logical sequence inquiry in California

1989This logical sequence of inquiry was overlooked in dicta in at least three Court of Appeal cases [four counting Gonzales]: Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 6 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 ]; Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 588 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 ]; McCarthy v. Frost (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 872 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 470 ].

1989This logical sequence of inquiry was overlooked in dicta in at least three Court of Appeal cases [four counting Gonzales]: Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 6 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 ]; Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 588 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 ]; McCarthy v. Frost (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 872 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 470 ].

1989This logical sequence of inquiry was overlooked in dicta in at least three Court of Appeal cases [four counting Gonzales]: Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 6 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 ]; Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 588 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 ]; McCarthy v. Frost (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 872 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 470 ].

1989This logical sequence of inquiry was overlooked in dicta in at least three Court of Appeal cases [four counting Gonzales]: Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 6 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 ]; Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 588 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 ]; McCarthy v. Frost (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 872 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 470 ].

1989This logical sequence of inquiry was overlooked in dicta in at least three Court of Appeal cases [four counting Gonzales]: Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 6 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 ]; Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 588 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 ]; McCarthy v. Frost (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 872 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 470 ].

1989This logical sequence of inquiry was overlooked in dicta in at least three Court of Appeal cases [four counting Gonzales]: Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 6 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 ]; Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrance (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 588 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 ]; McCarthy v. Frost (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 872 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 470 ].

2002(See, e.g., Stout v. City of Porterville (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 937, 948 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 301 ]; Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1091-1092, fn. 11 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 725 ].) Consequently, “[i]n sorting out the issues presented, we must follow a logical sequence of inquiry, keeping in mind that conceptually, questions of statutory immunity do not become relevant until it has been determined that the government entity owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and would be liable in the absence of such immunity. . . .” (Walt Rankin & Associates, Inc. v. City of Murrieta (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 605

2002(See, e.g., Stout v. City of Porterville (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 937, 948 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 301 ]; Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1091-1092, fn. 11 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 725 ].) Consequently, “[i]n sorting out the issues presented, we must follow a logical sequence of inquiry, keeping in mind that conceptually, questions of statutory immunity do not become relevant until it has been determined that the government entity owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and would be liable in the absence of such immunity. . . .” (Walt Rankin & Associates, Inc. v. City of Murrieta (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 605

2000The City responds that no such mandatory duty exists and makes reference to the immunity provision contained in Government Code section 815, subdivision (b). [4] In sorting out the issues presented, we must follow a logical sequence of inquiry, keeping in mind that conceptually, questions of statutory immunity do not become relevant until it has been determined that the government entity owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and would be liable in the absence of such immunity. ( Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 .) Accordingly, alth

2000The City responds that no such mandatory duty exists and makes reference to the immunity provision contained in Government Code section 815, subdivision (b). [4] In sorting out the issues presented, we must follow a logical sequence of inquiry, keeping in mind that conceptually, questions of statutory immunity do not become relevant until it has been determined that the government entity owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and would be liable in the absence of such immunity. ( Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 .) Accordingly, alth

2000(Gov.Code, *899 § 815, subd. (a); [citation].)' [Citation.] Thus, in California, `all government tort liability must be based on statute [citation].' [Citation.] `"In the absence of a constitutional requirement, public entities may be held liable only if a statute ... is found declaring them to be liable."' [Citation.]" ( Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 , 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 811 , 968 P.2d 522 , fn. omitted.) One such statute is Government Code section 815.6.

2000(Gov.Code, *899 § 815, subd. (a); [citation].)' [Citation.] Thus, in California, `all government tort liability must be based on statute [citation].' [Citation.] `"In the absence of a constitutional requirement, public entities may be held liable only if a statute ... is found declaring them to be liable."' [Citation.]" ( Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 , 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 811 , 968 P.2d 522 , fn. omitted.) One such statute is Government Code section 815.6.

1998At the threshold, it must be established that the public entity owed an affirmative duty of care under the circumstances and that there was a statutory basis for liability. "`[I]n California, all government tort liability must be based on statute.'" ( Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 716 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 , italics in Rodriguez; Gov.Code, § 815 ["Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity...."].) Only if these points are answered in

1998At the threshold, it must be established that the public entity owed an affirmative duty of care under the circumstances and that there was a statutory basis for liability. "`[I]n California, all government tort liability must be based on statute.'" ( Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 716 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 , italics in Rodriguez; Gov.Code, § 815 ["Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity...."].) Only if these points are answered in

1945(In re Jones, 202 La. 729 [ 12 So.2d 795 ] ; In re Meraux, 202 La. 736 [ 12 So.2d 798 ].) However, it has been determined otherwise in this state (See In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]).

1945(In re Jones, 202 La. 729 [ 12 So.2d 795 ] ; In re Meraux, 202 La. 736 [ 12 So.2d 798 ].) However, it has been determined otherwise in this state (See In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]).

1945(In re Jones, 202 La. 729 [ 12 So.2d 795 ] ; In re Meraux, 202 La. 736 [ 12 So.2d 798 ].) However, it has been determined otherwise in this state (See In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]).

1945(In re Jones, 202 La. 729 [ 12 So.2d 795 ] ; In re Meraux, 202 La. 736 [ 12 So.2d 798 ].) However, it has been determined otherwise in this state (See In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]).

1945(In re Jones, 202 La. 729 [ 12 So.2d 795 ] ; In re Meraux, 202 La. 736 [ 12 So.2d 798 ].) However, it has been determined otherwise in this state (See In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]).

1945(In re Jones, 202 La. 729 [ 12 So.2d 795 ] ; In re Meraux, 202 La. 736 [ 12 So.2d 798 ].) However, it has been determined otherwise in this state (See In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]).

1924It is indeed doubtful, whether it was incumbent upon the State to do more than prove that there was an artificial being assuming and acting under a name indicating and implying a corporation. ’ ’ In People v. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 645 , it is said: “The next question is one of greater importance and of much more difficulty: The indictment charges the defendant with feloniously having in possession certain blank and unfinished bills in the form and similitude of a bill for the payment of money, to be issued by an incorporated bank, viz.: The Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, a foreign *1

1924This doctrine is the logical sequence of the doctrine declared in Smith v. The State, 28 Ind. 321 .

1868In Stewart v. Hutchins, 13 Wend. 485 , that provision was under consideration, and it was held that its object was to cut off one of the three remedies theretofore enjoyed by the mortgagee; but it was not regarded as changing the character of the mortgage.