v. Cose (Alaska 1979) 592 P.2d 1230 , in which the Alaska Supreme Court held that the federal supremacy clause prohibits application of state property settlement concepts on divorce to military retirement pay on grounds of congressional intent, and Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (1971) 439 U.S. 572 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 1 , 99 S.Ct. 802 ]. | 2 | 1980–2016 |
Edward Joseph Harding v. David Galceran Terry Gingerich Lawrence Moser James D. Chisim
green
2 sentences2016(Harding v. Galceran (9th Cir. 1989) 889 F.2d 906, 908 ; cf. Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842 [the federal supremacy clause precludes the application of California claim presentation requirements to bar federal actions (i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions)].) Likewise, the substantiality doctrine does not apply to bar the application of the doctrine of res judicata in the circumstances of this case. 2016(Harding v. Galceran (9th Cir. 1989) 889 F.2d 906, 908 ; cf. Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842 [the federal supremacy clause precludes the application of California claim presentation requirements to bar federal actions (i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions)].) Likewise, the substantiality doctrine does not apply to bar the application of the doctrine of res judicata in the circumstances of this case. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Arizona v. United States
green
2 sentences2014The conclusion follows inescapably, under the federal supremacy clause, that California cannot authorize such an award, for it would “ „stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . .‟ [citations].” (Arizona v. United States (2012) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [ 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2501 ].) The instant majority struggles mightily to avoid this result. 2014The conclusion follows inescapably, under the federal supremacy clause, that California cannot authorize such an award, for it would “ ‘stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . [citations].” (Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S._,___ [ 183 L.Ed.2d 351 , 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2501 ].) The instant majority struggles mightily to avoid this result. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ex Parte Young
green
2 sentences2004To begin with, the principal cases upon which the city relies — Ex Parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 and LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, supra, 205 F.3d 1146 — are readily distinguishable from the present case. 2004To begin with, the principal cases upon which the city relies — Ex Parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 and LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, supra, 205 F.3d 1146 — are readily distinguishable from the present case. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Lso, Ltd. v. Jay Stroh
green
2 sentences2004To begin with, the principal cases upon which the city relies — Ex Parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 and LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, supra, 205 F.3d 1146 — are readily distinguishable from the present case. 2004To begin with, the principal cases upon which the city relies — Ex Parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 and LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, supra, 205 F.3d 1146 — are readily distinguishable from the present case. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
In Re Marriage of Stenquist
green
2 sentences1984Apparently Cullen retired under chapter 61 of title 10. 10 “The California Supreme Court in [Stenquist I] determined that to permit a spouse, by unilateral election to receive a military disability pension instead of a retirement pension, would allow the spouse to transmute community property into separate property and thereby negate the protective philosophy of the community property law of California.” (In re Marriage of Stenquist (Stenquist II), supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 430, 432 .) “Pending some positive treatment by Congress indicating the inapplicability of this Stenquist rule on the Stenqui 1984Apparently Stenquist’s retirement was under chapter 61 of title 10. 11 Even though the instant case may be distinguished from In re Marriage of Cullen, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 414 and In re Marriage of Stenquist (Stenquist II), supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 430 , which involved disability payments under chapter 61 of title 10 (see ante, fn. 8), we question the reasoning of those decisions. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Fahey v. Gledhill
green
2 sentences1984For an extensive analysis of the relationship between state workers’ compensation laws and LHWCA, see 4 Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation (1984) sections 89-89.74, page 16-165 and following. 3 Fahey v. Gledhill (1983) 33 Cal.3d 884 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 639 , 663 P.2d 197 ], relied upon by Colberg, is not to the contrary. 1984For an extensive analysis of the relationship between state workers’ compensation laws and LHWCA, see 4 Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation (1984) sections 89-89.74, page 16-165 and following. 3 Fahey v. Gledhill (1983) 33 Cal.3d 884 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 639 , 663 P.2d 197 ], relied upon by Colberg, is not to the contrary. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
United States v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate 1982(See United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 427 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 531 P.2d 1099 ]; People v. O’Roy (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 656, 662 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 717 ]; People v. Metzger (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 338, 342 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 264 ]; Masaoka v. People (1952) 39 Cal.2d 883, 885 [ 245 F.2d 1062 ].) Under Payton and Steagald the search of Codinha’s house without a warrant, without consent, without exigent circumstances was proscribed, To the extent that People v. Block, supra, is inconsistent with the principles enunciate | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Cose v. Cose
green
1 sentence1980The husband also cited Cose v. Cose (Alaska 1979) 592 P.2d 1230 , in which the Alaska Supreme Court held that the federal supremacy clause prohibits application of state property settlement concepts on divorce to military retirement pay on grounds of congressional intent, and Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (1971) 439 U.S. 572 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 1 , 99 S.Ct. 802 ]. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.